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JA E P L
The Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning (AEPL), an official
assembly of the National Council of Teachers of English, i s open to all those
interested in extending the frontiers of teaching and learning beyond traditional
disciplines and methodologies.
The purposes of AEPL, therefore, are to provide a common ground for
theorists, researchers, and practitioners to explore ideas on the subj ect; to
participate in programs and projects on it; to integrate these efforts with others
in related disciplines ; to keep abreast of activities along these lines of inquiry;
and to promote scholarship and publication of these activities.
The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning,
JAEPL, meets this need. It provides a forum to encourage research, theory, and
classroom practices involving expanded concepts of language. It contributes to a
sense of community in which scholars and educators from pre-school through the
university exchange points of view and cutting-edge approaches to teaching and
learn i n g . JAEPL i s e s p e c i a l l y interested in helping those teachers who
experiment with new strategies for learning to share their practices and confirm
their validity through publication in professional journals.
Topics of interest include but are not limited to: intuition, inspiration,
insight, imagery, meditation, s ilence, archetypes, emotion, attitudes, values,
spirituality, motivation, body wisdom and felt sense, and healing. Articles may
be practical, research-oriented, theoretical, bibliographic, professional, and/or
exploratory/personal . Each issue has a theme. The theme of the 1 996- 1 997 i ssue
is Writing, Thinking, and Teaching in the Borderland.

Membership in the AEPL is $ 1 2. Contact Nat Teich, Department of English,
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, 97403 - 1 286 for membership informa
tion. Membership includes that year ' s i ssue of the JAEPL.
Send submissions, address changes, and single copy requests to Mary P.
Deming, A s s i stant to the Editor, JAEPL, Department of Learning S upport
Programs, Georgia State University, 720 One Park Place, Atlanta, GA 303033083 , (404) 65 1 -3360; Fax : (404) 65 1 -4377.
Address Letters to the Editor and all other editorial correspondence to Alice
G. Brand, Editor, JAEPL, 2 1 7 Brittany Lane, Pittsford, NY 1 4534. Phone: (7 1 6)

248-9638. Fax: (7 1 6) 395-239 1 . E-mail: abrand@acspr l . acs.brockport.edu
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The Editor's Message

T to believe-particularly when it is published only once a year and by a
he prospect of bringing off a new j ournal is character building, I have come

fledging organization. The Journal of the Assembly for Expanded Perspectives
on Learning (JAEPL) had to be good, very good, especially the inaugural issue.
That this was the first i ssue also meant, I hoped, that readers would tolerate
mistakes. Surely, mistakes could be corrected with the next i s sue. But on second
thought, that was a long year away.
Nonetheles s , I celebrate the occasion of the inaugural i s sue of JAEPL.
The logo is derived from the Egyptian hieroglyph, akhet. The sign represents
the horizon from which the sun emerges and behind which the sun disappears
daily. The logo depicts mountain peaks with the sun appearing between them
on the h o r i z o n . The d e s i g n w a s c h o s e n b e c a u s e the image grap h i c a l l y
embodies both the quieting and broadening vision of language that this j ournal
indeed speaks to.
The theme of this first issue i s Contemporary Composition Studies: Steps
Beyond. What it does not mean i s abandoning the solid armature of knowledge
and skills. What it does mean i s that we reflect our history but we question it. We
resist its safety. Let me rephrase that. It means that we hold tradition up for
scrutiny at the same time that we push boundaries back, follow intuitions, test
and record them. What this also means i s that JAEPL i s different from other
publications in the field. Unlike establishment j ournals, an occasional expres
sive essay, for example, will not merely seep into JAEPL, valorized by a special
few who, only after playing by the rules, are allowed to break them. The forms of
the articles, as readers will see, are not only empirical, theoretical, and practical,
but also exploratory/personal and imaginative. This journal i s for all thinking
feeling instructors who learn and teach, so to speak, to the beat of a different
drummer.
JAEPL serves as an alternati ve forum for teachers and writers with
establishment profe s si onal affi liations but whose profe s s ional beliefs may
s traddle s e v eral perspecti v e s . For t h i s i s s u e arti c l e s are c ontributed by
professionals using unorthodox methods in mainstream language teaching-play,
drama, kinesthetics . Readers will also hear the voice of educators working in
related fields or those who feel marginalized because they serve marginal popu
lations: the disabled, the neurologically impaired, the underrepresented; and do
so in alternative locations (By this, I mean not only physical settings but also
bodily locations. ) . Individuals who do not know which professional forum to trust
will find the door open here. But if I were asked to characterize the authors of
those articles, more than anything else, I would say that they believe in things
they cannot see.
A few stati stics about the inaugural i s sue of JAEPL: Inquiries about
submitting articles numbered 3 3 . Actual submis s i ons numbered 29. Of the
contributions r e c e i v e d , readers requested o n l y minor revi s i o n o n three
manuscripts . Five manuscripts were returned with recommendations for maj or
revision. Eight manuscripts were rej ected, five by both readers and three by me
JAEPL, Vol.l, Winter 1995-1996, v-viii
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because their subjects and the j ournal were clearly a mismatch. Seven came back
with recommendations that were split between major and minor revision. And six
submis sions were returned with a split between maj or revision and rej ection.
Twelve pieces are published in this i s sue, producing an acceptance rate of 4 1 %.
The inconsistencies i n ratings were not surprising, given our amoebic-like
subspeciality. Pairing manuscripts and readers was not easy. A few manuscripts
were returned when reviewers said they recognized the author. Resending those
submissions added three to four weeks to the review process. Readers willing to
speak with potential contributors also lengthened reviewing time but usually made
for stronger pieces .
With personal experience submitting and publishing scholarly articles, I
devised the JAEPL manuscript review to work like thi s : A manuscript arrives and
is logged i n . Two readers are identified and the submission is sent out with
Reader ' s Guidelines and a Reader ' s Form. Reviewers have about three weeks to
read the manuscript and return their comments and the manuscript. If they feel
unqualifi e d to e valuate a particular submission or believe anonymity has
somehow been compromised, they return the article unreviewed.
Just as authors, readers need to be accountable for their comments. I ask
reviewers to sign their name at the bottom of the Reader ' s Form and to indicate if
it may be made known to the author. When permis sion i s granted, the ensuing
dialogue, written or oral, often turns into an opportunity for sub stantial
c l arification. As does collaborative learning, the peer review proc e s s has
obvious virtues. Potential contributors reported that they were generally enriched
by pre-publication conversations.
After reviewers ' comments are returned, I read the articles carefully,
leaning heavily on reviewers' j udgments. I send reviewers' comments to the
author with a letter of my own and any emendations written on the manuscript.
When major revisions are requested, I often send the revised manuscript to the
original readers, though in the end, it i s I who makes the final decision. The
procedure generally takes between two and three months.
The first time readers are sent contributions, I send along guidelines, asking
readers to:

1 . Observe some version of the golden rule. Respond as if you were
writing to a friend whom you want to keep as a friend. Use a natural
and respectful tone.
2. Feel free to point out significant, related publications that the author
may have overlooked.
3. In a rejection give earnest, concrete, supportive advice. It might even
be helpful to suggest another outlet for the piece.
4 . If an otherwise acceptable article exceeds the page limit, mark parts for
deletion. However, emphasize what should be saved in a manuscript,
not only what should be changed or edited out.
When a contribution has been accepted, I start copy editing. If I don ' t
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already have the submission on disk, I ask for one plus a short abstract and
biography. At this point I usually call the contributor to set up a time when we
can go over the piece. I try to do the line editing by phone, even though it may
take an hour or two. After considerable experience with this method, I find it
exquisitely effective. We all know how illuminating it i s to get our words into
our muscles, into our vocal chords, as we try to be clear for someone who i s truly
trying to understand. It is the dialogue of negotiating meaning, j ockeying for
clarity and understanding.
Most reader responses were gentle and specific, generous and sympathetic.
A few reviews produced several cursory comments but only one yielded a harsh,
off-putting reaction. Unlike in the review processes of establishment j ournals, I
did not come across any bad mouthing because a contribution infringed on a
reader's own research program. On the contrary, reviewers seemed only too happy
to see work out there, getting read, getting published.
There was no right kind of essay. Essays were downgraded or rej ected if
they were conceptually shallow or chaotic, or inaccurate and out-dated. Readers
in general wanted nothing heavy or pretentious. They resented j argon. Corn-ball
sentimentality, syrupy or purple prose also j arred them. Readers took a dim view
of stylistic awkwardness or redundancy, or an egregious number of typos and
spelling errors.
Accepted were generally pieces that added something substantial to our
body of knowledge or provided insight into the complexity of that knowledge.
Or the contribution posed a new i ssue, bringing it to bear on some question in
language teaching or learning. As other editors have stated, contributions should
be enlightened and fresh. Authors should have a sense of what is happening
in the disciplinary debate. They should try to engage practicing professionals
at the same time that they say something important to them. Critical rigor,
imaginative speculation, and a graceful, felicitous writing style also worked in
authors' favor.
Why did I choose APA style over MLA? An interesting question. The virtues
of the MLA style are that it is m o s t famil i ar to the greate s t number of
contributors and readers. It calls for a Works Cited list that conforms to standard
punctuation and capitalization conventions. For example, full first names in a
Works Cited list means more information, so that citations for, say, writing
specialists Charles Cooper and Marilyn Cooper could not possibly be confused.
In contrast, APA style requires a number of curious conventions. In the
References full first names are replaced by initials , which I find unnecessarily
telegraphic. Unlike the third edition of the APA Publication Manual, the first line
of each entry in the references is now indented while the lines following are
flush left. Because the entry names are now buried on the page, I find locating
citations visually more difficult. For books, only proper nouns and first words of
titles and subtitles are capitalized; the rest are lower case. But not titles of
j ournals . They are virtually the only document capitalized as in MLA style-the
logic of which escapes me. Titles of e s s ay s , book chapters, and articles in
periodicals are capitalized like book titles. But unlike MLA style, quotations marks
are virtually extinct on APA's Reference list.
However, the big ticket item for me was the in-text documentation. I like to
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know when things were done, said, written, or published. What stuck most in my
craw was the fact that the MLA style does not require dates in intratextual
citations. S o unless authors insert dates into their text, readers may be left
without chronological grounding. MLA adds abbreviated titles to authors' names
for intratextual c itations to di stinguish among several works by the s ame
author-which to my mind are irredeemably intrusive. This is precisely where
APA style carries the day. Although I think readers could do w ithout the
abbreviations, p. or pp. that precede page numbers, APA style calls for the publi
cation year as part of every intratextual citation.
For this volume I drew reviewers from within the ranks of AEPL because I
did not know enough about the professional pursuits or publishing record of our
larger special interest constituency. We continue to need book reviewers and
manuscript readers. Among the ways to participate in the JAEPL process are
to attend AEPL sessions at the annual meetings of the CCC or the NCTE,
participate in the AEPL summer retreats, write and publish, and become a self
studied specialist on some aspect of the domain beyond the cognitive. Drop a
letter to me or to Assistant to the Editor Mary Deming. Identify your areas of
interest and describe what professional experiences (presentations, publications,
workshops) you have had in these areas. Feel free to recommend individuals whose
interests intersect with ours but who may not be affiliated with the Assembly.
And of course, same time, next year. The theme of our next issue is Writing,
Teaching, and Thinking in the Borderland. By this I mean stories of personal and
professional discovery or renewal, administrative or community cooperation, and
theoretical epiphan i e s , so that advances in language education are being
realized in enabling and constructive ways.
We have already made some adjustments for the next volume. We have
increased the maximum number of pages to fifteen. We will start a Letters to the
Editor section provided we receive some. Although I read all material, determine
the reviewers and its ultimate publishability, submissions are now sent first to
Mary Deming for logging in and manuscript management.
S ub m i s s i o n s c on t i n u e to come i n . If they w e re t o o l ate for t h i s
inaugural i s sue, I a m holding them for consideration for the next issue. Potential
contributors should refer to page 1 1 0 for submission guidelines. The deadline i s
February 29, 1 996.
I hope with this journal that we are keeping some old friends and making
some new. Of the old friends , let me thank the SUNY at Brockport Educational
Opportunity Center for being my weigh station during my sabbatical year. B oth
Georgia State University and the English department at SUNY at Brockport helped
with every form of communication available to them: e-mai l , fax, postal service,
phone, and duplicating. What else is there? Gracious thanks to the Lifebridge
Foundation for funds for this inaugural i ssue of JAEPL. I also thank Martha Goff
Stoner, Mary Deming, and her staff member, graduate student David Olliff.
JAEPL promotes self-definition, emotional wisdom, and an openness to
experience. Please consi der this Editor ' s Message your i n vitation to j o i n
AEPL, t o write, t o listen, t o understand. cQ
Alice G. Brand
SUNY at Brockport

Writing Reality:
Constructivism, Metaphor, and Cosmology
Mary C. Daane

W the floor, walls, and ceiling of our existence" (Nouwen, 1 98 1 , p. 3 1 ) , from
hen l anguage i nstructors teach from the conviction that "words form

a recognition that language is both the foundation and reflection of students'
reality, value systems, experiences, and ways of being in the world, instructors
receive and evaluate their students ' di scourse as far more significant than
accumulations of discrete achievement skills . This constructivist (Ortony 1 979)
or experientialist (Lakoff & Johnson, 1 980) perspective sensitizes teachers to a
holistic view of their student s ' linguistic lives; often constructivist teachers
assign activities that encourage students to use "expressive" language, language
that i s "close to the self' and gives signals about [students] as well as signals
about [ s tudents ' ] topic [ s ] " ( B ri tton, 1 9 8 2 , pp. 96-9 7 ) . By doing this, the
"constructivist" teacher becomes privy to the recurrent themes and metaphors
by which students render their identities.
In recent years epi stemic theory in many disciplines has drifted from
taxonomy to "linguisticality" (Foucault, 1 973 ), resulting in a burgeoning of
publications on metaphor. Surprisingly, though, the trend has given rise to very little
discussion about the significance of metaphor in writing theory. In fact, Seitz's
"Composition's Misunderstanding of Metaphor" ( 1 99 1 ) notes a paradox in the field's
persistence in viewing metaphor as something to be isolated, controlled, even
expunged from student writing and discussions about writing, for the sake of clarity.
As Booth ( 1978) reminds us, "The quality of any culture is in large part the quality of
the metaphorists that it creates and sustains" (p. 72).
Metaphors help thinkers and writers forge new connections, relevancies,
realities and, at the same time, control the way they view the world. For this
reason the discussion of metaphor should no longer be closeted in the literature
class; a theoretical understanding of language, metaphor, and the reality they
embrace is as essential to contemporary composition pedagogy as it is has al
ways been to poetry and metaphysics. Those who take language seriously and
acknowledge its power to change lives and, consequently, the world, recognize
that composition classes must be more than laboratories to dissect syntax and
paragraph patterns; composition classes must become studios where students'
inchoate potentials can be trans formed by the magic of metaphor from the
unspeakable within to an articulate without.

Basic Philosophies of Language
S ince the time of Aristotle and throughout the history of Western thought,
Mary Daane is Assistant Professor of English and reading and Chairperson of the Division of
Developmental Studies at Waycross College, Waycross, Georgia.
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"obj ectivi sm" (Johnson, 1 987) has dominated philo sophical approaches to
language. Briefly, the objectivist understanding holds that language relates in a
one-to-one, precise manner to a reality that is disembodied or separate and out
side of human thought, i . e . , words have exact meanings that fit the properties of
the world we live in. Collaterally, the objectivists consider knowledge fixed and
accessible; for them, "the cat sat on the mat" means one and only one thing to all
competent speakers of English. Objectivity i s possible and necessary for reason;
absolute and knowable truth exists and may be derived by impersonal and
rational analys i s . Moreover, the vocabularies of philosophy and science are
accurate, and the formulations of these disciplines can correctly describe and
predict the universe.
In the twentieth century an alternate understanding of language evolved from
the work of such philosophers as Kant ( 1 781 1 1 965), Ricoeur ( 1 976), Vygotsky
( 1 962), and Whorf ( 1 956). This new approach i s aphorized in Wittgenstein's
( 1 95 3 ) often cited statement, "The limits of my language are the limits of my
world. " This new point of view led to the now widely-held conviction that the
l anguage we generate both creates and communicates a constructed reality,
shaping our value systems and our ways of being in the world. Indeed, accepting
the breach between the world and the word accounts for the postmodern view of
an indeterminate reality.
Those who hold this view of reality argue that truth is a product of our cultur
ally determined thought sy stem and our particular experiences within that
culture, not of some absolute or neutral set of pan-human concepts. Rorty ' s ( 1 990)
comment, "Truth i s simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying
their way" ( a s c ited in Klepp, 1 990, p. 1 1 8) , makes this very point. For
constructivists, objectivity i s not nullified but understood to remain possible
within the framework of cultural supports and limitations. From this stance, ra
tionality appears to rest on both logic and imagination. Therefore, a set of infor
mational propositions may yield many validly reasoned conclusions that will vary
individually depending on the experiences, imagination, and available linguistic
resources. Accordingly, any individual ' s understanding of "the cat sat on the mat"
is shaped by earlier personal encounters with, and cultural perspectives on, both
c at s and mat s . P h i l o s ophers who acknowledge the human propen s ity for
"seeing-as" (Wittgenstein, 1 9 5 3 , p. 1 93 ) are known as con structiv i s t s or
experienti al i s t s . They view language and imagination as endowments that
l i berate us from the constraints of absolute meaning and thereby elevate
linguistic expression beyond the skill category to a "phenomenon of freedom"
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 1 5 1 ) .

Constructivism and Metaphor
In order to derive a correspondence between metaphor and cosmology, I settle
on one point of view as to how metaphors operate or what they do. There are
generally three positions on this issue.
First, the substitution view considers metaphors "fuzzy and vague, inessen
tial frills, appropriate for the purposes of the politician and of the poet, but not
for those of the scientist, who is attempting to furnish an objective description of
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physical reality" (Ortony, 1 979, p. 2). This objectivist approach holds that "meta
phors are essentially linguistic ornaments for which their more prosaic equiva
lents can be readily substituted" (Ortony, 1 985 , p. 1 5 3). In that view, Yeats ' ( 1 927/
1 962) lines from "Sailing to Byzantium" : "An aged man i s but a paltry thing,/ A
tattered coat upon a stick . . . ," are simply an unnecessary embellishment having
the semantic equivalent of the literal, drab, but more precise, "An old man is
insignificant, frayed, brittle and frail" (p. 95).
A second position on metaphor, the comparative view, has its roots in
Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle in "On Poetics" defines metaphor as "the intuitive
perception of the similarity in dissimilars." This belief that metaphor allows language
users to propose otherwise similarities differs little from the substitution view, for the
comparison view finds "every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile" (Richards,
1 936, pp. 35-36). Thus, the comparison view, just another spin on the substitution
view, would find Yeats' line an expendable, implied simile approximating, "An old
man looks like a tattered coat hanging on a stick."
A third view of metaphor, one that is consistent with the constructivist view, holds
that the terms of a metaphor interact to set off a chain of associations that give rise to
an altogether new meaning, one that conjures far more than the meaning constituted
by the original terms . This view, arising from R ichard s ' discussion of the
"interanimation of words" (as cited in Black, 1 979), holds that new meaning arises,
not from the words themselves, but from a new or startling juxtaposition of words.
The interactionist position on Yeats' line would hold that readers bring their own
associations, thoughts, feelings, reminiscences about old men, tattered coats, and sticks;
thus, individuals ' interpretations of the line will vary. The interactionist view i s
consistent with contemporary reader response theory in describing meaning, not as
captured ideas inalterably preserved by the page, but as variable incantations at the
juncture of the word, the reader, the culture, and the moment.
In the constructivist universe, both the substitution and the comparison views
are inadequate, for if all language i s seen as a reflection of the user's view of
reality, and if an objective reality i s understood to be a myth, then all language is
seen to be more or less removed from the objects and phenomena to which it
refers . If nothing in the lexicon conforms directly and absolutely to reality, then
everything in the lexicon is a metaphor for that reality. Thus the difference
between literal and figurative language is quantitative rather than qualitative.
The i ssue i s not whether or not an expression i s metaphorical but whether it is
metaphorical enough for the average, competent language user to recognize its
metaphoricity. Black ( 1 979) and others have differentiated between "live" and
"dead" metaphors. A live metaphor is one that is syntactically j arring enough to
catch the attention of a reader or listener. On the other hand, dead metaphors are
those that have become so automatic that average u sers barely note their
metaphoricity; head of the family, arm of the chair, and foot of the bed are
everyday metaphorical expressions we rarely note as such.

Metaphor and Reality
Several commentators have taken exception to the objectivist position that
finds metaphors "unimportant, deviant, and parasitic on 'normal usage"' (Ortony,
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1979 , p. 2 ) . Levin ( 1 979) maintains that when we respond to metaphorical
constructions, we do not construe "the utterance so that it makes sense of the
world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance" (p. 1 3 1 ) .
Encountering a metaphor, w e complete a quick mental check o f the meanings of
the terms and conjure an imaginary reality to make that anomalous expression
sensible. Thus, the notion that metaphors are aberrant expressions i s superseded
b y the idea that the l anguage is impeccable; j u st the facts are deranged.
Metaphors are to be taken literally; "They mean what they say-what gives i s
the world" (p. 13 1 ) .
For those who see truth a s a matter o f "fitting words t o the world" (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1 980, p. 1 96), concession to a new reality can imply falsehood and lies.
Empson ( 1 951) noted that the truth or falsity of literary works i s not the issue;
when contracting with a text, readers are expected to rearrange the world to match
the writer ' s creation.
A prototype of the notion that metaphor creates truth w as reified in the works
of literary Romantic s . Coleridge' s "willing suspension of disbelief" (as cited in
Salingar, 1966, p. 89), the condition necessary for the reader ' s transaction with
the text, and Keats' ( 1 8 1 7 / 1 967) "negative capability" (p. 399), the tolerance for
the ambiguity of paradox, and Shelley ' s ( 1 8401 1 967) "Defense of Poetry," which
argues that poetry "creates anew the universe" (p. 483) are all concepts that fore
shadowed the constructivist position on language.
Identifying poets as seers and visionaries popular to Western stereotypes
attests to an understanding that the metaphors of poetry do not stand as merely
juxtaposed to logical descriptions of reality, but actually create a transcendent
reality for reader consideration. In other words, the truth of language is located
in its removal from the world-its otherworldliness. The concept of objective
reality makes a faulty backdrop for interpreting linguistic constructions. One
contemporary humorist concisely settled the conflict between the objectivist and
constructivist points of view: "In cases of maj or discrepancy [between literature
and life] it's always reality that's got it wrong . . . . Reality is frequently inaccurate"
(Adams, 1 980, p. 38).
Just as any consideration of metaphor on a scale polarized between truth and
falsity is untenable, so is any attempt to fix discriminations between the literal
and the metaphorical. In the constructivist or experientialist view, literal and
metaphorical expressions are not separate species but variants of a single breed
human language. We cannot claim that metaphors are present in some texts and
absent from others. All texts are rife with metaphors, a few arresting, most veiled
in everyday use. This blurring of the literal/metaphorical distinction reflects the
postmodern mischief which aims to deconstruct and level many of the pet valua
tions in Western philosophy ' s collection of hierarchical opposites, including true/
false, real/fictional, objective/subjective, and literal/metaphorical.

A Constructivist Cosmology
In the objectivist system, metaphor is considered the sole province of the
literary mind that is interested in the subtleties and amenities of language. It i s
not. I t i s a t the very core of o u r learning, thinking, and writing. Noting the
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omnipresence of metaphor, Seitz ( 1 99 1 ) reminds the field of the futility of its
recommendations that figurative expressions be replaced with literal explana
tions ; "we cannot catch up to the speed of figuration nor somehow hold it still
with literal language" (p. 290). We have also seen that the literal can be called
metaphorical, that metaphor can be taken literally, that through language humans
create their own reality. To complete the circle, we can even claim, with Galeano
( 1 989/ 1 99 1 ), that "[p]erhaps we are the words that tell us who we are" (p. 1 8)
that it i s the language that has created the human.
B iolinguists assert that language defines humans and separates them from the
animal kingdom; words elevate us "above the silence of plants and the grunts of
beasts" (B artel, 1 983, p.75). Dennett ( 1 99 1 ) refutes Wittgenstein ' s comment:
'"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"' by claiming " [If] a lion
could talk that lion would have a mind so different from the general run of lion
minds, that although we could understand him just fine, we would learn little
about ordinary lions from him" (as cited in Johnson, 1 99 1 , p. 60). To paraphrase
Primo Levi ( 1 989), the "whine of an animal" is not a text (p. 1 72). While animals
may s ig n a l w i t h their whimpers and w h i n ni e s , their n o i s e s are neither
paraphrastic nor inventive.
The equation of language with creation i s nearly as old as Western culture
itself. The first chapter, third verse, of Genesis tells of a God who speaks cre
ation (And God said, Let there be light: and there was light) and names our exis
tential opposites, night and day, heaven and earth. The opening chapter of the
Gospel of John, first verse, repeats this theme; "In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The last verse of "The
Revelation of John" lists those who will be excluded from messianic Jerusalem:
"dogs, fortune tellers, and the sexually immoral, murderers, idolaters, and every
one of false speech and false life," reflecting both a pre- and post-modern stance
on the power of language to define reality. The kingdom of God is gained by
utterance, not grace.
The great prophets and mystics have always known this , and that is why the
great religious texts are built on allegory, parable, proverb, and magical imagery.
Jesus, Lao-Tzu, Muhammad, Siddhartha, the Zen Masters, and the Hasidic Zaddiks
all worked from a tacit understanding that humans recoil from the bald truth, that
seekers are more likely to accept new theological premises when they are
presented indirectly. Often the new religious values are disguised in stories
i n v o l v i n g c o mmonplace s i tuation s , s u c h a s a l l e g o r i e s and parab l e s , o r
paradoxical puzzlers like those found in the O l d Testament book of "Proverbs,"
the Tao Te Ching, and Zen koans.
Ben Shahn's ( 1 954) telling of the "The Alphabet of Creation," a legend from
the Zohar, the Kabbalah ' s primary mystical text, derived from ancient Gnostic
tales begins:
Twenty-six generations before the creation of the world, the twenty
two letters of the alphabet descended from the crown of God whereon
they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire. They gathered around
about God and one after another spoke and entreated, each one, that
the world be created through him. (pp. 1 -2)
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According to the legend, the Lord chose to fashion the heavens and earth with
the masculine Beth and the feminine Aleph. Aleph's selection was a reward for
her modesty (a conceit that has had for millennia a profound effect on human
expectations about women).
In a recent article on quantum cosmology, Primack and Abrams ( 1 995)
remind us of another account of creation involving language found in Jewish
midrashic literature. "Genesis Rabbah 1 : 1 say s : 'The Holy one in creating the
universe, . . . worked from a plan-the Torah' " (p. 7 1 ) . Moreover, the notion that
language can form the universe is not peculiar to the traditions of Judaeo
Christian creationism. The Buddhist monks' chant, "Aouhm," vocalizes from
back to front of the mouth, a gloss of all the speaking positions . The gloss itself
functions as an auditory metonymy, a symbolic reiteration of the act of creation.
If, mythologically speaking, l anguage created the universe, and if we, as
members of the universe, have been given power over language, then we, too,
have been endowed w ith the power of creati o n . "The exerc i s e of human
language enacts, albeit on a microscopically humble scale, the divine reflexes of
creation, the Logos or ' speaking into being' of the universe" (Steiner, 1 97 1 ,
p . 7 5 ) . "One word can cripple a human relationship, can do dirt on hope"
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 58).
Language and metaphor are our human trust; through them we spell our
v i sion of the now and the forever. A s huma n s , our nature is to use them
constructively. As teachers, it i s our responsibility to empower our students to
use their linguistic and metaphorical birthrights to construct and re-construct their
intellectual, political, and even their spiritual lives; for by their own metaphors
will they be known and will they know. We must teach with the conviction of
Vaclav Havel: "Transcendence is the only real alternative to extinction" (as cited
in Primack & Abrams, 1 995, p. 73). If we fail in this obligation, we risk revert
ing to the abyss of unspeakability. c::::J
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Earthworm Hermeneutics
Derek Owens
The Omnipresence of Boundaries

T I begin to tally the obvious barriers: Metal doors barricading unopened shops;

he markers are everywhere. Riding through Queens at 7 a.m. on the Q3 1 bus,

graffiti on walls, sidewalks, stoops-hundreds of tags on a single block, city as
strata of palimpsests; concertina wire strung around apartment balconies; iron
gates built across a street leading to a school; parking garage stairwells dead
ending in plywood; bars on windows. And from where I sit on the bus, invisible
lines of separation surround every face. In the standing-room-only crowd I search
to find cracks between bodies where my line of sight might leak out a window.
I get off at the University for my 8 a.m. class, note the iron fence enclosing
the campus ; the security booths; combination locks in the doors of the buildings ;
m y office cubicle where the walls don't quite reach the ceiling, blurring public
and private space; the raised platform in my classroom where instructors are
expected to stand behind a podium twelve inches taller than students.
At the end of the day, waiting at the Jamaica train station I see concessions
where porn magazines are sold by men bunkered behind their counters ; sitting on
the train, I keep my elbow from touching the woman ' s next to me, my eyes from
hers; on the ride home through Nassau and Suffolk counties I realize that I can ' t
look out the window for more than 30 seconds without seeing chainlink fence,
the one ingredient "nice" neighborhoods, industrial parks, and vacant lots all have
in common.
At 7 p.m. I walk home through empty suburbia. It is dark, and I trigger
motion detectors above garage doors, spotlights clicking on as I come within
range. When I walk into my own yard I am, as always, momentarily conscious of
my feet making contact with the ground. This is our new house, and the first
thing my wife and I want to do is surround it with an attractive fence.

Boundaries as Psychosocial Inevitabilities
The boundaries stratifying our communal and psychic landscapes are more
than omnipresent. They are nothing less than prostheses, psychotopological
extensions shooting out from mental into physical space. Not only are we
cyborgs, as theorist Donna Haraway ( 1 989) taught us, but we are the very lines
of territorialization and demarcation that we navigate e very waking hour.
B oundaries are social constructs, as integral to our construction of the world as
language. In fact, while it has been said that language i s a system of boundaries,
it might be more apt to say that we are systems of boundaries painted with

Derek Owens is Assistant Professor of English and Coordinator of the Writing Program at St.John 's
University. His book, Resisting Writings (And the Boundaries of Composition), was published by
Southern Methodist UP in 1994.
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something called language.
Consequently, talk of dismantling boundaries and eliminating once and for
all the lines of attraction and repulsion that are our physical signature s , of
moving beyond boundaries into some pure, perimeter-less space i s at best a
fantasy, at worst fascism (conscious or otherwise). It is human to construct
boundaries on top of boundaries, to create boxes of influence and resistance.
Hedgerows, avenues, voting districts, grids, lines of latitude, every utterance and
signifier-the blanket hung over the rope between the beds in Clark Gable's and
Claudette Colbert's motel, those two reluctant lovers in It Happened One Night.
They're all signs of our need to preserve and redefine the spaces that are ever
extensions of our bodies. While the forms our markers take are infinite, at a base
level we are all dogs constantly marking our territories and just as obsessive in
our constant need to seek out scents made by others.
Of course, no boundary i s ipso facto permanent. The walls of Jericho can
and do come down, as Gable says in the movie-and are of course always in
states of potential flux. But if boundaries crumble they leave in their stead not
vacuums but newer walls, mutations, and hybrids. Even Deleuze and Guattari ' s
( 1 987) idea of the body without organs i s not t o be confused with the fantasy of
the transcendentalist's transparent eyeball passing through the environs, but "is
a limit" (p. 1 50) and thus a horizon point toward which our tribes of selves
continually slide and yearn. We are all border writers, to use D . Emily Hicks'
term ( 1 99 1 ), and it must be within the ability of every one of us to "present the
world with a new multidimensional holographic ordering of desire" (p. 1 23 ) .
Because constructing boundaries is so inherently human (Perelman, 1 9 9 3 , p.233),
we need to imagine newer, richer ways of articulating whatever boundaries we
seek to build with and over the old. But before we introduce some routes toward
this end, it is necessary to expose what's wrong with binary thinking that wants
either to preserve final boundaries or transgress (through inclusion) "all" of them.

Binary Assumptions in Centrist and Pluralist Thinking
The problem with boundaries is not that they exist but how people pervert
them. The most obvious abuse comes in the form of those who define themselves
as the Center and need to maintain that image of power and self-promotion through
systematic oppression of all who do not meet their image of Being. First world
countries, militaries, corporations, elitists, men who destroy women, adults who
destroy children, all read boundary as weapon. Those who do not exist in the
Center do not exist. They are threats and as such must be erased or converted.
For the Centrists there is only one border, the edge of the world. The battle to
maintain a State of purity, an anaesthetized zone of sameness is waged against
pagans threatening to rise from the abyss. This (patho)logic of the Center has
been expressed countless times but perhaps nowhere more thoroughly than in the
work of Argentinean philosopher Dussel ( 1 98 5 ) .
Equally sinister but slightly less obvious than the Us versus Them rhetoric
of the Centrists is the supposedly "multicultural" agenda of romantic s who
claim to promote difference but in reality are engaged in a project where differ
entiation is imposed on others in order to preserve another centrism, this time
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calling itself Pluralism. To distinguish humans by cataloging them under differ
entia (such as race, class, sexuality) too often amounts to assigning the "Other" a
title through which it can be made recognizable: The once exotic, like a butter
fly, is now safely pinned in its appropriate box. The unknown is now "ours" and
thus no longer a threat. Soundings from the periphery are "brought in" by the
Pluralist, made canonical and palatable, in a word, legal (whereas "the inevitable
position of liberation [is] subversive illegality," [Dussel, 1 985 , p. 66] ). Any origi
nality, any true difference i s now subsumed by the (always fictitious) rubric un
der which it has been assigned. Difference "in the name of" multiculturalism is
racism-often unintentional, but racism nonetheless. It reflects a desire to clas
sify and regulate humans and their works under a desensitizing, awe-inhibiting
grid' of familiar, dead terms (Black lesbian writer; young Asian-American artist).
To fetishize difference this way i s to cultivate a different kind of samenes s . This
is why multicultural anthologies are sanitized, nonthreatening, and interchange
able. "Difference" here is not so much that which is genuinely new-and thus
not j ust a threat to existing canons but the notion of canonicity itself-but that
which will best "fit" within the pluralistic proj ect. Its marketability determines
its value. Even Giroux ( 1 992), who rightfully articulates the violence of binary
oppositions, does so in a discourse predicated on an assumed dualism where
"radical" theory exists to right the wrongs of conservative and leftist ideology
(pp. 23-28) . Many of the sentiments embedded in so-called radical educational
theory are laudable, but we still have to admit that all parties involved in the
debate are related in some embarrassing but undeniable ways. Fundamentalist
conservatives, Afrocentrist theorists, and postmodern feminists alike all collect
paychecks from institutions with questionable if not reprehensible politics . We
(I do not leave myself out of the equation) own property, want more money, con
sume more than we need, and think constantly of our careers . And we all waste
dangerously limited natural resources in our race to publish. Seen from this angle,
we are all on the same side of a fence that few are willing to acknowledge.
"The smell of totalitarianism i s in the air," wrote Giroux ( 1 989, p. 2 1 8) , and
we are all gagging from the stench as hateful dimwits infest an already infected
federal legislature. But there is a problem when we become too caught up in our
own us-versus-them rhetoric ; even the best of us have the little voice of the fas
cist lurking somewhere deep (and too often not deep enough) within our psyches.
"Perhaps now it is only the impure which might claim any kind of authenticity,"
writes one of the editors of Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cul
tures (Ferguson, 1 990, p. 1 2) . But none of us is pure. None exempt. Which ren
ders the very notion of a viable "out there" dangerously suspect (particularly an
"out there" desperate to "claim" authenticity. For if one is indeed the real thing,
why beg the question? )
Both the centrist and the pluralist rely on boundary markers of exclusion;
the latter simply permits more variety in its territory than the former. But of course,
eve n for the pluralist there are still voices and activities "way out there" which
will never appear in any made-for-profit anthol ogy or surface in any politically
correct pedagogy of multi culturalism. Such works can only be declared obscene,
porn ographic, unsuitab le even for the most permi ssive of canons. And, of course,
that whic h i s truly diffe rent-that which is unclas sifiable, terrifying in its strange
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and alien beauty-is precisely pornography but not i n the sense o f the body
hatred found on newsstands, but as magic, gnosis (Bey, 1 99 1 ) .

Earthworm Hermeneutics
To address "the boundary question" I am trying to flesh out a stance from
which we might begin to rejoin our selves and our environments; in the process
we move ever away from the homogenized emptiness that characterizes any cen
ter in order to locate the truly different and dangerously authentic. To peel away
the inevitable film of cynicism that coats all of us living in the late twentieth
century and reach the potential for amazement and fascination I believe still lies
dormant w ithin anyone not totally anaesthetized b y tel e v i s i o n or theory.
To translate the self to itself on its own terms, unmediated by the State. My
thinking-which to be sure on this matter i s still in the infancy stage-draws
from Enrique D u s s e l ' s p h i l o sophy of liberation through exteriority and
antifeti shism, the writings of Hakim B ey, and the ecopolitics of Paul Ryan.
I have chosen the worm motif for the moment not j u st because of catchy
alliteration (although the sounds of the terms are now at least as important as
what they contain) but because it helps us focus on a three-pronged pedagogical
initiative embedded within a hermeneutics concerned not with textual exegesis
or reinterpretation of the social, but with poeisis. That is, the project of writing
the world, again and again, from scratch, each time.
First, earthworm hermeneutics finds value only at the periphery, the
wildness "outside" the outside that has been tamed, appropriated, turned outside
in. I believe with Dussel that liberation can be found only in the periphery, for to
be of the center (which is to be the center) i s to consume ourselves in the name of
stasis. Exteriority brings consciousness as much as centrality induces stupor, and
it is the investigation and cultivation of each person's private exteriority that is
the rightful business of education.
Soil surrounding a healthy earthworm population i s usually fertile. It pro
motes greater diversity of flora and fauna. Poor soil, which likely indicates a thin
earthworm population, invites aggressive and invasive weeds that spread quickly,
monopolizing the system inefficiently and unproductively. A few aggressive,
"opportunistic species" (Hawken, 1 993) take over, discouraging variation. Cen
trist theories are built on sour soil; what makes them thrive will ultimately de
stroy them because the ecological balance they promote i s severely restricted.
Romantic pluralistic theories, on the other hand, want rich soil but limit what
will grow there. The carefully shaped Victorian garden may be more aestheti
cally pleasing than a sea of weeds, but it is every inch an indicator of someone 's
need to control and restrict. Where the centrist impulse risks inbreeding in long
ing for supreme homogeneity, the pluralistic stance encourages contradiction: it
claims to want the conditions for variety, but simultaneously limits that variety.
Earthworms respect boundaries not by usurping them but by providing the
conditions that support such surface variety. Earthworms tunnel beneath bound
aries while not appropriating them. Boundaries rise and fall on the surface, and
the earthworm assists that random rise and fall without seeking to contain or
restrict the variation on the surface.
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The educator may be seen as a chaos gardener. Not conventional gardeners
limited by the tiny range of seeds reserved for them in store s , but those who help
create an environment receptive to all variety. Educators reject neither the
canonical nor the extreme but wish to surround themselves with human and
natural works so long as they induce fascination and amazement. Such educators
seeks to share, to return to others that sense of mystery, primarily because this
enhances the sense of awe. I bring particular material into my class not because
it i s "great" and "ought" to be taught, but because I find that to be amazed also
involves a need to share that amazement. In essence, we become that mystery by
entering into it, perpetuating it.
What thi s means in my own writing classes i s that I try to introduce
materials that my students will not find on television or in most American
bookstores . In fact, unless it i s unavoidable, I do whatever I can to ensure that
d i scussions directly or indirectly related to television, adverti sing, and the
unimaginative business of the world do not enter the classroom. To spend an
hour critiquing the Cult of Sameness (examining misogyny in a cigarette ad,
"deconstructing" Beverly Hills 902 1 0) is to have one hour of one ' s life owned by
advertising executives . Dismissal of televi sion i s still promotion of the beast,
since the medium continues to control the conversation.
It also means that I try not to entertain all the old stunted pseudo-debates:
death penalty, abortion, euthanasia, legalization of drugs, etc. "In every single
'issue' cooked up for 'debate' in the patternbook of the Spectacle, both sides are
invariably full of shit" (B ey, 1 99 1 , p. 50). And just as the fiction of binary
debates distracts us with their seductive "arguments," so too has the fashionable
tug-of-war embodied in the Centrist-Pluralist politics become the e ssence of
academia. A s a way to resist the limitations of this split, I ferret out works
located "off to the side" by visionary, intuitive, and utopian thinkers. As a result,
I have students investigate communitarian sects, early American "dropout"
cultures, underground "zines," "art brut," and "outsider art," visionary treatises
on business and economics, and so forth. Obviously shaped by my own needs
and interests, the material I teach focuses on those who have thought to rebuild
the world through controversial and restorative thinking. In writing about these
themes, students are also encouraged to compose in exploratory forms (Owens,
1 994) .
W h e r e a s the fir s t i n i t i a t i v e b e h i n d earthworm hermen e u t i c s i s the
privileging of extreme variation of ideas, the second condition i s more pragmatic.
It is a mistake to encourage modes of construction (thinking, writing, perfor
mance) still dangerous in the eyes of the academic community-if students re
main at risk. Students, of course, need to learn academic discourse not so they
can become better puppets but because they need camouflage. Developmental
writers attract attention; mistakes in grammar trigger raised eyebrows. Such out
side attention restricts private intellectual activity. To have the freedom to pur
sue our intellectual goals, we need a certain amount of time alone. Consequently,
a considerable portion of any writing course these days must be aimed at helping
students pass-that is, pass for academics-in-the-making. Those who can, at least
grammatically and verbally, know how to fit in, have greater opportunity to
disappear, and follow their own pursuits.
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Earthworms are "nightcrawlers . " They move under cover of darkness, know
how to get things done. They work behind, beneath, and under the boundaries
without drawing attention to themselves. To engage in Dussel's idea of illegal
philosophy means knowing how, when necessary, to travel incognito. Just as be
ing alive means navigating through and constructing numerous boundaries, so
too it means knowing how (and when) to wear masks.
Finally, there is a moral function to earthworm hermeneutics . To privilege
variation just because it's funky and exhilarating could be enough, but not today.
Today we are in a fix unlike any we have ever known. A friend of mine says that
the first required reading for every course in every discipline should be the most
recent State of the World ( 1 993) distributed by the Worldwatch Institute. We live
in a time when, at current rates of population growth and ecological devastation,
the earth will become irreversibly damaged within our lifetimes. Few of us even
know how to begin to conceptualize this fact, let alone address it. But it is the
responsibility of educators to make nothing less than new pedagogies in response
to this news of the world. To promote variation is to foreground that which is
truly strange. At this point in history the thing strangest to all of us is something
called the earth. Although postmodernists like Hicks separate the world into the
territorialized and the deterritorialized, all of us can now be said to inhabit the
latter. Women, gays, people of color, and just about everyone who looks, walks,
and talks differently from me are simply the more obvious "borders" subletting
or squatting in power zones constructed and commandeered by other, usually in
visible figures (white-male-heterosexual-capitalist-you know the litany) . But
we're all border riders, straddling not one but an array of unstable, impermanent
fences. Those who would claim centrality, who truly believe that to occupy terri
torialized havens, to be the hubs and the nuclei of society, are simply more far
gone than the rest. These people have the wetiko psychosis analyzed in Forbes'
Columbus and Other Cannibals ( 1 992) in which carriers "consume another's life
for their own private purpose or profit" (p. 34). But while such individuals (or
more appropriately institutions) do indeed wield violent power, the figures we
associate with such centers of hate have turned from humans into witches (I use
the term in the traditional Native American sense), and besides, it is too late for
blame; my discussion here is aimed at the remaining humans .
I n order t o combat the cynicism that permeates our present historical mo
ment, we need an inventiveness borne of urgency and visionary ideals. One such
example is Paul Ryan's Video Mind, Earth Mind ( 1 993) which documents his
attempts over several decades to articulate strategies for an ecology of mind.
Ryan begins his book, like the State of the World, by reminding us that in under
four decades "we pass a threshold of irreversible environmental destruction. The
door to a healthy life on earth dead bolts behind u s . We watch our grandchildren
garbage-pick their way through life in ecosystems that are terminally ill" (p. 1 ) .
Seen from this angle, we are all deterritorialized in the most literal sense: We
have come to think of ourselves as nomads detached from our bioregions. Deleuze
and Guattari' s ( 1 987) "Body without Organs" ultimately fails as a metaphor be
cause the fact is we have organs, and they are not just the soggy things inside but
the chloroplasts, bugs, and atmospheric conditions "out there . " Of course, out
there is always in here, in our guts and cells : It is empirically obvious that we are
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not only children, sucking at our earth-mother ' s breast all of our lives, but that
we are also mixed with, and part of, that which Europeans choose to call "the
environment. " For us, truly, there are no "surroundings."
I can lose my hands and still live. I can lose my legs and still live. I can lose
my eyes and still live. I can lose my hair, eyebrows, nose, arms, and many other
things and still live. But if I lose the air I die. If I lose the sun I die. If I lose the
earth I die. If I lose the water I die. If I lose the plants and animals I die. All of
these things are more a part of me, more essential to my every breath, than is my
so-called body. What is my real body?
We are rooted, just like the trees. But our roots come out of our nose and
mouth, like an umbilical cord, forever connected to the rest of the world. Our
roots also extend out from our skin and from our other body cavities (Forbes,
1 992). The job of the educator is to make accessible the secrets that remain
hidden, repres sed, censored. The strange zones of activity in between the
boundaries, those glitches in the grid, those sites of shared strangenes s unfamil
iar to all of us require our attention. One obvious zone is the earth. Regardless of
the contentious political, ethnic, sexual, and class backgrounds of our students
and ourselves, we all ultimately occupy the same zone. Certainly matters of race,
gender, sexuality, and class are intricately involved within such an ecological
project, and Merchant ( 1 992) presents useful strategies for making these connec
tions in a pedagogical context. But the reality of a dying ecology i s the umbrella
under which all other realities and pursuits must be assembled. By this I do not
mean the romantic dream of some pure, boundary-less heaven of multicultural
unification. Instead, we need methods of tunneling under the walls and borders,
into a common bedrock seen for the first time, in order to discover, literally, the
bioregions we drive over, sleep in, eat, and dismantle. rQ
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Strictly Ballroom?
Dancing along the Borders of
Movement and Writing
Tim Doherty

W seated writer, who occasionally paces , stretches, but is mostly stationary

hen we imagine a typical scene of writing, we probably have an image of a

and alone. Certainly a glance in the doorways of most writing classes would re
veal seated writers, either composing or talking. In an attempt to expand our
sense of the possibilities beyond this static image, to broaden our vision of how
writers' bodily experiences and various intelligences may be involved in the act
of writing, Karen Klein and Linda Hecker ( 1 994) have recently advocated two
teaching strategies, "hands-on manipulatives" and "walking the structure," which
exploit the ideas of 'learning-by-doing,' cross-fertilizing students'
linguistic abilities with spatial or kinesthetic intelligences. By work
ing directly with students and observing their writing difficulties,
[they] found that many individuals struggling to express their ideas
on paper could build models of how ideas relate using colored pipe
cleaners, Legos, or Tinkertoys, or they could walk those ideas across
a room, changing direction to indicate changes in logical structure.
(p. 89)
In the latter approach, the exact shape of an individual ' s "walk" or explor
atory movement is "arbitrary" ( Klein & Hecker, 1 994, p. 9 3 ) . Gross-motor
experiences of ideas are more important than following the movement patterns
set out by Klein and Hecker: "[I]n fact, individual students are encouraged to
invent their own sets of moves, if that feels more comfortable to them . . . . It is the
gross motor movement of arms and legs, hands and feet that makes the abstract
both concrete and tactile" (p. 95).
Klein and Hecker ' s work illustrates the utility of movement in teaching
writing. What impact, what contribution, can movement make in a given act of
composing? Could we claim that, by attending to feeling and thought through
movement, our expression is facilitated? Or are the modalities of movement and
writing impermeable, untranslatable? Or, for writers, does movement altogether
change what Alice Brand ( 1 994) calls the "valuative" experience, the various
ways thought and feeling may intertwine in mental activity (p. 1 56)?

Tim Doherty, graduate student a t the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, i s completing a
dissertation entitled, Out of Our Heads: College Writing and the Resources of Theatre. He thanks
his students, and Peter Elbow, Ellen Kaplan, Jenny Spencer, and Anne Herrington for their advice.
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Translating Intelligences: Moving Words
Of course, it is tempting to be simplistic. Movement is suited to "hot,"
vibrant expression; stationary writing lends itself to "cool," conscious, rational
processes (Brand, 1 994 ). On the one hand, it seems common sense that move
ment i s more closely connected to emotion than i s the act of writing. Feeling and
movement are both somatic-feeling happens "in" the body; movement happens
"because of" or "with" the body. It is tempting to focus on the gulf between what
we experience when dancing, compared to when talking or writing. Howard
Gardner ( 1 985), for example, claims that the bodily-kinesthetic mode of intelli
gence i s identifiable in how we use tools , in how we dance, and in how we mimic.
He posits this mode because, presumably, other intelligences somehow cannot
capture its modality. Gardner provides a sense of these limits by quoting famous
dancers on how "untranslatable" meaning is in dance:
And indeed, it is difficult to get dancers (or even dance critics)
to characterize their activity in a straightforward and concrete
way. Isadora Duncan . . . summed it up in her well-known remark,
"If I could tell you what it is, I would not have danced it" . . .
[and] , Martha Graham . . . has made the intriguing observation,
"I have often remarked on the extreme difficulty of having any
kind of conversation with most dancers which has any kind of
logical cohesiveness-their minds just j ump around (maybe like
my body)-the logic-such as it is-occurs on the level of mo
tor activity." ( 1 98 5 , p. 224)
Why use movement in a writing classroom if the boundaries allow little in
the way of immigration? B ecause the boundaries are not impermeable. And
Gardner is quick to emphasize that no single "intelligence" ever solely produces
a given performance. In thinking about these boundaries or relationships between
our intelligences, we have two approaches : First, we can go about our business,
relatively unconscious of co-existing intelligences working in a coordinated way,
such as when we dance. As my former student, Jen, once described: "Yo u ' re lis
tening to music, utilizing an aural mindset and musical intelligence, and uncon
sciously, you ' re translating what you hear into kinesthetic intelligence, and put
ting it literally into motion." The second relationship i s of a different, trickier
sort. We can consciously try to create contexts in which various intelligences
cross-fertilize, translate, or mingle. This may be the case, for example, when we
present a painting to students and ask them to write their responses to it, the
visual and linguistic intelligences orbiting one another, so to speak. Or when we
ask children to listen to music and draw what they hear. This second kind of
cross-fertilization of intelligences is ambiguous because it involves both a con
scious mingling of how we act and know in different domains. But it also in
volves "a letting go," listening to the music, allowing associations to occur, mov
ing image to page, at times consciously, or semi-consciously, or unconsciously.
Perhaps this "trickines s " is the paradox of conscious, creative intentio n s ;
success depends o n the degree of unconscious "release," a n openness t o "peak"
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or "flow" experiences, once we have consciously set ourselves in a creative
direction. It i s also tricky in the sense that, phenomenologically, the moment
to-moment relati o n s h i p between the i n t e l l i g e n c e s i n v o l v e d in heari n g ,
i m a g i n i n g , a n d drawing i s h ard t o p i n d o w n : I s i t o n e of c a u se/effe c t ?
Translation? Hybridization?
We know s o l ittle about the nature and creative p o s s ibilities of this
conscious coordination of intelligences. I believe it i s worth our time as writing
teachers to explore it, warranting the use of movement as a way of shifting
student awareness of thoughts and feelings into and out of somatic and linguistic
action. A back-and-forth movement. Note how, having to say something about
dance, Graham, i n the earlier quote, does in fact capture a sense of how meaning
operates in dance-it "jumps," perhaps in the same way our v isual intelligence
operates by discrimination and gestalt.
B ody sense i s present across our experiences and actions, whether we are
aware of it or not. Seated writers, consciously or not, have bodies involved in the
act of writing, whether that involvement comes in the form of a felt sense, a
frustration, the excited j iggling of a foot, the pauses and breaths between j ot
tings, the voicing of words, or the subterranean murmur of inner speech. Indi
vidually, movement and writing are both tools that are expressive extensions of
our bodies, in the sense described by Polanyi ( 1 958): "We pour ourselves out
into [our tools] and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept
them existentially by dwelling in them"(p. 59). My own wish, therefore, is to
wonder about the role that a more extensive, deliberate use of "the body ' s
wisdom" can play in writing events.
We have a number of pedagogical strategies that can help students attend to
their physical experience during composing: freewriting, Perl ' s ( 1 994) exercises
for felt sense, Klein and Hecker ' s ( 1 994)"walking structures" and "hands-on
manipulatives," guided imagery related to a particular topic, v isual representa
tions, or even doodling. Presumably, by cross-fertilizing our different physical
and cognized emotional lives, we ground or inhabit the moment of writing more
cogently, successfully, or perhaps even surprisingly. Or, as Brand ( 1 990) observes,
"Learning that includes emotion has more stick-to-the-ribs quality than does 'cold'
cognition and influences performance years later" (p. 306) . However, the present
culture of most classrooms limits our vision of what is "appropriate" and helpful
to better writing. Movement in a writing course seems tantamount to "dirty danc
ing" in the ballroom. What can movement offer writers? In given composing
scenarios, how can movement shape their emotional and cognitive experiences?
I am trying to make more room culturally for the vital role that intrapersonal
intelligence can play in this process. Nevertheless, I also embrace the caveat made
by Klein and Hecker that movement-based approaches to writing "do not work
for everyone," but should be presented as valued options in a student-centered
pedagogy ( 1 994, p. 98).
Two recent experiments suggest directions for those interested in this line of
inquiry, teaching, and learning: a collaborative one between the philosopher
Robert Schwarz ( 1 993) and the dancer Christina Svane; and the other, a project
completed by Jo-Ann, a student dancer in an experimental course I co-taught
with Margaret Daisley at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. In the latter
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instance, I functioned as a participant-observer, seeking to understand how one
student conceived of movement-writing connections, and how both I and her peers
responded. I will tell both of these anecdotes and then conclude by reflecting on
their implications for the teaching of writing.

Dancing into a Different Space
In October of 1 992, the contact dancer Christina Svane and philosopher Rob
ert Schwarz conducted a seminar at the School for New Dance Development in
Amsterdam, entitled "Spatial Orientation: A Key to Meaning in Thought and
Movement." Schwarz ( 1 993) collaborated with contact dancers, exploring con
cepts of space and "the role that body postures and movements play in the pro
cesses of abstract thinking" (p. 45). In effect, Schwarz and Svane wanted the
dancers to try to change their sense of space as a separate "thing," around which
bodies move, to an understanding that space i nheres i n the experience of
movement itself. They encouraged the dancers to experience spatial concepts as
the metaphors they are, linguistic constructs for the human experience of motion
and mass .
Drawing o n the works of Lakoff and Johnson ( 1 980, 1 987), Schwarz first
provided lectures describing the central metaphors that can be found underlying
the d i s c ourses of p h i l o s ophy, l aw, religion, and s c i ence ( verticality and
hierarchy being the most obvious), and the relationships of these metaphors to
"motional meaning": " [T]he key words which seem to advance any discourse are
words of motion" (Schwarz, 1 99 3 , p. 47). He deduces that motion guides all
thought processes, and that
[s]pace, time, mass, gravity, inertia, and countless other essential
abstractions from which our reality is formed are not so much
external a priori givens as they are a posteriori creations out of
the matrix of body experience. (p. 48).
Schwarz ' s objective w a s to help the dancers realize this new body- space
relationship. A conceptual transformation of space i s created "inside" their
experiences of moving. Movement and thought become inseparable.
After the lectures by Schwarz, S vane led the dancers through movement
sessions, intended to effect new, non-reified, body-centered orientations to
space. Svane's term for this phenomenon is the "now-plane" (Schwarz, 1 993,
p.44 ). While dancing, participants attempted to "turn about" a spatial concept in
their minds, trying to locate the way in which they conceptualize through the
motions of their body. The dancers' journals suggest that they moved with a spa
tial term in mind, such as "along" or "beside," and then somehow attempted to
release that word into the motions of their bodies, "letting go" of the "idea" of
the term. Integrating thought and movement, the dancers were re-orienting or
"mingling" their physical and conceptual senses of "movement," "space," "dance,"
and so on. Svane and Schwarz sought to effect these "conceptual transforma
tions" for the dancers through a conscious interpenetration of movement, discus
sion, and writing. In their j ournal reflections, often in imagistic, metaphoric,
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associative form, many of the dancers report powerful transformations in their
approach to contact dance:

Mary Overlie: I had a very strong and amazing experience when
I worked by myself with the word 'through' in conjunction with
moving without the concept of space. I suddenly had a whole new
movement vocabulary available to me (p. 44) . . . . It was astonishing
to me that when Christie and I did some Contact work with these
words [with, until, carry ] , we were able to be in the Contact dance
with such completeness and clarity. (p. 50)
Katinka Bosse: It was new, every single little sensation, sound,
emotion, posture . . . . While this [dance] went on . . . l O% of my con
scious mind . . . was still able to put labels on the "happening": phrase
it, recognize it, compare it, evaluate it. (p. 52)
Christina Svane: So many layers to be aware of. This process has a
preparation phase . The Now Plane does hinge upon the body. The
body needs time to remember its own complex chords. One doesn't
hear all the instruments in the orchestra at once. Roving is part of
Now. Images fleet. A fleet of images. An association seems the next
step. Images first. Awareness. Image. Association. (p. 48)

Jo-Ann's Movers and Witnesses
In the Spring seme ster of 1 99 3 , Margaret Daisley and I co-taught an
experimental writing class in which we explored with nine students the ways of
integrating the arts of performance and writing. The second half of the course
was entirely devoted to student projects and experiments, one of which, Jo-Ann 's,
involved us in forging movement-writing connections. B ased on her past train
ing and experience in dance, Jo-Ann believed in what she termed "the body ' s
v o i c e , " "a nonverbal v o i c e , " a w a y in which t h e moving b o d y i t s e l f has
something to "say." What intrigued her most were the "connections and gaps"
between embodied and textual "voice. " Her inquiry into these possible relation
ships involved us in "deep movement" exercises, which were fol l owed by
freewriting. Jo-Ann ' s sense of the "connections and gaps" are best summed up in
this excerpt from her proj ect narrative:
Rhythm is a central defining feature in dance and in writing. Voice,
in writing and dance, becomes apparent in the pauses; shaped by
where one stops, and for how long, and at what level. Are you left
hanging in the air, or heavy on the ground? How does the writing/
dance flow, how intense is it? Does it creep low, slowly, timidly
with caution or tendernes s , or is it running, leaping, spinning
s o fast that it seems like the ground/page will explode? And
breath . . . where does the writer/dancer stop to breathe? Are you
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breathless or deeply sustained in full breaths that give lustre to
every word/gesture? ( 1 993, p.2)
To begin her project, Jo-Ann asked us to stand in a circle and to warm up
physically through stretching and relaxation exercises. Then, she dimmed the
lights and divided us into two groups, five lounging on the floor, five others
standing, encircling them. As her proj ect unfolded, her voice was steady and
soothing:
The group on the floor are movers ; the group standing around them
are witnesses. In your own time, movers, close your eyes, and al
low your body to move, any way it wants, and when it does, let
whatever thoughts happen, happen-impulses, intuitions, images.
This i s like freewriting: freedancing. Witnesses, all you need to do
i s to keep the movers safe, keep them from hitting the walls or one
another. Just watch, but al so pay attention to your own thoughts
and reactions. (Doherty, 1 993)
Now, almost a year later, I remember well my partiCipation in Jo-Ann' s
project. During the movement phase, vivid images and thoughts came t o m y mind.
Concurrent with an upward reach, I saw a brilliant night sky. Concurrent with a
wing-like movement, I recalled images of dreams in which I could fly. Jo-Ann
urged us to envision our bodies and movements as extensions of our writing selves.
Because she was interested in the "connections and gaps" between the embodied
and written voice, the last phase of her project had two parts : a mixture of dance
and utterance-what one student later called "movement poetry"-and then quiet
freewriting, intended to connect the page to our previous movements. In the first
part, the group spontaneously danced together without music, some gliding,
others just gesturing slowly. As we moved, Jo-Ann urged us to express words
spontaneously, and after our initial nervousness and laughter, out they flowed,
pell-mell. It was hilarious and exhilarating. Needless to say, we were a trusting,
tight-knit group.
After the exercises, we sat quietly, freewriting in our j ournals :

len: Can ' t put words t o what I saw. N o words i n emotions, n o words
in movements, no words in reaction. Just movement.
David: I felt like I could go on forever like that.. .. the movement
poetry was also enlivening. I felt like I took it to heart, and kept
expressing that lonely line [sic] I had explored in the pure movement exercise . . . . I found movements shaping words, words forming movements . . . .
From Tim 's journal: I began to have images of a night sky, trees
outlined in blue and black shadow, and the green shoots of garlic in
the garden . . . . As a witness, I tried to imagine what was happening
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for each person. Were they simply moving on impulse-like Glenn
seemed to be? Was Nicole rocking and almost motionless most of
the time because of some deeply felt connection? The voices of
their bodies-a sleeper, one yawning and gathered into motion, one
rocking in a center. ( 1 993)

Stacey: How can we express ourselves w/o the constraints of
words? . . . Movement. Movement seems so natural and uninhibited
that's the way I imagine a dancer must feel-uninhibited-so flex
ible to stretch their limbs gracefully, diagonally, horizontally. Stand
up tall and extend your muscles, point and flex your toes, Roll your
head. A goal of mine w/my writing is to abandon all of these
constraints and be able to dancE with my pen [sic. , an illustration
trailing off of the "E" ] . ( 1 993)

Movement along the Continuum
In thinking about both of these experiments, to make sense of the many
ways movement and words interact, involving different cognitive and emotional
experiences for writers, we can draw on the work of Alice Brand ( 1 994). To un
derstand the various ways emotion and thought co-exist, she uses the metaphor
of a continuum, along which we might plot shifting ratios of cognition and
emotion, depending upon the kind of experience we are having: From the "cool,"
"slanted toward cerebration," to the "hot," "weighted toward feeling" (p. 1 55 ) .
Even though the "entire person" i s the site for learning, there i s heuristic,
analytical value i n such metaphoric separations, helping us appreciate the
nuances of interrelated thought and feeling.
Adapting Brand' s ( 1 994) "continuum," we can try to make sense of the ways
m o v ement and writing produce, in conj un c t i o n , a v ariety of " v al u a t i v e
experiences"-Brand' s term for the complex interaction of arousal, motivation,
cognition, and emotion. On the one end, as we move, we may experience some
thing akin to arousal, what Brand and others call "felt sense" or "protoemotion."
Such an experience i s prelinguistic, precognitive because it involves no "names."
On the other end, as we move, we may have something akin to a cognitive, lin
guistic experience, a fully felt and named emotion or thought. In the middle,
movement and reflection are ways of bringing felt sense into conscious aware
ness. Movement i s a way of "attending," the entire physical body participating
in the process of thinking and feeling, moving toward greater consciousness and
verbalization.
By virtue of this sort of continuum, we can appreciate a progres sion among
the experiences of both the contact dancers ( identified by last names ) and
Jo-Ann ' s participants (identified by first names), a progression from relatively
u n c o n s c i o u s , n o n - verbalized movement, to experiences of image s , to a
word-richness triggered by, or continuous with, movement itself:

"No words in movements. No words . . . " len
For Jen, no words could capture the kind of knowing and experiencing of
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movement. Words are absent in what Jo-Ann called the "body' s voice." Svane's
"now-plane" seems comparable.
"1 0% of my conscious mind. . . " Bosse

Just as we begin to attend to meaning in the course of moving, things may
begin to make sense. Images , words, and feelings may be only vague "blips" at
first, as on a radar. My own initial reaction was relatively uncognized. Immedi
ately after, I recorded it as "impulses to move a limb-not very conscious, but
sometimes moved because of an intruding thought 'have to move, ' or a sudden
awareness of witnesses or noise upstairs." The dancer Bosse, as well, seems to
describe this phenomenon: "While this [dance] went on . . . 1 0% of my conscious
mind . . . was still able to put labels on the ' happening. "' (Schwarz, 1 99 3 , p . 52)

"Images fleet. A fleet of images. An association seems the next step. " Svane
Insofar as images and memories are evoked during movement, our post-move
ment, freewritten record of them may begin to capture the texture and substance
of a movement experience. The image-word interaction i s also another dimen
sion of "mingled" intelligences. During movement the visual and auditory modes
are triggered simultaneously. The majority of my own movement experience was
imagistic: "I began to have images of a night sky, trees outlined in blue and black
shadow, and the green shoots of garlic in the garden."
"1 found movements shaping words, words forming movements. " David

For David words "happened" while he was moving, but he also seemed to
explore a "line" in both the "pure movement" and "movement poetry" phases of
Jo-Ann ' s project. Here, as in improvisation, censorship loosens. Movement be
comes heuristic, opening the door to linguistic performance. To the extent that
ideas themselves are evoked as we move, words may begin to mix with, or cap
ture, the knowing and experiencing of movement. As a moment-to-moment phe
nomenon, such a relationship is indeed "tricky," hard to put into words alone.
Schwarz and S vane also encouraged the dancers to begin with a "motional term"
like "through" or "around." Overlie's experience attests to the power of this
approach: "I suddenly had a whole new movement vocabulary available to me. "
(Schwarz, 1 993, p . 44)

"to dancE with my pen " Stacey
Finally, there may be a post-movement effort to translate in words that "feel"
right. Through the medium of words, we "feel through" or "convey" the move
ment experience. Most of the dancers in Schwarz and Svane' s experiment use
writing as a post-movement processing of the subtle and intricate discoveries
and experiences they have had (Schwarz ' s essay describing his project includes a
total of fifteen written "reports" by the dancers).
The above "progression" mirrors Brand 's ( 1 994) continuum, though I should
echo her cautions about overlap and complexity (p. 1 56). In general, I speculate
that the emergence of sense through movement and into words depends on
our motives for using movement: to experience the "body ' s voice" for
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its own sake; to discover meanings and felt sense; to explore a pre
determined word or idea;
the confidence, ease, mood, or attitude of the mover, itself shaped by
the immediate context and its climate;
the trust of the group;
the intensity of the movement experience;
the highly particular experience in space-time;
the nature of the emerging and often simultaneous emotions, images,
and sensations; and
the kind of writing we are doing, before, during and/or after the
movements (recording, freewriting, reflecting, integrating into a larger
essay).
It seems clear from their writings that Schwarz and Svane ' s dancers per
ceived afresh the central ideas of their art. Jo-Ann's movers and witnesses, through
combined movement and writing, experienced sensations, images, words, and
ideas that writing without movement would not have produced. Moreover, these
dancers literally and figuratively moved beyond verbs, the traditional words of
action, transforming prepositions and adverbs into a new "movement vocabu
lary." The material in both experiments may be viewed as reflective, linguistic
cross-fertilizings of somatically transformed thinking. They seem shaped by the
movement experiences themselves, leading the dancers into memories, associa
tions, metaphors-the stuff of poems. B oth of these "movement-language events"
reveal a strong bond between what was felt and what was uttered; as a result,
learning had a "stick-to-the-ribs" quality.
As teachers, we can integrate movement into writing classes in different ways
and to different degrees, depending on several factors. From the systematic con
nections made by Klein and Hecker between movement and the progres sion of
thought i n writing, to Jo-Ann ' s more open-ended, intuitive approaches to
freewriting and "freedancing," our choices depend on our obj ectives and our
willingness to take risks. We might ask students who are reading and writing
about social issues to examine the metaphors of their own and others ' writings,
to detect the emotional-cognitive "movements" of thought, and to weave within
their reading and writing processes their own movement explorations.
But there are simpler, easier beginnings: I use movement for writers to warm
up and explore persona in text through physical, gestural activities such as facial
expressions or "walks" used in conjunction with oral reading (see Johnstone, 1 9 8 1 ,
on "status"). Peter Elbow ( 1 995) also offers a number o f ways o f incorporating
physical performance into reading and writing activities, such as choral readings
and tableaux.
Clearly, movement takes time, and often the movement-writing connection,
in its complex manifestations, i s not an efficient, instrumental means to finished
written products. It i s more about expanding our sense of what learning can be
and about connecting our multiple intelligences. To do this as teachers, we must
try to create a reassuring climate that diminishes self-consciousness and embar
rassment. We may feel safe relegating movement to a pre-writing stage of com-
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posing, and no doubt any greater role summons a changed vision: writers out of
their seats ; writers moving their bodies; writers transforming these experiences
into meaning. In essence, such images are a challenge to the prevailing culture of
what counts as learning, knowledge, and writing. cQJ
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The Subversive Element of Play:
Using Play, Dream and the B ody
in the Classroom
E l len W. Kaplan

0 n the summit of Mt. Greylock, mid-hike on a Sunday, my family and I wit

nessed an event that transformed us from casual observers into enthralled
spectators. Three "actors" were engaged in an extraordinary performance: They
were preparing to leap off a cliff. We stood spellbound as they unfurled their
gear, strapped themselves into it, and soared aloft. The performers , who received
warm applause from the folks gathered around, were hang gliders. As an actor
and acting teacher, I was struck by the analogy to theater: the concentration, the
risk, the resistance to obstacle (gravity).
Acting, at its best, i s like jumping off a cliff: intense, detailed preparation
followed by a j ump into the unknown; playful improvisation within constraints;
clarity and precision in observation; responsiveness to minute and ever-changing
stimuli, and, above all, trust of our resources, trust of the body ; feeling, reacting
in the moment to catch a current and stay aloft.
Hang gliding, like acting, is an embodied experience; the knowing is in the
doing. And learning to do it, so gliders say, comes from the "playing around"
they can only do in the air. Knowing, doing, and playing are inextricably linked
through the body-which is not to suggest that intellectual knowing is irrelevant.
An ability to understand and analyze the engineering principles behind glider
design or the aerodynamic principles that govern wind currents is essential
knowledge for anyone wishing to leave the ground. But, plainly, one can 't fly if
one doesn't fly.
An embodied experience puts body knowledge at the center of learning, the
sensate often unvoiced and unexamined knowledge that is part of a body ' s
history. But, like that which exists in dream and fantasy, what the body can ' t
tell us i s valid precisely because it i s often farthest from the reach o f social
prescription and the authority of others.
The mind abstracts experience, names, and categorizes it, bringing it into
conformity with the already known, the normative, the accepted. But the body
resists. It knows and has the capacity to act on its knowledge. Dance theorist
Randy Martin ( 1 990) finds that the body in action threatens to subvert rational
order, because it may well be a more reliable source of knowledge than the
"polluted" ( i . e . , socially influenced) mind. In this sense valuing embodied
experience i s fundamental to personal autonomy, to what Bruno Bettleheim ( 1 960)
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calls a person's "inner ability to govern [him or herself]" (p. 74). The very ma
teriality of the body makes it a subject, a site of agency; its actuality, its "pres
ence," i s intrinsic to agency.
Meaning, like agency, is directly linked to bodily experience. Mark Johnson
( 1 987), formulating a position that "put[s] the body back into the mind" (p. xxxvi),
contends that much of our understanding of the world takes the form of "meta
phorical projection from the realm of physical bodily interactions onto so-called
rational processes" (p. xx). In other words, meaning is derived from our bodily
experience; the meaning of balance, for example, (literal and conceptual; the
latter elaborated in metaphor) emerges from physical acts of balancing.
Acting-performing-is body-centered knowing. There i s a chasm between
my everyday self and the body that reveals itself in performance. When I act, the
shift in my physical life alters my perception. My understanding shifts with al
terations in alignment, adj ustments to my spine, changes in my center of gravity,
pauses in the rhythms of my breath. Paring my toenails with a rusty knife, grip
ping the earth with strong ankles and bare toes as the peasant Agata in Betti ' s
Goat Island ( 1 966), profoundly alters my preverbal, precognitive understanding.
I play the lover of a woman (with whom I am unacquainted) and inhibition is
replaced by intimacy; I act differently until "the act" i s over. What I experience
in those moments is an alternative self, a way of processing experience that comes
from re-ordering it, the stuff of creativity.

Repression and Subjugation of the Body
Society demands regulation of the body ; we contain it: what flows from it,
the space it occupies, the magnitude of its gestures, the loudness of its sounds .
B u t prohibition, censure, the filtering of impulse have corrosive effects o n
individuals a n d the larger community, both of which are diminished by their
inability to use the unexpected gesture as a source of knowledge. Reclaiming the
body, unlocking and welcoming it also releases the voice. Helene Cixous ( 1 98 1 ),
speaking of women' s bodies as "confiscated," says, "Censor the body and you
censor breath and speech at the same time. Write your self. Your body must be
heard" (p. 2 5 0 ) . Fluency, expressiveness, and the body ' s disinhibition are
interconnected qualities, with social and political implications beyond personal!
psychological ones. The needs of communities to regulate themselves are valid,
but so too are the need of individuals ' to assert themselves, to question, to advo
cate, to find and use their voices. Henry Loui s Gates Jr. ( 1 992) makes a strong
point about the ownership of meaning: "[Language/the word] exists in other
p e o p l e ' s m o u th s , in other p e o p l e ' s c o n te x t s , s er v i n g other p e o p l e ' s
intentions; . . . one must take the work, and make it ' one's own ' " (p. 44). A plural
istic, participatory society needs individuals who can make the word their own
and become the authors of that experience.

Playing and Doing
The body knows because it does. Doing relates to the world; we are social
"actors," and we change the world with our acts. Play, an "as if' doing, may be
a rehearsal for life, but it is also a rehearsal for social change. Perhaps, echoing
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Augusto Boa! ( 1 979), we could take the idea further: "Theater i s action ! Perhaps
not revolutionary in itself; but. . . a rehearsal of revolution" (p. 1 55 ) .
When w e play, w e set u p alternate worlds; w e create a n artifice, a structure
of rules that may mirror, invert, or negate the restrictions of everyday life. We
re-arrange, explode, connect, j uxtapose, by virtue of our curiosity alone. Play i s
both unruly and rule-bound, expansive and subversive; the release of energy,
desire, voice and power that emanates from playful bodies is disturbing and of
ten liberating.
In Art as Experience ( 1 934) John Dewey traces the Western predilection
for opposing play, the arts, all things physical, material, and actual with an
emphasis on abstraction and the ideal. But the serious play of art, doing, being,
and making contains within it the potential for transformation, the possibility of
redefining ourselves (and our students) as meaning-creating beings.

Going Inside
For several years while working in rural Pennsylvania and inner c ity
Philadelphia, I gave workshops in writing and creative drama for special educa
tion students (i.e., those identified with severe mental and physical impairments
or social maladjustment), ranging in age from kindergarten to high school. In a
room of rowdy and rambunctious kids who had been classified as disabled or
disturbed, I asked who in the room considered themselves a poet. Not too many
students responded "yes." Very few teenagers are eager to call themselves poets
under any circumstances, certainly not in front of their friends and especially not
to some stranger who ' s dumb enough to admit to being an actor and, worse, a
writer. Yet, these were kids with more passion and poetry and vivid insight than
could fit on the page. By what definition were they not budding, incipient poets?
What didn ' t work in these classrooms was instantly apparent: I couldn ' t go
in and say, for example: Let' s get out on the floor and act; Let' s pretend to be
other people, move from impulse, or be playful. Using your body i s a commit
ment; dignity and psychological candor are at stake. The deep silent breathing,
guided imagery, and free play with music that comprise the typical entry for be
ginning actors was out of the question; the risks for these students were too great.
Every age group presented different challenges, of course. But what worked
consistently was finding the "group temperature," a sense of the dynamics, per
sonalities, issues, and weaving a story with them that spoke out who they were in
that moment. Responses to a simple set of questions (Where would we be if we
weren 't here? Describe it, envision it, see it, say it. Who ' s there? Who' s talking?
What do you see there that makes you angry? What do you do about it? How
does it change? Is there a lesson?) became an out-loud story we created and shared.
From there we would make an environment and live in it, move through it,
respond to it: a riverbed, a drive-in. And trust a story to emerge.
With some groups the work remained preverbal; with others, dialogue and
role-play allowed for reworking dramatic material from students' own lives. In
one third grade class, for example, Aesop ' s fable, "The Lion and the Mouse,"
developed into a parable about an uncle j ailed for selling drugs and the child' s
ambivalence toward him. She understood the dramatic action b y embodying it.
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She scurried, nibbled, squealed, and hid in the face of danger (in her neighbor
hood) , and he protected her from harm. But when he needed her help (in this
case, her acceptance), she had to make choices about loyalty and her own sense
of moral behavior; she communicated her inner struggles eloquently and acted
on her decisions; in fact, she felt she couldn' t stick by him, contrary to the mouse
in the fable. She and her classmates explored and considered the implications of
all this in the context of play.
Through this work I found voices and bodies responding accurately to inner
impulses. Two years ago, in Orange, Massachusetts, I developed a theater piece
at a literacy center that celebrated the history of this rural town and the grit of its
inhabitants. At first the adults who wrote and performed Hometown Tales looked
at the blank page as a mortal enemy (the empty stage filled them with an even
greater degree of terror). They began slowly, telling stories about their working
lives, then recording and rewriting and shaping those stories into monologues. A
few brave individuals began to improvise, writing on their feet, so to speak. And
little by little they faced down the empty page, some beginning to express them
selves in bursts of raw, gutsy writing. Others worked with dialogue, exploring an
i ssue from two perspectives . Many found that not only had they something to
say, but they could say it and enj oy the experience. As one student stated after
the performance, "You know, you can act. You can really act. A lot of people out
there, they don ' t really realize what they can do . . . . When you do it, . . . you ' d be a
lot more stronger about things" (Kingsley, 1 993, p. 1 5 ) .

Principles and Strategies
H o w do we make the b o d y and i t s experience available to writers/
performers ? The trick i s to find the strate g i e s that unhook buttoned-up
creativity in students and channel it into forms that strengthen their expression.
The problems of self-censorship and stereotypical thinking haunt every class
room. With my special students (many of whom were highly expressive verbally
and physically but unable to articulate their insights), I used some of the same
basic strategies that I use in teaching acting, strategies designed to unleash the
stream of imagery and association we carry with us, and designed to connect this
inner life with physical impulse.

Crossing the Border
In acting classes I often layer in core images and texts, myth, music,
fragments of poetry, and dream j ournals to provide stimuli. In one class we used
myths of transformation to create a theater collage entitled Crossing the Border.
In small groups the class worked through a process of physical exploration,
j ournal and poetry writing, mimesis, interview, and historical research to create
s hort i mpro v i s ational piece s . The texts included selections from O v i d ' s
Metamorphosis, a n Inuit creation story, a Japanese legend about a geisha who
turns into a cat, and fragments of a tale from The A rabian Nights.
The process (which took place over several weeks) follows: First, the myths
are read aloud to the "dreamers," all the actors who are in a quiet state; they then
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draw their dream/responses without giving thought to the literal content, but
working from sense impressions and fleeting images. With music serving as a
foc u s , the actors envi s i o n and slowly move into the landscape they have
imagined. Supported by quiet side-coaching, they use movement and sensory
response to create an evocative terrain of obstacles, attractions , fearful and
forceful objects. Actors then focus on a powerful sensory event: the sound of an
axe, the smell of plantains. They allow it to act on them, to effect movement,
motive, and imagery. Voices might whisper in the shadows ; others might live
here . Actors begin to find a character, what that character wants , how that
character experiences this place. The actor then creates a ritual activity with
significance to his or her imaginary life. Finally, each actor recovers something
of value and leaves.
The private experience of the actors now needs to be shaped and shared. The
actors, working in the voice of their embryonic characters, write poems and read
them aloud in small groups. The groups are able to discern motifs, points of
connection and contradiction; this leads to discussion and the initial staging of
the myth.
A s the rehearsal progres s e s the groups research sources, keep a dream
journal, and write personal response material, including a dramatic monologue.
Music i s chosen, visual images are collected, text i s written, and the piece i s
rehearsed. Each actor within the group takes o n the function o f writer, designer,
director, or choreographer. The final phase involves structuring a group piece
that often incorporates elements of the myth with poetry, music, staging, and
dialogue.

Lynne
The progress that one student, Lynne, made through this work illustrates both
its effectiveness and its drawbacks. Lynne is a nontraditional student with no
background in writing or performing; her reasons for taking the class were, she
said, shyness and discomfort with her body. In one preparatory activity in which
the class began from silence and gradually connected movement to breath, Lynne
remained virtually frozen on the floor. When we added text (using phrases like
"Voice," "My voice," "I can speak," and then bits of poetry), she whispered
softly but began to move more freely. Only when we wrote short passages after
the experience, however, could she explore and expand on her feelings.
Things changed for Lynne when she was asked to come to class as a seven
year-old child. "That' s when I got past the adult part, the judging part. I got to
the child . . . the one I wanted to be, not the one that I w as . " She was becoming
attuned to the impulses beneath her movements as well. When her group chose
to work on "Orpheus and Eurydice," they contemporized the story. It became one
of betrayal and loss of self; Eurydice w as lost in a private hell, mesmerized by a
musician boyfriend who seduced her and saved her only to hurt her again in a
cycle of abuse, abandonment, and rescue. Lynne found this character' s voice in a
powerful, beautifully rendered monologue of a battered woman. (She told me
later that she had not experienced this herself but had gained insight through
empathy, role-play, and research.) Cheryl, her Eurydice in the monologue, seemed
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t o disappear in her lover, living through and for him,
justifying h i s behavior,
unable to extricate herself. Eurydice's hell was the loss of her own identity and
the abuse she withstood. The rescue of the myth was turned on its head. Cheryl
finally had the courage to leave her abusive lover.

Keys to the Kingdom
In staging the myths students found connections between their own lives and
the texts that were released and enriched by the playful and uncensored use of
their bodies. Let me list the basic elements which need to be integrated into this
work:
Physical warmups, not calisthenics, but free movement connecting
body, breath, image, and impulse;
Inner listening (deep relaxation, meditation, focus on breath) to become
aware of the flow of images inside;
Sensory work to sharpen perception;
Countering the inner censor that i s tied to shame (This means working
against an atmosphere of discomfort with oddity, emotion, the "too
big" response.);
Respecting muscle memory, following physical impulse; and
Welcoming the random, the chaotic, the unpredictable.
There is a need to "three-dimensionalize" learning, to consider body, emotion,
intuition, and imagination as partners with intellect. There are strong pedagogi
cal reasons to cons ider teaching literature through rhythm, science through
simulation, and politics through role-play. A s w e endorse playful ways of
learning, we also move toward interdisciplinary, less field-specific approaches .
Play i s work o r a t least it might b e . Anthropologist Victor Turner ( 1 982)
wrote a series of essays subtitled "The Human Seriousness of Play" in which he
explains how play, which is a form of work for a child, may also perform work i n
society. In preindustrial cultures, he suggests, play contains "the s e e d s o f
cultural transformation, discontent with the way things are culturally, and social
criticism" (p. 45). The opportunity to "play" with variables, to experiment be
yond the limits of the norm, to offer freedom from constraint, i s what makes play
ergic or work-like; play changes society, or rather, allows the experimentation
beyond constraint that contains the seeds of change. The ergic potential of play
is restricted in industrial societies; the question is to what extent might we be
able to make use of its power.
Through play we meet a different order of knowing, a way of knowing in
which, to paraphrase Henri Bergson ( 1 946), we place ourselves directly at the
heart of the subject. We do with our bodies, and doing is a way of knowing. Play,
which i s an unencumbered doing in an "as if' world, i s a crucial part of the way
we know. cQJ
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The Found Play:
Learning and Teaching the Value
of Interpretive Reading and Writing
Randi Patterson and Kim Jern igan
What is important is not to elaborate and
disseminate knowledge about literature (in
"literary histories ") but to show literature
to be a mediator of knowledge.
Roland B arthes

I i s usually taken for granted. As educators, we focus on reading literary works

n traditional langu�ge education, the value of interpretive reading and writing

and writing critically about them with the underlying assumption that this type
of reading and writing is valuable. However, many entry level students aren ' t s o
sure. "Why must we take apart this story o r poem? Isn ' t the experience of read
ing it enough? Surely the writer didn't intend for us to waste time thinking about
this structure or image pattern. Where do you get all thi s?" Despite some resis
tance, students and educators are comfortable conceptualizing a literary text (ca
nonical or not) primarily as a "thing," an artistic artifact or cultural icon worthy
of study for its own sake, aesthetic pleasure, or historical-cultural representa
tion. By conceptualizing the literary text as aesthetic object, we encourage both
mute aesthetic response and thematic and/or cultural criticism. This approach i s
itself necessary, but limited. Students are unsure o f the value o f interpretation
itself, the importance and utility of the practice of critical reading and writing.
Consequently, we must teach the nature and value of interpretation explicitly.
If we focus on the work as both artifact and interpretive act, two types of
interpretation are involved: authorial interpretation (the act of writing as both
conscious and unconscious interpretation) and readerly interpretation. Because
both are acts of interpretation, what the reader does can be seen as an extension
of what the author does, rather than, as some students believe, antithetical to it or
nonexistent. As such and arguably most important, the text i s a medium that
enables us to see the value of our own acts of interpretation, our own readerly
processes .
What is at i s sue here i s not simply the difference between product and
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process, but between our conceptualization and separation of "knowledge" as
fact or artifact and "knowing" as a meaning-making process. While we strongly
agree with critics such as Louise Rosenblatt ( 1 978) and Stanley Fish ( 1 980) that
a transactional or interpretive theory of reading is necessary to effective reading
and writing, most educators today are under pressure to acknowledge the role
played by factual knowledge. However, we believe that this notion must be con
sidered in any comprehensive articulation of the nature of "knowledge," a word
which, after all, has both noun and verb forms.
Theorists as disparate as the hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the
progressive educational psychologist Howard Gardner agree that interpretation,
as a conscious cognitive skill, is invaluable in the search for self-knowledge and
the need to overcome unconscious, limiting habits of thought. For Ricoeur ( 1 98 1 )
hermeneutics involves not only a resolution of conflicting interpretations, but
more importantly, the search for self-understanding by means of cultural works,
particularly works of art. Gardner urges "education for understanding," whereby
one attains "a sufficient grasp of concepts, principles, or skills so that one can
bring them to bear on new problems and situations, deciding in which ways one's
present competencies can suffice and i n which ways one may require new skills
or knowledge" ( 1 99 1 , p. 1 8).
In order to foc u s our students ' attenti o n o n the l i terary work a s an
interpretive act deriving both from the autho r ' s conscious and unconscious
shaping of experience and the nature of language itself, w e developed an
exercise that requires students to eavesdrop on an actual conversation and then
transcribe and shape this conversation into a short dramatic scene or "found"
play. This exercise allows them to come at a literary artifact from the perspective
of writer, performer, and critical reader by finding, enacting, and responding to a
drama in their own domain. As we discovered, three types of interpretation are
j uxtaposed and made conscious in this proj ect. When students turn actual dia
logue into a play, they discover for themselves that the literary artifact i s itself a
work of interpretation-their own. When the work is performed, they discover
that there are additional levels of mediation (such as casting, setting, symbols,
and word choice) which also influence interpretation. Finally, when evaluation
takes place (self, peer, and instructor), students engage in the act of critical
interpretation with which we are most familiar. By identifying these types of
interpretations, we had been privileging literary criticism as evaluation and not
teaching the value of interpreting the text as itself a work of both authorial and
readerly hermeneutics.
In order to take readers through our process, we outline the origins of the
found play project, present a brief found play, examine the types of interpreta
tion at work during the three main phases of the project, and articulate the peda
gogical advantages of the project as a whole .

Origins of the Project (Kim)
I devised this exercise for a first-year genres course (i.e., short stories, drama,
novels , and poetry), the sort of course that attracts both students for whom it will
be the only English course they take at the university and those for whom it is
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the entry course into an English major. In Ontario first year students are
typically 1 8 or 19 years old, though a number of second and third year students
and returning students extended the age range to 4 5 . Consequently, students
diverged both in their ability and their enthusiasm for the kind of close analysis
we practiced in class. For some, criticism seemed to diminish their emotional
response to a literary work without increasing their intellectual or aesthetic
engagement in it or their understanding of the way language, inevitably, shapes
their own experience. The question of authorial intent was often the stickler, that
is, the question of whether criticism is a matter of perceiving or interpreting
meaning or of simply extracting what the author has "put into" the text. Students
were willing to accept both the constructed nature of the text and also the
possibility that the act of construction might be partly intuitive, conditioned by
the author ' s own psychology, culture, or historical and economic position. But
they felt confident neither of their ability to divine the author ' s intention nor of
their right to i nterpret the text.
The term hermeneutics means not only to interpret but to translate into one's
own idiom. I wanted an exercise that would help my students see how they
selected, framed, and patterned the details of ordinary life in order to make it
meaningful. I wanted them to understand that shaping the play was eased or
frustrated by language, that is, how language both reflects and constructs the
world. By having them play author, and then allowing the class to respond to
their work, I hoped to d e m o n s trate h o w a text can s u s tain a v ariety of
interpretations, not all of which are subject to the author ' s control.
A number of other educators have demonstrated the effectiveness of creative
writing as a means to critical reading ( see Bowen, 1 99 3 ; Gebhardt, 1 988). Of
particular relevance to the found play exercise i s Peter Parisi's ( 1 979) contention
that creative writing, when offered for class discussion, can focus students' at
tention on the indeterminacy of their own language and on the way both the writ
ing of a primary text and its subsequent reading are interpretative acts. By ob
serving what students make of their own work, their peers come to appreciate
that language is not so much "the transparent garment of the writer ' s thought" as
"a locus of. . . possible meanings" which an adept reader or writer can "sense, con
trol, and ultimately exploit (p.64).

The Found Play (Randi)
The proj ect began with this basic intent: to personalize both authorial
intent and critical interpretation. The students were not asked to create a play,
but to form actual dialogue, so they could experience how the author molds and
thus interprets experience without the overwhelming task of imagining a play.
Kim introduced it as an impromptu exercise, marking the transition from their
study of short fiction to drama. I subsequently wrote the project into the course,
supplementing class discussion with written responses from students in their dual
role as playwright and critic.
The plays ranged from social realism to theater of the absurd, from farce to
self-reflexive metadrama, plays that call attention to the process of their own
construction. Circular forms were popular; and most, like the one below, pre-
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sented a slice of student or family life. The following play is typical of what
students produced or found, both in its personal subject matter and its seeming
inconsequentiality.

Dinner Table Talk (Ang Vachon)
Characters : Mom, Dad, Teenage Daughter, and Younger Daughter.
Mom: [yells] Dinner!

[Mom, Dad, and Younger Daughter all sit down at the dinner table. Mom and
Dad are discussing their days. ]
Mom: I was talking to my s ister today, and she told me that Brian cries every day
when she drops him off at school. He says he hates his teacher.
Dad: [uninterested] Oh, yeah.
Younger Daughter: [whining] Mom, cut the fat off my meat.
Mom: [yelling] Becky ! It's dinner time !
Dad: [sarcastic] She ' s probably on the phone again !
Younger Daughter: Why do we always have to have salad?
Mom: Because it's good for you. Now stop asking questions and eat your dinner.

[Older Daughter sits down at the table. ]
Older Daughter: Pork chops are so gross ! They're fattening and I don' t want one.
Younger Daughter: [whining again] I have to eat my salad so she has to eat her
meat !
Older Daughter: [says to sister] You be quiet ! [turns to mother] But Mom ! I ' m
o n a diet!
Mom: [frustrated] I don't care. Do what you want!
Younger Daughter: Danny had to sit in the thinking chair today because he spit in
Jenny ' s hair.
Older Daughter: We ' re eating ! Don't tell us your gross stories now !
Dad: Be nice to your sister.
Older Daughter: Well, tell her not to . . . .

[ Telephone rings. The Older Daughter jumps up to answer it. ]
Older Daughter: I ' ll get it! [She exits . ]

Levels of Interpretation
The Play as Artifact: " Writing " the Found Play (Kim)
Our instructions were minimal as to what constitutes a play. We asked
students to listen for a bit of dialogue that had some sort of dramatic tension. We
stressed that they need not reproduce the found text exactly, that they could trust
memory to select the significant detail, intuition to shape it, and intellect to name
it. Supplying a title was the one overtly interpretive gesture they needed to make.
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The first thing the students were able to see was how the most mundane
exchange became significant as soon as they lifted it from the quotidian, framed
it, and set it before an audience. Presenting life as a literary artifact creates the
illusion that everything is significant and connected. Because the found dialogues
were isolated and transformed, the class saw them as cohesive texts and auto
matically treated them as meaningful and the details symbolic.
The intention of the author of Dinner Table Talk was to present a slice
of ordinary family talk-fragmented and discontinuous-as opposed to sitcom
family conversation. She claimed not to have given much thought as to how to
give it aesthetic form. However, the class saw the telephone as a framing device.
The teenage daughter i s presumably late for dinner because she is on the
telephone. She subsequently uses the telephone to escape from the dinner table
and the tension she has helped create. What is ordinarily a vehicle of communi
cation becomes, ironically, a symbol of the failure to communicate. The teenager ' s
refusal t o hear her younger sister ' s concerns i s prefigured by the father's failure
to attend to the mother and undermines the sincerity of his imperative, "Be nice
to your sister." The play contains a number of passing references to culturally
engendered values (for instance, the importance that teenage girls attach to being
thin) and the whole argument around food is perhaps emblematic of a larger
conflict in the family about what's "good for you."
Such discussion focuses attention on the construction of meaning and on the
degree to which a literary text is fluid or fixed. The "finder" of this play had not
put in this symbolic detail in any conscious way. However, she could see in
retrospect that in making her decisions about how to shape the play-where to
begin and end, what to juxtapose-she had recognized, without fully articulat
ing, the patterns inherent in the situation itself.
As we hoped, students reported that the found play exercise gave them
insight not only into literature but also into their own experience. One student,
recording a conversation with an older relative which took place while they were
raking leaves, thought he had written a simple play about male bonding when in
fact, he had written about his s adness on his fathe r ' s aging. When another
student focused attention on a passing inquiry about the student's father (then
severely crippled with arthritis), he began to see how much the whole interaction
was overshadowed by his father's absence, the father ' s inability to do such simple
things as rake leaves, and how the setting (the time of year, the falling leaves,
and other details he had thought to include) underscored a loss he was feeling but
had not yet articulated.
As their classmates responded to the plays, students began to relinquish the
egocentric attitude that the author controls the text. At the same time, they
d i s covered how many supposedly l iterary device s-the use of metaphors,
repetition, silences, circular structures-are akin to their strategies for making
experience intelligible. This helped them read with greater attention and begin to
appreciate criticism.

The Play as Enactment: Performing the Found Play (Kim)
If creating the play as artifact allowed students to see how art can
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determine as well as reflect what is significant in the world, then performing the
plays in class allowed them to see how many different forms interpretation can
take. This had two positive consequences: It made criticism seem less daunting,
and it empowered a d i fferent s e g m e n t of the c l a s s by fac i l i tating l e s s
language-centered types o f interpretation.
Drama is a particularly u seful genre for demonstrating the naturalness
and value of interpretive response because of its inherent levels of mediation.
Words of a play are not sacrosanct but are "interpreted" by the casting, the
staging, the pacing-modes of interpretation more easily enacted, though no less
telling, than conventional academic criticism. The playwrights were asked
whether their plays turned out i n performance as they had envisioned them.
Often casting, vocal tonality, expre s si o n , gesture s , and timing s hifted the
intended meaning. For i nstance, the author of Dinner Table Talk could see
how her play could be enacted humorously (for the comic predictability of the
s ib l i n g r i v al ry, the parents ' help l e s s r e s i g nation, the audience ' s b e n i g n
identification with the scene) or more soberly ( a s a sociological inquiry into
family breakdown).
Students were directed to consider not only the more obvious theatrical
devices at work, but also the cultural context and how that affected their recep
tion of the play. What was the effect of university students playing older or younger
characters? How might people of different ages or economic classes react to the
play ? How do changes in the race or gender of given characters affect our sense
of the power relationships at work? They could see, for instance, how, without
changing a word of the text, casting women in a male locker room drama imme
diately changed the impact of the scene. Thus, they were prepared to accept that
a work' s professed ideology and its implicit ideology can be at odds.
Gardner ( 1 99 1 ) proposes that intelligence i s not single but multiple, that
students have disparate learning styles depending on the form of intelligence that
dominates . Humans possess to varying degrees the following seven "intelli
gences": linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic,
interpersonal, and intrapersonal. Gardner argues that many "who exhibit the ca
nonical [scholastic] mind are credited with understanding, even when real under
standing is limited or absent" while others "who are capable of exhibiting sig
nificant understanding appear deficient, simply because they cannot readily traf
fic in the commonly accepted coin to the educational realm" (p. 1 2- 1 5 ) . Our
educational system increasingly favors language-centered learners. Gardner urges
educators to teach to a variety of learning styles. An unanticipated side effect of
the found play was the sense of community it built in the class. The quality and
engagement in class discussion increased as types of learners who had been re
luctant to participate felt their disparate learning styles validated. B owen ( 1 993)
also found that the use of creative writing as a mode of critical inquiry levels the
playing field and that student involvement in play production as well as in re
sponse leads to richer discussion of the critical i s sues raised by the primary text.
It also increases awareness of both the techniques available to writers in a given
genre and the effects these techniques create. Both B owen and Gardner envision
a topic as a room with many doors; students will enter it differently depending
on their learning styles.
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The Play and Criticism: Evaluation as Interpretation (Randi)
The play as artifact and the play as enactment are forms of interpretation
and also incentives to a third kind of interpretation. In order to help students
discover what and how they know intuitively and to use that knowledge and
experience to enhance critical interpretation, I subsequently developed several
evaluative techniques. The first two times we tried this exercise, we focused on
authorial i nterpretation and the l e v e l s of mediation inherent i n dramatic
performance. In an effort to stress the importance of this kind of experiential
exercise or performance-based learning, I graded each found play and provided a
written assessment of how the play made meaning through the use of symbols,
word choice, non-verbal dramatic devices, and so forth. For instance, one found
play presented two roommates discussing an unspecified event taking place off
stage that the characters ostensibly could see, but the audience could not. The
result was a comic Theater of the Absurd. While the class could articulate why
the play was funny, my interpretations not only provided a critical vocabulary to
facilitate interpretation but also eased the transition from authorial intent and
performance-based response to criticism.
In order to encourage students to take part i n this type of criticism, I
scheduled more time for in-class discussion of each play (7-8 minutes for each
2-3 minute play). To stress transferring oral criticism into critical writing, after
hearing and contributing to class discussion, students were required to fill out a
one-page written evaluation of two found plays. I assessed and graded this
evaluation and returned it to the student playwrights. In addition, the playwrights
were free to comment i n class on the performance of their plays and were
required to submit a brief evaluation of their play as performed, with particular
attention to levels of mediation that resulted in unexpected interpretation.
Con sequently, all students received oral and written feedback from other
students and the i n s truc tor, a s well a s experience in writing authori a l ,
performance-based, and critical interpretation.
In my evaluation of Dinner Table Talk, I focused on how the title influences
our interpretation of the play as an example of "talk" and lack of communication
or genuine "conversation . " The students were comfortable naming the play as
social realism which used both the telephone and the entire family situation sym
bolically. What was most satisfying for the students, as the playwright herself
noted, was the interaction between shared personal experience as dramatically
portrayed and the pleasure of articulating how this experience worked as a play.
Bridges had been built between personal experience and authorial, performative,
and critical interpretation, bridges that facilitated a sense of the personal value,
limitations, and pleasure. Having had several interpretive experiences in relation
to their own found play and the accessible and assessable plays of their peers, the
students were able to apply these kinds of interpretations to the anthologies stud
ied in the course.
Then for us came the process of interpreting what the project had achieved and
how. When we repeat the project, we will stress the movement of the play from arti
fact, to enactment, to authorial and readerly interpretation. We will stress how both
literature and criticism are ways of knowing and of creating knowledge.
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What may resist articulation to some extent but nevertheles s be enacted in
class i s the value of interpretive reading and writing. To some degree, the
interpretation of a literary cultural artifact is used to provide justification for the
value of a work. The text as literary artifact is a useful concept for reading in
relation to historical and cultural concerns which must be recognized and used
responsibly. But it must not be given priority over the pedagogical and personal
value of learning about the nature of interpretation itself. Like particle and wave
theories used to describe the nature of light, the nature of the text (and the nature
of the text as knowledge) encompasses this basic act. Literary interpretation, then,
not only operates within this epistemic system, but also provides us with the op
portunity to foreground the nature of interpretation itself, to foreground the ways
that we both know the world and create verbal knowledge. As the found play
playwrights seemed to experience, interpretive reading and writing i s not valu
able for the purpose of dissection or even to interpret a work for its own sake.
By becoming conscious of different types of interpretation as we work in rela
tion to literature, we become conscious of how we limit ourselves with private,
disconnected interpretations, how we can expand our ethical and cultural hori
zons by grappling with other interpretations, and why we should take pleasure i n
the human experience as it i s enacted in both literature and interpretive reading
and writing. cQj
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Subj ectivity and Academic Discourse:
Apples, Cupcakes, and Beige
Frances Jo G rossman

Pain gives of its healing power
where we least expect it.
Martin Heidegger

P which never passes over completely into language, i s always something

aul Ricoeur writes,"What asks to be brought to language in symbols ; but

powerful. . . " ( 1 976, p. 63). This "something powerful" precipitated a search when
I believed my writing held nothing ever to say again. Poet-philosopher Martin
Heidegger describes poetry "as saying which, in preparing the sayable, simulta
neously brings the unsayable as such into a world" ( 1 97 1 , p . 74). Heidegger places
language in the context of disclosing and opening: "Language alone brings what
is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time" (p. 73). I had not been
aware of "something" needing to be brought into the Open. I was simply lost,
and the world was colored gray.
I kept remembering Camu s ' first line from The Stranger: "Mother died
today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can ' t be sure" ( 1 95 8 , p. 5 6 3 ) . And, I remember the
coldness I felt not knowing exactly which day. That stranger ultimately gazed at
"the dark spangled sky from a prison chamber with his heart open to the benign
indifference to the universe" (p. 640) . The stranger' s tale presented difficult
questions for both me and a sophomore class. During my early college teaching,
I fell in love with Existentialism and such phrases as Camu s ' "condemned to
freedom" ( 1 966, p. 3 0 1 ), Sartre' s "existence precedes essence" ( 1 966, p. 277),
and Pascal ' s "you must wager ... which will you choose" ( 1 966, p. 223). I still
hold close those books, but my perspectives on responsibility, teaching, and choice
have been tempered by sharp encounters with mortality.
•

•

•

My mother died on September 7th. I know the day, a holiday denoted to honor
laborers, September ' s first Monday. I remember the scene. That early morning I
heard my name called by a stranger in a North Carolina mountain camp. Turning
from the breakfast line, I set down the cold metal tray and followed the camp
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director. Something within me began a deep beating because the retreat had
specified, "No telephones , except in emergency." The director pointed to a tele
phone in the kitchen. I listened, then sank into the chair brought by another
stranger to whom I had waved, "Come, help." Help translate the words from my
youngest daughter, calling long distance with her message, incomprehensible,
yet the familiar language of sorrow-language of death.
There had been that other death-my brother, my blue-eyed twin. Seeing my
tears on his last visit, he held my hand, "I didn't mean to hurt you." His wound
ing words, spoken moments earlier, had merely been the truth. My daughter ' s
critical illness could no longer b e hidden behind the mask I wore, pretending
against such reality. Seeing my confusion, he gave a prescription to return from
grief. "Be with people," he prompted, knowing my penchant for seeking refuge
in the words of poets rather than in the presence of others.
And then he was gone. Outrageous humor, boots, tall brother. Gone. I cannot
remember the day he died. Several seasons have turned, and although that Sun
day morning scene i s still vivid, I can never remember the date of that call. Alone
in my bedroom, I was told of storms, icy curves, car destroyed, and a coroner' s
findings. Someone later offered, "Died instantly." Just a season t o remember, a
time preceding the South's early spring, about daffodil time. What now of my
brother and my mother gone too? Both birthdays arrive in April, but neither i s
here t o receive flowers o r telephone calls. Time t o mark this interim o f floor
sitting, reading poetry, Matthew Arnold's "The Scholar Gypsy" ( 1 959), the title I
have always transposed to "The Gypsy Scholar." Does it matter whether one is a
gypsy scholar or a scholar gypsy? It quite likely matters. A colleague counsels ,
"Claim the voice y o u already know ; y o u have no other time. What fear binds you
rather than lets you assert your knowing?" My responses are feeble. I say, I
don' t have enough depth; I need another degree or a deeper understanding of
Heidegger ' s being and Kierkegaard' s caritas (as cited in Brown, 1 95 5 ) .
•

•

•

I had forgotten my exhortations to my students, "Write what you know."
Truest writing emerges in stages not clearly defined yet somehow discernible.
Writing develops through story; the extended narratives tell what happened. With
familiar guidelines students choose sequences of temporal order or re-ordering
the telling of the hour, the day, the event. Find the pictures, describe them, feel
the scene. See the images in your mind's eye; re-create them with words as your
resource.
And they write stories that beguile with their sincerity and bravery and alert
me to dangers in their lives. The class applauds stories that capture what it is to
be the only white kid, the only black kid, the one assigned a seat behind the
bookcase where she could hear but barely see the teacher. We read of a high
school senior's battle to extricate herself from gang membership in the Blades.
She knew the inevitable confrontation must be set in a public place; the police
would be called if anyone were cut or shot. And someone was shot, and the po
lice did come. The summer ends. Students' papers mix graduation and college
with funerals for friends, a suicide, and a drug-related street killing. Accessible,
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extraordinarily vivid, the stories speak, "This is me-the self who write s . "
Then, moving toward more formal discourse, the students blend personal
narrative with critical reflection. Some students make this transition without strain,
yet few retain their natural voice, wry humor, or assured sense of "I know where
fore I write. "
Again, on the floor surrounded b y the texts o f Yeats, Eliot, and Arnold, all
who have given the world a "scholar gypsy" (gypsy scholar?), I cannot write.
Not just my story seems lost, but the autonomy and assurance that I earned in
teaching term after term feel broken. I do not yet recognize this incertitude as a
deep struggle to reclaim writing, my voice. Yet, my body knows that special sen
sitivity of entering the classroom to eager and not-so-eager students, where I live
the role of teacher in the manner taught by Louis Agassiz (Shaler, 1 95 7 ) , or Jo
seph Conrad, or Maya Angelou, or Annie Dillard and all those who have guided
our seeing.
But in this moment, my questions spiral darkly. What do I see? What do I
have to say? Where is my story? My story is loss-loss and fear of being aban
doned with no one to notice or care whether I ever write again.
Then I remember this gypsy-the scholar and the wonder of Arnold's story.
I return to the old legend, the tale of the run-away scholar who learns of powers
and ancient mysteries and never comes back, though he has promised to share his
newly found secrets to fellow scholars. Yet, Arnold does not condemn the gypsy's
failure to return; instead, he accepts the truant and makes a plea to "keep thy
s olitude" and "unconquerable hope . " Arnold creates a poetic world where
enchantment, timelessness, and immortality prevail.
Perpetually at play, the gifted scholar portrays one of many heroes in
literature who pose questions about losing intuition or suppressing impulses. As
literary critic, Arnold affirmed that the effect of literature on readers must be
given serious consideration; he considered essential those "qualities which for
tify readers" (Trilling, 1 95 9 , p. 589) to help them become more resolute in con
fronting a world of difficult change. In writings marked by concern for imagina
tion, the validation of emotion, and fear of loss of the power to feel, Arnold, the
poet, cared.
Now, the poet' s caring restores me to what is already known-stories must
be told; stories must be written. I guide myself as I guide reluctant students.
"Begin with your own story. You can ' t get it wrong." It i s then that I begin
writing my stories:
Growing up in the western Pennsylvania's foothills, I watched
the seasons turn in majestic autumns, long winters, with spring
colors not seen until May. Mother, from Alabama, told us about
early spring-February with daffodils blooming down "home. " We
never believed her. We thought, just another story of longing for
the red dirt farm of her girlhood.
When no family i n our neighborhood owned an automobile, buses
were transportation to any "where. " On Mother ' s Saturday trip
downtown, she brought me a red apple from the open-air stand. I no

44

JAEPL, Vol. l , Winter 1995-1996

longer remember what she bought for my brothers and s i ster s :
Encircling her, we scanned packages placed on the kitchen table.
She brought me a single apple. I remember.
This fall, about a month after Labor Day, I began buying apples, bags and
bags of apples.
In seventh grade I packed my lunch with Mother's lunch "stuff''
bologna, cold cellar apples, and chocolate cupcakes in store-bought
packages of three. Mother cut open the packages of cakes, and we
rewrapped them in packages of two in wax paper. We seventh grad
ers, the silliest beings inhabiting our planet, pointed, and shrieked.
I noticed other cupcakes in neat cellophane, vanilla squiggles across
the top, filled with cream.
This fall, about a month after Labor Day, I began buying cellophane
packages of chocolate cupcakes with vanilla squiggles and creamy filling.
I sometimes bought three packages and ate them all at once.
Mother wore beige, beige blouses, s weaters, suits, shoes, and
several coats . When I was seven, she chose brown velvet for my
Christmas pageant dress. A long time ago I wore beige or tan until a
day came when I realized that my entire wardrobe was some shade
of brown. After that, I bought black, fuchsia, blues, burgundy, and
gray and wear blue and black until this day.
Thi s fall, about a month after Labor Day, I bought an old beige corduroy
j acket (reversible, beige inside and out) at my favorite thrift store. I wore it
every day.
By the end of January my sense of days and nights was confused. I ' d awaken
in a cold sweat wondering, "What time is it? What has happened?" And with a
sharp blow, I would blur back to awareness-it is a new year. Then friends told
me, "Eventually a sleep deficit takes its toll. You need to rest and release your
mind from the burden of this wakeful watching." Maybe I was guarding the night
universe so no more brothers or mothers would get lost. And then I wrote:

Apples, Cupcakes, and Beige
I began buying apples
green, golden,
granny apples,
beautiful heart shaped,
red delicious,
little blue circles claiming
prize quality
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I bought more apples
adding to the bottom
refrigerator drawer already full
more green, more red, more gold
I did not eat any
I bought chocolate twinkies
seventh grade cupcakes
with cream filled centers
I bought three packages of two
and ate them all at once
I bought an ugly beige corduroy j acket
and wore it every day
and finally
I awoke in the middle of the night
screaming
I am not a dying frail old woman.
I have not yet burned the j acket
but the chocolate crusade is over
and I really like oranges and bananas
and today
I saw a red headed woodpecker
and a tiny little,
nondescript, as they say,
brown bird
and, I am not as afraid
of spring as I was.

And my friends cried with me, "We ' re glad you ' re back." I did not know I had
gone away. Until I became conscious of my deep waking sleep of guarding the
world, I had not noticed the calendar turning. It was daffodil time, the season of
my brother ' s death. I did not know that my longing for his presence had been so
strong that I would forget his formula for living and instead become the mother
who joined her first son. Fragile little woman who had completed her l ife, gone
now with no more April birthdays on earth .
•

•

•

Once our body ' s buried grief is recognizable in the light of language, it can
be named. Phenomenologists differ on many i s sues but largely agree that human
beings embody consciousness. Merleau-Ponty ( 1 962) states, "My body knows
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more of the world than I myself' (p. 276). In order to exist, the thoughts and
visions that seek completion become embodied in words. "The naming of obj ects
does not follow their recognition, but is this recognition itself' ( 1 962, p. 207).
Remy Kwant ( 1 960) writes, "To name is to bring to light. As long as a thing is
unnamed . . .it is submerged in a realm of obscurity. Through being named it emerges
as a point of light in the world" (p. 3 8 ) . Thus, grief moves from silence, to faint
vision, to fragile wording, and then into a written-albeit fragmented-story.
And story releases the "lost" writer back to the work of the world.
Writing, too, has been waiting, because I have abandoned several proj ects
in the middle. Frank Kermode ( 1 967), exquisite scholar-writer, tells us there are
no beginnings. We always arrive in the "middest," to use his language (p. 39).
We always come in the middle, but that is our beginning. Writers, professionals,
and novices need reminders that we are always beginning and ending; each
ending is a beginning, with each moment unlike any other.
Research demonstrating that the very act of composing is an epistemologi
cal tool (Bruner, 1 98 7 ; Emig, 1 977) confirms experience and returns us to
primary questions. Does any single plane of language describe the encounter of
subj ective experience with objective existence? Metaphor promises illumina
tion; empirical evidence provides data. Different domains of experience require
different ways of seeing. The ambiguity of some experiences obliges us to under
stand them at multiple levels. And some individuals do not know that or they
need reminders of simultaneous meanings. To select an interpretive strategy from
such a multiplicity of choices holds potential confusion for any writer.
Yet, liberation for writers lies in the awarenes s that we need not follow an
orientation that challenges our own integrity. We can remain on chosen ground.
Herbert Fingarette ( 1 963) articulates this concept:
The question is not how to introduce what is alien in spirit into any
of these visions . . . [but ] , rather, to shift from one great vision to an
other so as to maximize our total vision, to deepen it, to build in
many dimensions, to render what was opaque into that which i s never
transparent but increasingly translucent. (p. 2 3 5 )
Writers live in a world so paradoxical that a t the very moment of fixing words in
print, they may become inwardly aware of changes which can only be addressed
in retrospect. The more critical the writing, the more likely perception shifts, the
more likely other perspectives will emerge, complementary or contradictory,
though not essentially canceling the others . There is more to tell than I can ever
say, and I know this even as I write. The challenge of "writing what you know"
chooses a stance of informed naivete, not burdened or burdening others by
assertions of absolutes. Yet the challenge remains to stay open to sharper visions
of experience. Kwant ( 1 969) notes the paradox: "Strange as it may seem, our
intellectual interpretations can sometimes make us blind to the original given"
(p. 1 40). Bringing light to our questions rather than losing them in labyrinths of
theory is essential to our goals .
Now, I again remember Camus ( 1 95 5 ) and his last line from "The Myth of
Sisyphus" that I have often repeated: "One must imagine Sisyphus with j oy"
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(p. 9 1 ). I do not know the exact day of my brother ' s leaving; I simply cannot
remember. However, awake, I returned to teaching where my students are simul
taneously serious and outrageously funny.
Despite Peter Elbow ' s ( 1 99 1 ) free writing and Gabriele Rico ' s ( 1 99 1 )
clustering, at times students have trouble beginning. P o s s ible responses :
"Focus. Be present to your thinking. A writer ' s Now is the beginning and the
ending." The writing surprises with the unexpected. The readings delight with
recognition. Thoreau, Rodriguez, Welty, Walker, and all those beloved writers
who cared to capture a reality so transitory that writing is the barest suggestion
of what is. Most important, they cared not only to write for themselves but they
cared enough to write for us, too.
I remember now other tasks, questions to research. How do personal stories
connect to external contexts, to academic i s s u e s ? I am not alone here. The
very mentors who grounded my philosophical orientation offer more than an
understanding of classroom dynamics; they defy any mandate that composition
teaching i s limited to traditional discourse, questioning not just the language of
sophisticated formality but a writing stance of detachment, the impersonal, the
lack of emotion (see Berthoff's concept "the consciousness of consciousnes s . "
1 98 1 , p. 65). Expres sive thinking and critical distinctions support the writer in
merging objective and subjective knowing-although we have come to under
stand that such designations of knowing are not sufficient. James Moffett
affirms the whole student, expressing concern that the absence of spiritual val
ues seriously inhibits writing, that isolated writing in artificial contexts divorces
writing from "all octaves of our being-physical , emotional, intellectual, and
spiritual" (Brand & Graves, 1 994, p. x i ) . The parade of scholars, theorists,
and perhaps gypsies proceeds along with the ongoing debate of the permeable
boundaries connected to teaching writing both personal and academic, both
critical and creative (Gleason, 1 99 3 ; Wyche-Smith & Rose, 1 990). Within this
multiplicity, some embrace a dialectic between the poles of the personal and the
p u b l i c , for although rhetorical tradi t i o n s have separated n arration fro m
exposition, they can be considered a n "interdynamic continuum" (Dipardo, 1 990,
p. 84 ). The theories of Paul Ricoeur ( 1 980) and Jerome Bruner ( 1 987) provide
the scholarly basis for accepting narrative as a way of knowing.
Writing moves toward wholeness when students engage in the struggle to
give passionate expres sion to their own i s s u e s . Racism, abuse, and family
dilemmas evolve from personal stories to rhetorical situations appropriate i n
academic circles . Students generally do n o t think o f themselves as writers, b u t i f
their work i s read aloud and applauded, they c a n no longer deny that possibility.
Other times when students hear each others ' voices, the silence creates a space to
name a tacit dimension that had existed prior to the writing but had not found
expression. This is the mystery of intersubjectivity. By beginning with the real,
the true, the issues emerge subterranean from the stories as each writer finds
affirmation in, "As I see this, it i s . "
We c a n create a n honest space for silence t o move into words. We do this by
being open to mystery, to silence, to the resonance of language-by not being
afraid of unstructured assignments, not fearing the secret, unspoken questions of
discovery. The students write: I am light skinned i n a dark skinned family; my
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parents are angry when I do not speak Chinese at home; my mother cries since
my s ister ran away. All true. All stories connected to solemn questions in a world
of conflicts within and wars without.
And a body of scholars has emerged to challenge designating knowing to
any single conscious cognitive realm, to explore ways of knowing previously
under-studied or unstudied by composition theorists. Such ground is both brave
and treacherous in the academy, bastion of quantifiable research, where emotion,
intuition, inspiration, silence, and healing are likely to be met with disdain. If
not lost in the academy, these topics are often perceived as threatening to more
authentic research. Alice Brand ( 1 989) researches from a cognitivist's perspec
tive the territory of therapy, emotions, the psychology of writing. In his preface,
Richard Graves ( 1 990) names writing "spiritual agony and exhilaration," reflect
ing lived research in spirituality and silence, the interface between the rational
and the mystical. Willing to face the impalpable, the inscrutable, these scholars
bring together colleagues who research topics heretofore deemed inexplicable
(Brand & Graves, 1 994) . Allowing the words "feelings" and "heart" i s indeed
"beyond the cognitive."
Knowing that all writing i s ultimately time alone, with sometimes precari
ous boundaries, I still must write. So, too, students need to write of their losses
or hidden searches until they are free again to pursue other issues. Whether we
call such dim awareness affective barriers or writing blocks, when sleep, choices
of food and clothing are governed by unconscious yearnings, all that we know of
whole being and whole spirit tells us the body holds memories and understand
ings that must be spoken before the body-mind can move to other subjects. Stu
dents find validation for where they are in the story and confirmation that where
they have been is a story well worth telling, well worth writing.
Ricoeur's ( 1 976) philosophy of language encompasses an awareness of sen
sitive intersubjectivity. Because of our essential singularity in the world, we are
beings of solitude, in the radical sense:
what is experienced by one person cannot be transferred whole as
such and such experience to someone else. My experience cannot
directly become your experience. Neverthele s s , something i s
transferred from one sphere o f life t o another. This something i s
n o t the experience as experienced, b u t i t s meaning. Here i s the
miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private,
but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. (pp. 1 5- 1 6)
Ricoeur believes dialogical discourse appears as a way of overcoming the
fundamental aloneness of each human being, and he names such communication
"an enigma, even a wonder" (p. 1 5) . Although writing brings complex issues
different from those in speaking, the language events of writing and speaking are
interrelated. Ricoeur expresses the paradox in universalizing the audience with
a written text as opposed to face-to-face spoken dialogue, making written
discourse "more spiritual" (p. 3 1 ) in the sense of moving beyond immediate
personal encounter. The paradox suggests written dialogue includes the self-as
other in the writer' s audience.
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The gypsy told his fellow scholars that his knowledge needed a "heaven
sent moment" (Arnold, 1 959, p. 6 1 0) in order to be imparted. He never told his
secrets. We are earth-bound beings in body but we do know moments sent from
heaven when our prisons of silence are broken into by the light of language. Some
words, once written, lead to other travelers willing to j ourney with us, to the next
story, to other beginnings . C2J
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A Plea for Re-Form:
Aesthetics in the Writing Classroom
Anne Mullin

F brown crescents, yellow rectangles striped with beige and bordered with this
rom the window o f the plane I relish the geometric boldnes s : green squares,

Tuesday' s blue morning. I realize, though, that the farmer on his red dot of a
tractor moving in the midst of one brown curve cannot see this grand design, this
whole made up of complex relating forms. Nor can any of us on the plane see
what he sees, the seeds being drilled into the furrows, the occasional scooting
mole, the curious worm.
This momentary reflection serves as a metaphor for a concern that i s funda
mental, I think, to our teaching of writing: we and our students "see" the writing
in different ways, from differing perspectives. Our constant involvement with a
panoply of professional and student writing gives us an aerial v ista. We view a
particular essay as a whole with its parts in relationship. We have probably,
consciously or not, developed our perspective through the aesthetic appreciation
of form in the work we have read, done, dreamed, loved, hated.
I believe from experience that the more we help our students appreciate the
aesthetics of form in writing, the more effective we become as writing teachers.
Yet, I also believe that our training in teaching composition may not have
prepared us explicitly to do this. We are likely to see our maj or function as
helping students discover and express content, their ideas . We know that conven
tional usage provides a means for that end, and so we are concerned when uncon
ventional forms or "errors" get in the way of those ideas. We have tended, I
think, to link notions of form with notions of norms or standards, and to deal
with them when we teach about editing and proofreading.
Our approach, I would argue, has not been so much wrong as limiting. I would
further argue that we can enrich our repertoire of writing activities and responses
when we teach form with approaches based on the principles of aesthetics. To do
so, we needn' t be intimidated, although we may well be fascinated, by discus
sions ranging across the centuries and involving myriad attempts to define form
and its relationship to content or idea in works of art. We can trace positions
taken by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Burke, Kant, Bell, Beardsley and Langer vis a
vis formal properties like smoothness, wholeness, freedom from imperfection,
unity, and variety (Dickie, 1 97 1 ). We can observe debates about whether art works
"contain" specific properties, whether the formal properties or the conceptual
content should be privileged, or whether a beholder determines art through aes
thetic experience (Dziemidok, 1 99 3 ; Kennick, 1 966; Lind, 1 992).

Anne Mullin is Associate Professor of English and Writing Lab Director at Idaho State University.
Her interests include unconscious influences on the writing process, poetry, and creativity.
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Rather than becoming entangled in such debates, however, we may simply
w i s h to recognize that traditional terminology such as "proportion" and
"harmony" and "arrangement" can be useful for talk about writing, because such
terms relate to considerations of organizational coherence, tension, and style.
We may want to remind ourselves that aesthetics has much to do with pleasure,
and indulge ourselves again in the pleasures we feel when the form and content
of an artistic work mesh, as Coleridge ( 1 962)aptly demonstrates:
The reader should be carried forward . . . by the pleasurable activity
of mind excited by the attractions of the j ourney itself. Like the
motion of a serpent. . . at every step he pauses and half recedes, and
from the retrogressive movement collects the force which carries
him onward. (p. l l )
We would probably agree with W.E. Kennick's point ( 1 963) that form and con
tent are "neither exclusive nor exhaustive concepts" (p. l 94 ). Yet, as he notes,
there are useful distinctions to be made between them: "the distinction between
WHAT is said, depicted, presented, etc . , and HOW it is said, depicted, presented,
etc . , connects with the distinction between form and content" (p. 1 98).
We may be sensitive to literary form. Indeed, as one-time English majors and
rhetoricians we can ' t help but be. Our students, though, especially students in
our freshman composition classes, may not have acquired the taste. We may very
much want them to understand something about coherence, wholeness, variety in
unity, or tension as desirable characteristics of writing; but we know we shall
have tough sledding through such abstractions .
A h , b u t the concepts don ' t have to remain abstract. They c a n become
concretely experienced as properties of art objects. We can bring students the
campus art gallery to demonstrate the harmony of colors, the balance of mass,
the detail within a unified shape as properties of paintings, sculptures, or other
pieces on exhibit. Slides of art work can do the same. I like to invite a painter
friend into my classes to illustrate how he confronts problems of unity, detail,
center of interest, backgrounding and foregrounding, relevance, tone, mood,
contrast, balance-all the elements of his process of "composing."
Students can "see" and "feel" how the colors of mountains in a painting's
background are subdued versions of the bright tones of a building, the center of
interest. They can follow paths ofHght that conduct a viewer through supporting
details to the main event. They can perceive how one selected figure dominates
while others are put in appropriate relationship. Or how, although some elements
have been left out or obscured, viewers apprehend a sense of wholeness. We need
not engage professional colleagues for such demonstrations. In our classes are
photographers, potters, jewelry designers, musicians, and dancers who will share
their experiences in creating various aesthetic forms in different media. Once
students focus on forms and their relationships in masses of paint or bronze or
movement or melody, they can, with explicit assistance, begin to appreciate texts
as made up of similarly relating elements.
Such explicit assistance for me i s a response heuristic based on Anthony
Petrosky ' s 1 9 8 2 adaptation of David Bleich ' s ( 1 97 8 ) "subjective criticism,"
Students and I use four categories for comments: Content, Affect/Associations,
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Form, and Expectations_ I emphasize the "form" category by asking in prompts,
"What do you notice about patterns of language, about words and phrases that
keep being repeated?" Students list these for each other when they give peer
feedback, noting "You use questions a lot" or "Short sentences, like a child. So I
believe this is what you remember" or "You use 'the beach' a lot. So I wonder
what is it you think is so important?"
Student writers further sharpen their sense of form when they give self
responses. Admittedly, looking at the form of one ' s own writing is hardest of all.
The pull back into the writer mode with its concentration on making meaning,
akin to the tractor-driving farme r ' s absorption within his furrows, exerts a
powerful force. But with practice, writers do achieve enough distance to spot
certain patterns , state what feelings these evoke, and speculate on what their
significance might be (Mullin, 1 994 ). Students look at how their sentences and
paragraphs are put together, whether long or short, questions or negations, or
bursting at the seams with ideas .
These observ ations c an also be represented tangibly by felt strips or
by cuisinaire rods of equivalent or disparate lengths or by Tinker Toy s . The
representations can be arranged in parallel or contrary directions, in clusters
containing similar or unequal numbers of strips, in configurations with conj oined
segments or loosely dangling or separated pieces . It is eye-opening for students
to see such concrete, non-verbal depictions of what aestheticians from Aristotle
to the present mean by "arrangement." Linda Hecker and Karen Klein ( 1 994)
offer still other ideas, such as choreographing essays to develop awareness of
kinesthetic and spatial dimensions in language, in "The Write Moves . " Physi
cally positioning and repositioning elements, seeing and feeling their effects give
new meaning to the process of revision. Or students can sketch the shape of the
essay to which they are responding; is it a straight-line path from Point A to
Point B ? A meander that connects several seemingly unrelated issues? A drawer
with neat compartments? A pie composed of variously sized wedges? A trunkful
of odd bits of fabric, outgrown boots, slats from a broken chair?
Once aware of how the formal aspects of written language may operate to
trigger response in much the same way as do elements of a painting or tapestry or
a symphony, we may more truly appreciate the relationships of form and content
and their effect on audience. Cloudy or not, these are the depths into which I
believe we and our students should plunge. Coleridge ( 1 962) reminds us that
connections between form and content are not always consciously perceived
by the artist:
In every work of art there i s a reconcilement [sic] of the external
with the internal ; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious
as to appear in it. .. He who combines the two is the man of genius;
and for that reason he must partake of both. (p. 258)
Freud, of course, offered a deeper analysis of how perception of aesthetic
pleasure derives from form and how form may trigger unconscious impulses. In
Creative Writers and Daydreaming ( 1 959) he wrote of the artist (in this case the
writer) who
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bribes us by the purely formal-that i s , aesthetic-yield of
pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies
[ sic] . . . . In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative
writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind,
and our actual enj oyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a
liberation of tensions in our minds. (p. 1 53 )
Unconscious responses may mingle with the conscious i n the perceiver
as well as in the creator of the form. As teachers, we may wish to disavow
unconscious influences on our readings of student papers. But perhaps we will
accept the notion more readily if we can appreciate how our response to form in,
say, a piece of sculpture, may result from non-conscious associations to elicit
feelings deep inside ourselves, some longing, some tension that needs to be re
leased, some wish or inchoate memory.
When, for example, I stand in the Portland, Maine Museum of Art before Ben
j amin Akers' marble, The Dead Pearl Diver, my response is powerful: white,
smooth, solid marble conveys, however improbably, a sense of limp flesh and
wet netting. The formal shapes and surfaces produce in me a wish to touch them
and experience their coolness and textures. They also evoke emotions, associa
tions, further sensory reactions, and intellectual responses: awe at the artist's
genius of design and expression, grief and longing to caress and revive that dead
son, a whiff of kelp, and recollections of starfish collected during childhood
summers. I reexperience delight at reading the description of this work in progress
in Hawthorne's ( 1 882) Marble Faun. I remember admiring the sculpture in Port
land once before with my daughter. I sense intimations of an existence beyond
dichotomies of death and life, matter and spirit, ephemera and eternity. The mix
of sensory, emotional, and ideational responses is obviously evoked by elements
of both form and content. But I also acknowledge the impact of my unconscious
reading of the formal properties, which are then brought into conscious associa
tion to ideas, memories, or dreams.
Understanding the complexity with which I respond to an aesthetic object
enables me to understand my response to students' texts and, in turn, to facilitate
their peer responses. Ideas about tension and release, pain and pleasure, and
openness to possibilities abound in Eco ' s The Open Work ( 1 989) and in writings
on fractal imagery, such as those by Short ( 1 99 1 ) , Voss ( 1 988), and Gleick ( 1 987).
An appreciation of "fields of stimuli" and the dynamics of seeming randomness
gives teachers grounds for dealing with papers we may find stimulating but are
tempted to fault for lack of "coherence" or "adherence to an organizational plan"
or "not meeting the expectations of the assignment." Artistic forms that balance
on the brink of instability do evidence more "liveness" as the artist struggles for
mastery over ideas and materials; the "safe" paper fails to raise our pulse rate.
We can explore with students how to establish bounds for instability and chaos.
When asked, students will identify places in drafts where tensions or con
flicts appear. The selected "places" may involve ideas or narrations of conflict,
or they may be sentences that contradict each other, have an important word left
out, or string themselves together with too many commas or no punctuation at
all. Students point out such troublesome areas, often affective descriptors such
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as "I was confused," or "lost," or bothered by "too much going on," where the
writing breaks down. Similarly, where the writing i s devoid of intensity or
livene s s , responses suggest "it goes on too long" or "it moves too slowly."
Teachers can use such responses as opportunities to show how form and content
interact.
For example, in response to a basic writer ' s paper about leaving her home and
family to come to the U . S . , peer readers pinpointed three episodes where they
felt "confused." Yet, the class also highlighted these as points of greatest inter
est. Here are the three: "I always hated the smell of my father ' s cigar. Now I miss
it." "It was a beautiful necklace. I was shocked. My sister and I had never got
along." "My mother and I held each other so tightly. After we broke apart and I
ran onto the plane."
When as a class group we focused on the formal patterns in each of these
examples, we noticed how clauses and phrases push up against each other, cling
together with commas or, as in the last sentence, separate abruptly. We could
then see the joinings or partings not only as problems in punctuation but as points
of tension, calling attention to possibilities for exploitation-which is why class
interest was piqued. Readers asked the writer what it was about the cigar smell
that she hated, when she realized she missed it, and why; they wanted to know
lots more about the necklace, whether she accepted it as a gift, what she thought
her sister had meant by it; they asked if she and her mother had embraced again
after they "broke apart" once. The writer was able to add details to enrich and
clarify those points of liveness.
On the other hand, one long paragraph about the train ride to the airport was
questioned in ways that suggested a need for more variety and intensity. "Did
anything happen on the train?" "Was it really a long way? Or did it just seem that
way?" "Maybe it was all very noisy, with kids and everyone yelling, but you and
your family were just sitting there quietly?" The writer decided to eliminate the
whole section, which, she said, had described "just a long, boring three-hour trip
on the train."
This episode illustrates another benefit from a focus on form. Formal
elements, as Langer ( 1 974) notes, may be seen as both presentational (what is
seen) and representational (what is meant) (p. 94). In the above examples, pre
sentational aspects such as incongruous juxtapositions or unexpected divisions
of phrases and clauses in some sentences may be interpreted as representations
of ambivalence or of enforced separation. The presentation of the drawn-out
paragraph describing the train ride suggests deferment of the inevitable good
byes once the train reached the airport. In other words, the form may express a
meaning different from that purported by the words and expected syntax. A s
Derrida ( 1 976) h a s alerted us, "gaps," or "erasures," o r "brissures" c a n be read
as "traces" which open a text to meanings that are "beyond it." Similarly, Mina
Shaughnessy ( 1 97 4) pointed out that students' "errors" often betray the strain of
unfamiliar discourse patterns, mislearned or misapplied rules. She notes how a
student "avoids crisp beginnings with real subjects," uses empty filler words
and p a s s i v e voice, and "backs off in other w a y s , both s y ntactically and
semantically . . . out of a tentativeness that is not of his making" (p. 8 6 ) . By
perceiving as presentational forms omitted words or non-parallel constructions
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or sentence boundary prob l e m s , teachers can point writers to underlying
significance that they may want to explore more fully and move into consciously
represented content.
Admittedly, considerations of aesthetic form are not necessary in order for
writing teachers to respond effectively to student papers. But such considerations
lead me to different and far more interesting responses than I once gave. In
taking up a set of student drafts, I ask myself about their formal properties. I ask
how these formal elements of balance, or breaks in a line of development, or
shifts in tense or person are acting in what Eco ( 1 989) would call my "field of
stimuli." My perspective on my task shifts.
When students focus on the form as well as the content of their writing, they
also shift perspectives. Their vision and their revision of their texts alter. They
can break out of the trap of their ideas and play with arrangements, with effects .
They, and we, can exchange vantage points and expectations. We can narrow our
sights on formal convention and notice formal disruptions or broaden our view to
range across contrasts and unities. We can sense the "what" and the "how" of a
piece in harmony or in conflict. We can be on the ground, or circling aloft, or
anywhere in between, experimenting with angles of vision. C2J
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Writing Ritual and the Cultural Unconscious:
The Great Mother Archetype
in the Composition Classroom
Cramer Cauthen
Re-vision and the Cultural Unconscious
When an archetypal motif is activated by experience in the social
world, it i s filled in with the contents present in the society. The
form that the [motif] takes in any given culture, then, is the bridge
between the universal and the historical; it is the point at which the
archetype becomes particularized into its s·o cial manifestations .
(Pro goff, as cited in Rushing & Frentz, 1 99 1 , p. 390)

F temology, noting that this Apollonian tradition leads to hierarchical binary
eminist scholars contest the hegemony of "objective reason" in Western epis

oppositions, inflexible judgments, and a separation of the knower and the known
(Wilshire, 1 989). Although feminist practices-most notably collaboration-have
become increasingly prevalent in composition classes, lacking is fundamental
change toward a feminist epistemology that welcomes affective and metaphoric
ways of making knowledge as well as "logical" ones. One path for this change
uses myth and archetype, which make and convey knowledge in intrinsically af
fective, metaphoric, and communal ways. Yet, Jungian archetypal theory has thus
far had very little influence on feminist composition pedagogy. My attempt here
is to ground Jung' s theories more fully within feminist composition practices,
and, in particular, to demonstrate that the Great Mother archetype, given its
frequency and extraordinary allusiveness, i s an empowering and practical resource
for teachers looking for alternatives to Apollonian, objectivist pedagogies.
Two common arguments arise against using Jungian archetypes in a feminist
context. The first i s an ad hominem protest against Jung ' s social ideas about
women, which seem to have reflected "the general prejudices of his time, his
views often being no different than those of any other Swiss "burgher" (Samuels,
1 985, p. 2 1 5 ) . The second i s that the archetypes are essentialized, ahistorical and
apolitical, and thus unresponsive to the cultural needs of contemporary society.
We may, I think, safely dismi s s the first argument, for although we cannot
absolve Jung of his prej udices, we can read through them and can use in feminist
inquiries those aspects of his theories that are appropriate. Thus psychologist
Jean S. B olen ( 1 984) says that Jungian and feminist perspectives, when taken
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together, "provide binocular vision into the psychology of women" (p. 4 ) .
We c a n find a response t o the second argument in the work of rhetoricians
Janice Rushing and Thomas Frentz ( 1 99 1 ), who, like B olen, advocate reading
Jung in synthesis. Their central assertion i s that "the external world of historical
conditions and the internal world of psychological processes are separate, but
interrelated, domains of human experience" (p. 386). Therefore, they postulate a
psychic structure that they call "the cultural unconscious," which is comprised
of J u ng ' s c o l l e c t i v e arch etypes " and the repre s sed c ontrad i c t i o n s fro m
oppressive social formations" ( p . 39 1 ). One o f our tasks a s writers and teachers
is to identify these contradictions and work against the forces promulgating them.
So accessing this cultural unconscious, learning an alternative history of hum \ln
spirituality, and finding this history reflected within us, in our personal stories,
in dreams, and in our relation to the natural world once seen as the body of the
Great Mother, seems to me es sential. The benefits of studying the cultural
unconscious in the composition classroom lie in what Adrienne Rich ( 1 979) called
"writing as re-vision . . . the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of en
tering an old text from a new cultural direction" (p. 3 5 ) .
Some of the most useful revi sions o f Jung ' s theories appear i n a 1 98 5 collec
tion edited by Estella Lauter and Carol S . Rupprecht, Feminist Archetypal Theory.
In their introduction to the book, Lauter and Rupprecht summarize the feminist
objections to the Platonic, ahistorical aspects of Jung ' s theories . They then ask
the central question of how the concept of archetype remains useful to feminist
theory. Their answer i s that archetype works when it i s validated by women' s
lived experiences:
We need a theory that will allow us to take seriously the patterns
we find in women' s thoughts and images while preventing exalta
tion of any detected patterns . In such a theory the archetype cannot
be defined as an image whose content is frozen but must be thought
of as a process, a tendency to form and re-form images in relation
to certain kinds of repeated experiences. (p. 1 6)
In search of these processes Lauter ( 1 985) examined visualizations of the mother
by women artists' to see if there was a viable archetypal pattern in them. She
noted that women artists prior to the twentieth century were almost wholly
restricted by patriarchal conventions in their depictions of mother figures . But
more recent artists have been relatively free "to explore the internal stresses of
mothering in the modern world" (p. 5 3 ) . This stresses what we might define as
manifestations of the repressed contradictions in the cultural unconscious.
Citing among others the highly varied works of Frida Kahlo, Remedios Varo, and
Camille B illop, Lauter concluded that the Great Mother archetype may be both
artistically and politically useful if properly contextualized, and that " [t]he
concept of the archetype could be, in the hands of feminists, a way of recovering
and revaluing women ' s experiences, of discovering nodal points i n women's
history" (p. 80). Adrienne Rich ' s 1 97 6 book, Of Woman Born , i s a lengthy
meditation on these "nodal points" and on the contradictions in our culture' s
view o f motherhood (Christ, 1 980).
Composition students, I believe, can isolate similar ways in which the Great
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Mother archetype i s culturally manifested in their lives. These ways may be
inspired by previous artistic or literary works, but they need not be. What i s
essential i s t o maintain a balance between the cultural and the archetypal. A s
Naomi Goldenberg ( l 979a) pointed out, w e must not deny the necessity for myth,
although we are free to rej ect any particular manifestation:
[W]hat binds us together as human beings is not, in fact, the con
tents of our religious and psychic imagery but rather the continual
process of producing and reflecting on imagery. It i s not necessary
to cling to past documents of the imaginal process to maintain reli
gious communities . Instead, we could build communities around
the observing and sharing of the imaginal process alive in all of us.
(p. 65)
The composition classroom is, of course, precisely where such communities can
be built. The advantages of the Great Mother archetype in building them lies in
the paradox of its ubiquity and its relative unfamiliarity: To many modern stu
dents, it would not be a "past document" and thus static and fetishized; but all
students might be shown how to recognize it within their own imaginal processes.

Dualism, Difference, and Mythopoetic Language
B ecause we have separated humanity from nature, subject from
object, values from analysis, knowledge from myth, and universi
ties from the universe, it i s enormously difficult for anyone but a
poet or a mystic to understand what is going on in the holistic and
mythopoeic [sic] thought of Ice Age humanity. (Thompson, as cited
in Sjoo & Mor, 1 99 1 , p . 79)
The history and attributes of the Great Mother archetype may be a particu
larly valuable means of bringing feminist concerns into the classroom and using
them newly to engage student writers. By studying the archetype, they can be
come poets and mystics and therefore begin to collapse the hierarchical
binaries that Thompson described. The first step in doing so is simply to realize
that the power of patriarchy is based in Western dualism; as Christ and Plaskow
( 1 979) pointed out, any dualism immediately becomes a hierarchy and "a model
for domination" (p. 5 ) .
The Great Mother Goddess originally combined within herself the attributes
of what we now call "good" and "evil"; these attributes were later separated into
the defining characteristics of two opposing deities (Neumann, 1 9 5 5 , p. 1 2) . It
would be valuable for students to trace the beginnings of Western dualism to the
transformation from one deity to two. But it is most important to see, as Rich
( 1 979) did, that dualism begins in the subjugation of woman to man, which be
comes a prototype for further oppression.
Studying the history of the Great Mother reveals these derivative oppressions
as well as the aboriginal one. For instance, Pamela Berger ( 1 985) showed re
peatedly that the struggle in Europe between the Goddess religion and Christian
ity was as much a class struggle as a theological one, with the rural poor hanging
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on to parts of the old beliefs despite the legal and financial power of the Church.
Patriarchal dualism can also be found when we examine racism and European
colonialism. Not only is there considerable evidence that the worship of the Great
Mother began in Africa (Sjoo & Mor, 1 99 1 , pp. 2 1 -32) but, as Neumann ( 1 95 5 )
demonstrated, our "natural" fear of darkness, encoded later into racial prejudice,
was unknown to goddess worshippers (p. 2 1 2).
Given the position that contemporary culture takes on the poor, people of
color and women, and Earth itself, one of the most important opposites to col
lapse i s that between the present and the past-that past rendered to us by histo
rian Stone ( 1 990) and Sjoo and Mor ( 1 9 9 1 ) . As these authors envisioned, the
very idea of a goddess, a unifying cultural symbol, subsumes polar opposites and
unites very different ideas and experiences. Ena Campbell ( 1 982) noted a con
temporary example of this unifying power of the Great Mother in her study of the
Virgin of Guadalupe, who combines the Christian Virgin and Aztec earth
goddess, Tonantsi. The Virgin of Guadalupe therefore mitigates class differences
and "integrates the folk and mainstream cultures of Mexico" (p. 5 ) . She has
become a politically-motivating symbol of the entire Mexican people, as Campbell
showed by citing the cry with which Miguel Hidalgo y Castilla began the revolu
tion against Spain: "Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe and down with bad gov
ernment ! " (p. 9).
Students may find an analogous synthe s i s in their own lives; the very
experience of motherhood, and, if we can but recall it, our infancy, discharges
the illusion of dualism by the intermingling of mother and child. The best way to
recall these experiences and to generate further meanings from the present and
historical constructions of motherhood is through archetypal knowledge, which,
Jung ( 1 969) stated
leads to a restoration or apocatastasis of the lives of [a woman 's]
ancestors, who now, through the bridge of the momentary individual,
pass down into the generations of the future. An experience of this
kind gives the individual a place and a meaning in the life of the
generations, so that all unnecessary obstacles are cleared out of the
way of the life-stream that is to flow through her. At the same time
the individual i s rescued from her i solation and restored to whole
ness. All ritual preoccupation with archetypes ultimately has this
aim and this result. (p. 1 88)
One of my hopes as a student of the Great Mother archetype and a teacher is
that archetypal knowledge lead us to enantiodramia. In turn, enantiodramia, by
which Jung meant that everything eventually becomes its opposite, returns us to
the mythopoetic language that Nelle Morton ( 1 979) characterized as one of the
casualties of the patriarchal culture. Sjoo and Mor ( 1 99 1 ), reading Robert Graves'
description in The White Goddess of the original, matrifocal language of poetry,
describe it as nondualistic.
Paradox and ambiguity are not exorcised as "illogical demons , " but
are felt and synthesized . . . . Subjective and objective merge into an
experience of cosmic oneness. Such a thought mode, of course, does
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not build huge political and corporate empires like Rome or Gen
eral Motors. For these purposes men have devised a language of
logical precision, in which words can be used like knives to chop
up one continuous life into mechanically unrelated parts; i n which
the v i si ble-i . e . , the i ntellectually p o s s e s sible-dimension i s
stressed a t the expense o f the aural, tactile, affective, and mystic
dimensions. (p. 4 1 )

Practical Applications
To expect a mythopoetic language of college writers may seem implausible.
However, various methods based on both Jungian and feminist practices provide
a beginning . All these methods have i n common Rich ' s ( 1 97 9 ) concept of
"re-vision."
Most initial exercises in description emphasize the visual dimension that Sjoo
and Mor ( 1 99 1 ) noted. An exercise in affective description presents students with
a number of symbols of the Great Mother: the moon, fire, all bodies of water,
volcanoes, wells, blood, lions, sows, stones, mares, cats, cranes, apples, seeds,
the cycle of the seasons (S tarhawk, 1 969, p. 263), chrysanthemums, shells,
chalices , and roses (Spretnak, 1 9 9 1 ) . Students are asked to select particular
symbols from the list and describe their feelings about them. The writers are able
to find parallels among these feelings by keeping in mind the fact that the
symbols- and the beings who observe them-are interdependent subjects within
a larger unity.
I have adapted another beginning exercise from the work of Graves and Becker
( 1 994) who use the river archetype. They begin by dealing with the physical source
of the archetype, asking students to brainstorm a list of words describing the
river near their college. The students brainstorm a l i s t descriptive of "the
inner . . . abstract" river, listen to music and poetry about rivers, and begin an ex
tended text (pp. 5 8-59). This procedure works equally well with the mother ar
chetype because a class full of students embodies a variety of attitudes toward
mothering. For brainstorming, variations on this procedure might include
particular images of the mother-possibly contrasting "traditional" representa
tions with some of Lauter' s ( 1 985) examples-and examinations of the motherly
aspects of the self.
Collaboration is also important in the feminist archetypal classroom; not only
can it decenter individual authority, but it can also give rise to shared archetypal
images. Goldenberg ( 1 979b) described a women' s dream workshop in which the
dreamer first relates as much of her dream as she can remember. Then she closes
her eyes and i s questioned about it, extending the dream landscape spatially and/
or imagining herself as other characters in her dream (p. 224) .
This technique works well in the classroom, and demonstrates to students
how the cultural unconscious as a whole can be revisioned in a concrete example
of the combination of social and archetypal knowledge-making (Hillman, 1 97 5 ) .
A n other c o l l ab o r a t i v e e x e rc i s e a s k s s t u d e n t s to r e v i s i o n an e a r l i e r
religious o r mythic text, paying particular attention t o how binaries might b e
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avoided, and to write a reflection on how the proc e s s has involved them .
Students might b e advised here that many myths and religious stories have previ
ously been revisioned, most notably the Eden myth, in which, as Spretnak ( 1 99 1 )
pointed out, tree, serpent, and Eve herself have seen their original, celebratory
meanings inverted (p. 1 40).
This last example raises the problem of student resistance, which can be
minimized sometimes by using avatars of the Great Mother that do not directly
challenge conventional Western belief. Jean B olen ' s work ( 1 984) is useful here,
and is one of the most powerful ways for writing students to use the archetype to
contemplate their own lives. Bolen used the qualities of Greek goddesses : the
assertiveness of Hera, the creativity of Aphrodite, the wisdom of Athena, to ex
amine both the interior and temporal lives of women. Furthermore, she encour
aged her readers to use these goddesses as models , saying that, for instance, the
continued practice of meditation can bring on the influence of Hestia, the most
"spiritual" of the Olympian goddesses, or that excursions in the wilderness may
evoke Artemis, the Huntress (pp . 3 1 -32). She also warned that abdicating the
choice of models allows "an instinctual or an archetypal pattern [to] take over"
(p. 285). All told, she saw the knowledge of goddesses as a means of becoming
more aware of our choices and our freedoms ; writing students can use this knowl
edge to evaluate their previous decisions, to rewrite them, and to focus their fu
ture choices.
Another challenging proj ect asks students to do in writing the same thing that
Lauter ( 1 985) described woman artists as doing, imaging the mother as numinous
and frighteningly bound by society at the same time. A somewhat similar attempt
could be made to examine, perhaps in consultation with Stone ( 1 990), how the
Great Mother has been (disastrously) revisioned in the past, and how she may yet
be revisioned to redress the balance. This could inculcate the idea that revision i s
a continuing proce s s .
It also seems important t o study a particular goddess in depth. M y focus for
such a study would be Inanna, the Sumerian Queen of Heaven, because, as Sylvia
Brinton Perera ( 1 9 8 1 ) characterized her, she "provides a many-faceted symbolic
image, a wholeness pattern, of the feminine beyond the merely maternal" (p. 1 6) .
lnanna i s extraordinarily allusive; she i s goddes s of the harvest, of rain, o f
borders, o f war, of sexual love; she i s the evening star, healer and songwriter.
Suitably, the main story focusing on her, "The Descent of Inanna" (Perera, 1 98 1 ),
is also extremely rich in symbolism.
As do the more familiar stories of Orpheus , and Demeter and Kore, Inanna's
story i s that of a j ourney into the world of the dead, and thus serves as "a
paradigm for the life-enhancing descent into the abyss of the dark goddess and
out again" (Perera, 1 9 8 1 , p. 1 3). My own interpretations use this paradigm for
purposes of writerly introspection. Certainly we may see the myth of descent
into the underworld as a metaphor not only for psychological insight and health,
but for any difficult attempt at making knowledge, and, specifically, during the
writing process. This process, in my experience and the experiences I have ob
served in my students, begins with straightforward expectations which are com
plicated by the gates (and gatekeepers) we must pass . There is confusion and
pain in the process, but only when the seed dies can it grow.
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Ritual and Writing
Teachers do not generally think of the composition classroom as a place for
mythopoetic language and spirituality. Here again, however, the Great Mother
archetype can act as an agent to synthesize apparent opposites. Sjoo and Mor
( 1 99 1 ) affirm that for the women and men who knew the Great Mother even the
most quotidian aspects of life were spiritual:
Religious rites were combined with industry. Women ' s religions
were organic, a unity of daily life tasks and cosmic meaning. Among
the women weavers of the matrifocal Navaho, for example, this is
still so.
The women experience themselves as being directly inspired by the
Great Spider Woman, the original weaver of the universe. They use
no set patterns and feel no separation between art (sacred) and craft
(secular, profane). (p. 5 1 )
The craft of writing becomes energized b y spirituality if we revision our ideas of
subj ectivity into a feminist archetypal model that does not separate the knower
and the known, intellect and affect. The student who learns through the Great
Mother archetype to observe herself and the external world as interdependent
learns to observe clearly and lovingly, and to see even the simplest writing task
as a path toward sacred knowledge. cQ
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Emotional Implication:
Performing Within Emotional Gaps
Kristie Fleckenstein

W more than he or she can be severed from a text: We are always writing
riting i s a process in which an author cannot be divorced from a reader any

something for someone. In addition, the we and the someone exist in a mutually
defining relationship. Writers do not merely have readers; they also transact
ecologically (Rosenblatt, 1 978), with one inscribing the other. It is Buber ' s ( 1 970)
I and Thou, a fluid process of becoming in which the writer exists dynamically in
relationship to an "other" by means of a "between" called the text world
(LeFevre, 1 9 87).
Dialectic i s the term we use to describe this fusion of writer and reader at the
heart of composing. But dialectic may be too limiting a concept. Authors transact
with more than their readers. In the act of composing, they constitute not only
their readers and their text worlds, but also themselves. A primary means for
enacting this fluid performance is through emotional implication, a term I use to
describe the process by which writers create emotional gaps that they expect read
ers to infuse with feelings, attitudes, intentions, and motives-that loose aggre
gate we call affect (Aylwin, 1 98 5 ) . The sense of shared presence occurs when
readers perform the role of the emotionally implicated other invited by the gaps
writers create in their text worlds (B arthes , 1 96711 992, 1 97711 992; Iser, 1 974).
To gain a clearer sense of this performance, I became part of the efforts of a
published author to create a science fiction short story. The author providing the
data for this exploratory study was Gail Wickman, a freelancer who writes short
stories, especially science fiction, children ' s stories, and poetry. As part of a
description of my methodology, I wish to explain my relationship with Gail since
it inevitably permeates my reading of her texts: protocol text and story text. Gail
and I met six years ago when I was soliciting volunteers to serve as case study
subjects for my dissertation. Gail, at that time a master' s candidate at a large
Mid-western university, volunteered because she was curious about all the
j argon I used in my written solicitation. During the ensuing years, we have formed
a close friendship that has extended over a 700-mile separation, 4 pregnancies
(2 hers, 2 mine) , innumerable protocols, and endless sessions responding to and
discussing our writing, our children, and our lives.
We wandered almost casually i nto the j oint venture of intermittently
studying her writing and reading practices. Thus far, in addition to regular
conversations and manuscript reviews , Gail has generated over 45 hours of
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talk-aloud protocols, recorded as she wrote j ournal entries, essays, poetry, and
short stories. Together we have taped many hours of conversations discussing
our composing practices and our evolving texts. Initially, I assumed a detached
stance, believing I could use the protocols to understand the interaction of cogni
tive and affective proces ses in Gai l ' s writing without the intrusion of myself as
reader. Although the illusion of detachment lasted throughout my dissertation,
my belief in that detachment disappeared midway. Now I view our multi-layered
conversations as a process of mutual inscription, similar to that which we engage
in as readers and writers. Thus, my insights resulting from my research grow out
of my participatory stance. As friend, as critical reader, as inquirer, I am both
participant and researcher, inscribed and inscriber. The protocol transcripts and
my interpretations thus reflect our multi-dimensional flow of expectations and
response, offering opportunities to examine the "authoring" of writers, readers,
texts, and participant-researchers.
For this portion of our s tu dy, Gail provided 9 hours of think-aloud
protocols i n which she talked through her first and second drafts of a 3000-word
science fiction short story called "The Brother." In addition to the protocols that
recorded some of Gai l ' s thoughts and reactions as she wrote "The Brother," Gail
and I discussed her experiences in informal sessions sometimes many days after
she completed her protocols. Finally, just as we discussed various permutations
and combinations of elements as "The Brother" evolved, so did we review ideas
and drafts for this article.
Briefly, Gai l ' s story involves Kerek, a young man struggling against his
assigned role within a culture dominated by a priest-led religion. Religious
ceremonies culminate every generation in a ritual s acrifice of a young man
designated as "The God Made Flesh. " Kerek, son of the high priest and brother
to the sacrificial victim, struggles to escape a marriage arranged by his father
without endangering his position as the next high priest.
I tran s cribed G ai l ' s protocol s-five hours of drafting, four hours of
revision-parsing the transcripts into clauses, identifying each clause as an
ideational unit. As I analyzed those units, working between generated text and
protocol text, I identified a contrast between an absence or gap in the story text
especially an emotional one-and the presence of a comment filling that gap in
the protocol text.
Gail would create a scene or an interaction, select a name, or plot a sequence
without articulating the affective matrix out of which all these elements evolved.
Instead, she would leave spaces that she expected her readers to infuse with the
same feelings that guided Gail ' s creation of that text world. As Gail described in
one of our innumerable conversations about "The Brother": "I figure out what I
want the reader to feel and try to create elements that invite that response."
I call this process of creating emotional spaces emotional implication.
Through those gaps-an absence that elicits a presence-Gail engaged i n a
dialectic that mutually evoked her reader, her evolving text world, and, more
significantly, herself. Let me explain in more detail this concept of emotional
implication, then describe the ways i n which such spaces allowed Gail to
establish and maintain a three-part flow of becoming.
Emotional implication might be a more familiar concept if we examine it
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from the angle of a reader, and, instead of implication, we talk of making
inferences (Flood, 1 98 1 ) . Inferring i s the act of supplying information not pro
vided by the situation or text itself. An inference i s a type of "inheritance" in
which a single instance inherits all the characteristics of its class (Beaugrande &
Dressler, 1 98 1 ) . For instance, no situation is fully fleshed, neither one we create
cued by an author nor one we author ourselves. Rather, it is adumbrated, and we
supply the lack through our inferences. S imilarly, the powerful role of the absent
signifier has been amply demonstrated by Lacan ( 1 972/ 1 987) in "The Seminar
on the 'Purloined Letter. "' Derrida ( 1 976) in Of Grammatology also asserts the
essential interplay of absence and presence in signification. What i s not said
exercises a greater power than what is said. Absence both constructs and
deconstructs the presence of the text world.
Such inferential spaces are emotional as well as informational. Emotional
implication occurs when the author implies without specifically delineating the
emotional tonality (such as the intentions, motives, attitudes, and/or feelings)
that gives rise to an experience or i s engendered by one. The author does not
tell, does not show; he or she expects. A variety of scholars-from Vygotsky
( 1 962) and Bates ( 1 979) to Bartlett ( 1 932) and Aylwin ( 1 985)-contend that lan
guage and thought are affectively based. Emotional implication draws on that
affective foundation or matrix. When authors leave an emotional gap, they re
quire us to perform emotionally, to inscribe responses, feelings, motives, and
intentions . It is within these emotional spaces that Gail invites her readers, her
self, and her text world to become.

Inscribing the Reader, Creating the Writer
Dialectic has been traditionally used to describe a reader-writer relationship ;
thus , I would first like to examine the ways in which Gail uses emotional
implication to create her readers and her persona as author. According to Gail,
the following example from the story text was designed to evoke emotions she
believed readers posses sed concerning particular gender interactions. In "The
Brother," an opening scene involves the protagonist, Kerek, repudiating his
intended wife, Dayca. At one point Dayca falls to her knees, clasping Kerek' s
leg s . H e kicks her away. The actual text o f the short story describes the visual
dynamics of the scene, but nowhere does the wording explicitly delineate Gai l ' s
expectations of her reader ' s responses.
However, as she creates this scene, Gail comments in her protocol text that
the spatial arrangement of Kerek towering over Dayca will evoke a sense of pity
in her readers: "Okay, so he' s standing before her. So she's going to look up.
That's gonna make her pitiful looking. " Since in the story text Gail never uses
the term "pitiful" or a synonym, she expects the reader to fill this emotional gap,
to inscribe the presence of a particular emotion within the textual space.
As the scene continues through both dialogue and physical action, Kerek
repeatedly rejects Dayca, who asserts she is pregnant with his child. Again, as
Gail creates this cycle of assertion-rejection, she intersperses protocol comments
articulating emotions that she expects her readers to inscribe as part of their text
world experience. For instance, after designing Dayca's plea for an early mar-
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riage, Gail comments, first, "Kerek, being the asshole he i s . " Then she com
poses a description of Kerek' s state as one of exultation at Dayca's imminent
dishonor. The story text, however, does not include descriptions either of Kerek's
character or of his state of mind. Thus, for the scene to function as an effective
part of Gail ' s intended plot, the reader must fill the textual gaps with emotional
inferences that Gail articulates only in her protocol comments.
B ased on her protocol comments, then, Gail creates an emotional space that
invites a particular kind of play with particular players. Gail designs a readerly
presence as well as an emotional presence within the textual absence. This reader
is one who will visualize a scene involving inequitable power lines between a
man and a woman; it is a reader who can cast the woman as victim, sympathize
with her, and condemn the man, perhaps even stigmatizing him with the epithet
"asshole," "jerk," "fink," or "bastard," all terms Gail uses to describe Kerek in
her protocols. At one point in her protocol comments, Gail responds to a situa
tion she created involving Kerek by asking : "Is Kerek a bastard? He j ust wants
to. Well, yeah he i s . He i s . " For the text world to function as she has planned,
Gail expects her readers to infuse the Kerek-Dayca interaction with the same
emotional resonance, thus evoking their attitudes and feelings on gender rela
tionships. If these expectations concerning emotional implication are not met,
the reader-writer dialectic is disrupted, and the text world may careen out of the
author ' s control.
If Gail inscribes her readers through her expectations regarding emotional
implication, she i s also inscribing herself. She does so in two ways. The first and
most obvious way is through her very expectations of a reader ' s responses. She
expects her "other" to react with a particular emotion because that i s one Gail
experiences in response to this evolving text world. During the initial confronta
tion between Kerek and Dayca, Gail creates a scene of unequal power. In doing
so, she defines her own sense of equitable power lines between genders, then
negates and unravels it. She expects her reader to view Dayca as pitiful (or later
in the protocol Gail describes her as "sweet"), because that is how Gail initially
sees her, thereby constituting through that revelation her sense of power in gen
der relationships . Thus , by the protocol comments reflecting her expectations of
her reader ' s emotional responses, Gail also reveals the expectations that drive
her own responses.
Second, Gail defines who she is by her unacknowledged emotional gaps,
unacknowledged because they are accepted as already filled space. It i s not what
she comments on in her protocols that is so significant; it i s what she does not
comment on. Thus, just as gaps in the story text are important in tracing the
presence of reader and emotion, so are gaps in the protocol text important for
tracing the creation of authorial presence. And it is within these gaps that I, as
the participant-researcher, enact my performance. For instance, because I am ac
tively responding to absences in the protocol comments, I infer that Gail has
automatically inscribed her presence within that textual absence, an absence that
exists several levels below those that "exist" within her story text. In this "taken
for-granted" emotional space, I read her as unknowingly inscribing the emotional
truths that define her life, the default options that guide her unconsciously. Per
haps the most dramatic example of this array of layered gaps is that of the father
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in Gai l ' s story text.
Within the short story, Kerek and Taret ' s father, the current high priest, ap
pears as a physical presence only in the final sacrificial scene of the story. Yet he
is a powerful and controlling, albeit absent, force in the story. For example, the
father betroths Dayca to Kerek against Kerek's protests; the father raises Kerek
to spy on the populace; the father chooses Taret to live and die as the god-made
flesh; the father perpetuates the status quo. The father i s the main mover and
shaker in the story, not Kerek who dominates physically. Yet no where in her
protocol comments, barring a question in her first draft about elaborating on the
father as a force of nature or evil, does Gail comment on responses she expects
the characterization of the father to evoke. Commenting is unnecessary because
these emotional gaps are automatically filled by a culturally c onditioned
presence. For instance, in Western liberal society husbands do not sacrifice their
wives; fathers do not cut the heart out of their sons, either psychologically or
physically; fathers do not impregnate their son's bride; nor choose as their son ' s
bride a woman whom the father h a s impregnated. Therefore, any father who
behaves as such i s reprehensible and should be the subject of negative responses.
No protocol or story text comment i s necessary, and, within this unacknowledged
and unfilled space, I "read" Gail as inscribing herself in terms of her truths about
a father-child relationship. The s ame point can be made about the father ' s
p h y s i c al absence within t h e story : fathers i n o u r culture are absent, b u t
controlling forces (Luepnitz, 1 988).

Inscribing the Text World, Creating the Writer
Finally, Gail defines and is defined by her evolving text world through the
very emotional gaps she creates as a means to inscribe her reader. The characters
acquire a life and force of their own, acting, then, as a force on Gail. Perhaps the
best example of this is the change that occurs within Kerek during the course of
the story. In the first scene, Gail attempts to establish Kerek as, in her words,
"cruel" and "malicious," a "fink." The emotional gaps she creates are almost
gleefully filled with protocol comments highlighting Kerek's less than admirable
character. However, when Kerek begins to interact with his older brother, Taret,
he starts slipping away from this negative representation.
Gail runs into difficulty when she tries to fill the emotional gaps caused
by creating a close sibling relationship. As she constructs Kerek and Taret's
interactions, she infuses Kerek with feelings and motivations she can identify
positively with, particularly brother love. For instance, at one point Gail puzzles:
"Kerek i s stuck between Scylla and Charybdis but that doesn't mean he loves his
brother any less; he's really torn up by the whole idea. S o how ' s he going to react
when his brother says, I ' m glad I ' m going to get to be in your wedding before
I die."
Gradually, the change in Kerek, even while created by Gail, creates her as
well. The search for motives and feelings to justify Kerek's reactions inscribes a
tension in Gail that she is unable to resolve. By the end of the first draft, Gail
admits that Kerek has "over time has gotten nicer," while Dayca has gotten "nasty."
She asserted within her final drafting protocol that "there ' s no reason for this
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change; I ' ve g o t t o figure other ways for this t o make sense because I don 't want
to change it." In the process of creating a character who deeply loved a brother,
Gail was unable to cast that same character as repudiating, without some cause, a
female with whom he was physically intimate. She was in essence defined by
this conflict within the text world. During a discussion session between drafts,
Gail said that she discovered that she couldn 't write about a "bastard." The very
process of inscribing a character thus created a backlash that forced her to
re-define who she was in this context.

Inscribing a Text, Creating More Text
So who creates whom? My answer resembles the progressive song, "This Is
the House that Jack Built," so popular with small children: Presences are inscribed
in the emotional gaps of a story text that writers create for readers to fill; the
play within spaces boomerangs to create the writers who carry within themselves
their own unacknowledged gaps. Like a progressive song, the performance tumbles
forward. Writers and readers are inscribed even as they inscribe, and, on an equally
important level, so are the participant-researchers who perform with them. The
chain that links Poe, Lacan, Derrida, and Johnson ( 1 97 81 1 987) suggests the
infinite regress of performance within gaps. No real end, no real beginning, just
the ebb and flow of expectation and response, absence and presence. Within this
flow, however, we are left with some interesting observations concerning the
reader-writer-text world transaction.
First, reading and writing may be a product of emotional as well as ideational
coherence. For instance, the very act of emotional implication seems to be built
on the belief that an imagined reader will attempt to empathize with an author' s
vision o f the text world, not a n unexpected conclusion concerning poetic writing
given the wealth of research on emotional involvement in aesthetic reading. Not
only do proficient pleasure readers suspend disbelief, but they also actively
attempt to identify emotionally with a text world. If the reading process goes
awry-if, for instance, no empathy or no engagement occurs or if an unexpected
perhaps inappropriate response takes control-we might wish to examine the
territory of emotional gaps. How was an absence perceived, if at all? How was a
presence infused? The construction (and the deconstruction) of a text world i s
a n emotional as well as a n intellectual endeavor; therefore, unexpected turns may
be the result of affective factors. Burke (as cited in Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 1 985)
describes coherence as the arousing and fulfilling of desires. If the arousing and
fulfilling of emotional expectations derails, a type of emotional incoherence could
result, holding as much potential for disruption as ideational incoherence.
I n the s ame v e i n , a writer may be the v i ctim of her own emotional
incoherence. For instance, if the trail of absences goes awry for the writer, as it
does for Gail with Kerek and Dayca, perhaps the place to begin investigation is
not with the concept of ideational coherence but with interpersonal coherence.
The emotional relationship between reader, writer, and text, may have derailed,
yielding a sense of fragmented meaning. Coherence, an unimpeded flow of ex
pectation and response, i s as much a product of the heart as it i s of the head. Gail
explained in a conversation following a protocol session that she "gets into an
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emotion" and writes from that basis. However, she added that she couldn ' t "think
about the emotion [because] it interferes . " Such interference of the heart with
the head, or the reverse, offers a new view of writer-based prose.
A second observation ari s i n g from studying emotional gaps involves
socio-cultural factors. Inscribing a presence within an absence, as we do with
emotional gaps, inevitably evokes patterns of socio-cultural practices. The site
of an emotional absence and the infusion of an emotional " something" offers a
fruitful area for examining cultural codes. A problem in both cultural studies and
writing research is that cultural codes tend to be treated as blueprints or molds
that exist prior to and determine individual development. But cultural codes,
like linguistic codes, like schemata, are not deep structures but active proces ses
traceable only in an action, such as the creation of meaning (Turner & Bruner,
1 986). The process of filling an emotional gap is a point of emergent meaning
and thus a moment during which we can "freeze" those cultural codes and exam
ine their influence in inscribing identity: self, other, and text world. For instance,
not all cultures would infuse a scene in which a woman kneels weeping at a man ' s
feet with negative emotions: pity and distress for the woman, condemnation and
dislike for the man. Thus, the flow of implication and inference can be examined
from the perspective of cultural influences.
My tentative c o n c l u s i o n o n the b a s i s of this study i s that dialectic,
especially reader-writer dialectic, i s too restrictive, perhaps even inappropriate.
Dialectic, with its implication of duality-even a mutually defining duality-is
misleading . Gail constituted not only herself as a writer and perhaps even herself
as other-the reader-but also her text world in a three-part relationship: an I
and Thou and This. In addition, as the participant-researcher in this performance,
I, too, was invited to inscribe myself as I inscribed Gail. What replayed itself
through her protocols and our collaboration was a intricate play of evolving writer,
reader, researcher, and text worlds as we performed within the space of emo
tional gaps. Identities merged, shifted, transformed, and reconstituted themselves
throughout these instances of meaning-making. I ' m not sure what term or meta
phor best captures this fluid shift of absence and presence that yields so many in
separable identities. But regardless of the terminology, as we examine the emo
tional dimension of the writer-reader performance, we must also factor in the
impinging plane of the text worlds, no small task. Q:j
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Mental Imagery, Psychology, and Rhetoric :
An Examination of Recurring Problems
Linda T. Calendrillo

A composing theories and practices. However, mental imagery in our field is

s writing specialists we often cross into p s ychology to inform our

not fully recognized as an area of inquiry from which to draw our theories. This
is a mistake for those of us interested in enhancing our thinking about writing
from the fullest possible range of disciplines. But this neglect is not surprising.
Research into mental imagery is fraught with debate over its nature and the
legitimacy of studying it. Indeed, by examining the parallels between the
c o ntemporary debate in p s y c h o l o g y and the c l a s s i c a l rhetorical d e b ate
surrounding the use of the mnemonic image, I show that the marginalizing of
mental imagery in rhetorical theory and pedagogy is an old phenomenon.
In this article I look at the conceptual problems psychologists face as they
describe, test, and apply mental imagery to show that we can trace similar problems
in rhetorical history. I look at the contemporary debate between the pictorialists
those who believe mental images are like photographs in the mind-and the
descriptionalists-those who hold that mental images represent ideas or sentences in
the mind (Finke, 1 989; Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983; Tye, 1 984).
Let me summarize the problems that psychologists discuss when they
describe empirical difficulties in experimenting with mental imagery. Ronald
Finke ( 1 9 89) in Principles of Mental Images isolates what he sees as two basic
problems i n studying mental imagery. Finke says mental images are first,
subj ective and second, elusive. Their subjectivity comes from their idiosyncratic
nature (different individuals will image a bird differently), and so researchers
have difficulty testing mental images (they cannot insure that the images they
are comparing are in fact comparable, which leads researchers to fear inaccurate
results) . The mental images are also elusive (one person's bird may last longer as
a mental representation than the next person's, and when the subj ect tries to
regain the bird image, she or he may find a different bird or no bird at all ) . These
difficulties make imagery research, Finke says, controversial.
These concerns resemble the classical disagreement on the v i ability of
mental imagery as a mnemonic device. This debate hinges on the utility of the
loci mnemonic, an imagery-based mnemonic art consisting of a series of mental
images an individual imposes on memory to enhance the recall of information.
The individual forms unusual and violent images and stores them in a sequence
of previously selected holding places in the mind. For example, to remember five
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name s , a person might image each i n d i v i d u a l w i th various bru i s e s in a
separate room in the person's home. This strategy for layering images , called the
loci mnemonic, was embraced by Cicero ( 1 948) in De Oratore as a longstanding
and highly regarded mnemonic, but was rejected by Quintilian ( 1 922) in his
Institutio Oratoria a century later. Though the loci strategy was taught and used
consistently through the Middle Ages, Quintilian's attack on it made its presence
circumspect. Quintilian 's argument against the loci mnemonic included some of
the same strictures that Finke pinpoints as inhibiting mental imagery research
today. Although Quintilian provided a clear description and analys i s of the
imaging strategy, he declared it overly complicated and unteachable, saying, in
fact, "My precepts . . . will be of a simpler kind" (p. 227). We are given to under
stand that since the loci method was difficult to recreate, to track, and, as
Quintilian believed, to teach, its value was suspect. At best, it was appropriate
for remembering long lists of names but otherwise an incumbrance. Indeed,
because it relied on a solitary learner, the loci did not lend itself to the rote
memorizing that Quintilian favored. In part, the medieval use of alphabet books,
commonplace books listing prescribed images for each corresponding letter,
reflected a retreat from independent images. This same disregard of the loci as
unteachable was repeated by Geoffrey of Vinsauf ( 1 97 1 ) in the early thirteenth
century when he said, "Tully [Cicero] relies on a theory of exotic images , which
it i s well to remember; but he i s teaching himself and is, as it were, the sole
devotee of his subtle system which i s of a subtlety unique to himself" (p. 1 05).
Quintilian ( 1 922) also foreshadowed the debate on the nature of the image
that i s argued by the pictorialists and descriptionalists. As a descriptionalist,
Quintilian believed that images were simply metaphoric representations of ideas
and language which he did not believe could be adequately visualized. Quintilian,
in analyzing the loci mnemonic, worried that words would be lost or confused as
images replaced them in individuals' mind. He argued against using the loci strat
egy to help remember texts: "How can such an art grasp a whole series of con
nected words?" (p. 225). In fact, he saw the method as a hindrance to a rhetor:
"Will not the flow of our speech inevitably be impeded by the double task im
posed on our memory?" (p. 227). This double task i s translating words into im
ages and then retranslating them back into words. Quintilian feared that the rhetor
would be unable to translate some words, a decidedly descriptionalist perspec
tive. He also feared that the images when recalled later for linguistic transcrip
tion would not accurately match the words that triggered the image. Quintilian ' s
position, which valued the verbal over the visual, ignored Cicero ' s contention
that images were more vivid and more easily recalled than words.
Research methodologies today create difficulty for those examining mental
imagery, b y muddying research results and complicating discussions. When
testing memory strategies, psychologists often investigate the classical directive
to use bizarre or violent images to enhance recall (Rollins, 1 989; Riefer, 1 992).
This particular component of the classical imagery mnemonic (Rhetorica ad
Herennium, 1 95 4 ) has been studied broadly in psychology, perhaps i n part
because it allows for a relatively straightforward empirical design that measures
whether or not exotic images are recalled more easily than neutral images (Riefer,
1 9 9 2 ) . To e s t a b l i s h t h i s e m p i r i c a l d e s i g n , r e s earchers n e e d o n l y g i v e
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directions for storing images that differ in their description of the nature of the
image (one group gets bizarre/violent, while the other does not) . Researchers
have tested this principle with uneven results (Richardson, 1 98 7 ; Rollins, 1 989).
In memory research that examines the loci mnemonic, this empirical design also
recurs, with often inconclusive or contradictory results.
Studying violent images may in itself be problematic in contemporary
Western culture. If subjects used for these tests are desensitized to unusual im
ages in the films they watch or the news they see, the classical prescription for
those images may not be effective for them. I make this suggestion in part based
on the work of John Richardson, a psychologist who questions the research
methods used in memory work. In his 1 987 critique "Social Class Limitations on
the Efficacy of Imagery Mnemonic Instructions," Richardson suggests that the
socio-economic backgrounds of the typical research subjects (college students)
skew the results of that research. These subjects, he argues, are empowered by
social class and believe themselves capable of performing well on such tests, are
empowered to learn, and c o n s equently may u s e learned s trate g i e s more
effectively than those from less privileged backgrounds. Richardson ' s critique of
memory testing can apply to the bizarreness tests. Would Riefer and Rouder 's
study ( 1 992) have yielded the same results had their subjects not been University
of California-Irvine students? Richardson encourages us to doubt the ability to
generalize from these and the results of other studies.
Major shifts in the treatment of the image, I believe, began in Western culture
during the Middle Ages. We again see something of a fringe science when imagery
was relegated to the status of memory enhancer to help Christians adhere to virtue
and avoid vice (Carruthers, 1 990; Yates, 1 966). To claim that imagery was used
during this extended period to teach illiterate people religious principles is an
oversimplification, but a useful one. The architecture of the times used statuary ex
tensively to represent virtue and condemn vice, especially in its cathedrals. Relics
that were valued as talismans of goodness and power were housed in containers that
recreated the artifact in some fashion. A fragment of St. Louis's jaw, for example, is
enclosed in a gold bust in Paris's Cathedral of Notre Dame. Symbolizing the relic this
way reminds viewers of its strength and its material wealth and of the value of living
virtuously. The notion that illiteracy necessitated the iconography of the Christian
faith may be partially responsible for the devaluing of the mental image in a literate
culture. If words are preferred as efficient codes of thought and if images are tied to
lower class illiterate cultures, then valuing images reveals social class and ignores
literacy as a status symbol.
In contemporary thinking, mental imagery, even when discussed by those
who support its validity, is often described in preliterate terms as well. For
example, Finke ( 1 990), in Creative Imagery: Discoveries and Inventions in Visu
alization, endorses using mental imagery as a "preinventive form," an almost
primitive term which Finke uses to identify "the products of combinational play
of visualization" (p. 3), wherein individuals form, combine, and manipulate im
ages in ways we might call a prose invention strategy. This view of the mental
image is also reflected in Flower and Haye s ' s ( 1 984) "Images, Plans, and Prose,"
in which non-verbal imagery i s listed as a preconscious form of cognition along
with structural relationships and procedural knowledge. In a chapter of his book
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called "Imagery on the Bounds of Cognition," Mark Rollins ( 1 989) tells us that
"a theory of mental i magery can elucidate a range of i s sues from animal
cognition to artistic creation" (p. 1 3 2). Though Rollins' statement does not
intend to disparage mental imagery, I am struck by the marginalizing language
he chooses. Mental imagery as a mode of thinking i s something done by dogs and
artists; medievally, thinking in images was something done by the uneducated,
and only those on the fringe of our field seem to be studying or endorsing its use.
When we begin to look at where in composition studies the use of mental
imagery is most often cited, we see continued neglect. Mental imagery is used by
some cognitive psychologists in a range of applications: to solve problems, think
creatively, and enhance memory; in psychotherapy mental imaging is used to
reduce stress and combat phobias; and in athletic training to improve physical
performance. Yet, currently mental imagery i s not seriously considered by most
mainstream composition theorists as a viable component of the process. It i s an
area of concern within NCTE' s Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learn
ing (AEPL), established in large part by Alice Brand and Richard Graves. This
concern is further endorsed in Brand and Grave ' s Presence of Mind, which
includes essays on mental imagery. But apart from its inclusion in the work of
AEPL, what little work i s being done in mental imagery is in technical writing.
Though this application represents a beginning, it unwittingly reinforces some of
the same marginalizing of mnemonic imagery strategies of the ancient Roman
rhetoricians. In an article, "Using Visual Mnemonics to Make Instructions Easier
to Remember," in the Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, for in
stance, Hirst ( 1 990) endorses visual mnemonics but does so in a way that contra
dicts both the principles of the clas sical loci mnemonic and contemporary
psychological thinking. However, this treatment i s in keeping with the spirit of
medieval imagery.
Though Hirst cites the work of contemporary imagery psychologists and
memory researchers, along with the class ical mnemonic imagery strategy
discussed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, his strategies contradict these sources.
Hirst instructs those who write technical instructions to use cartoon images to
enhance their readers' recall of information. These cartoon images toy with the
physical properties of objects, thereby exaggerating cartoons even more. For
example, to create an image for tuning an engine, the cartoon might show a man
drawn much smaller than a car engine handling an enormous and angry spark
plug. (Thi s s ame strategy w a s used by the Pentagon in the 1 95 0 s when i t
enlisted Will Eisner ' s talents t o prepare comic books for soldiers t o train them
in auto mechanics.)
Hirst's use of mental imaging falls short of both classical and contemporary
strategies. First, one essential element of the classical mnemonic is the idiosyn
cratic nature of the image; for the image to be recalled, persons storing the image
must create their own image. According to the author of the Rhetorica Ad
Herennium ( 1 954):
Often in fact when we declare that one form resembles another, we
fail to receive universal assent, because things seem different to
different persons. The same i s true with respect to images: one that
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is well-defined to us appears relatively inconspicuous to others .
Everybody, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit
his own convenience. (p. 223)
Hirst's treatment of images echoes the medieval creation of stock images and
reinforces the historical marginalizing of the image.
Although Hirst's treatment of the image does not coincide with the classical
mnemonic system, his modern, technical version does mimic a strategy used in
constructing "emblem" books of the early Renaissance (Freeman, 1 970; Lechner,
1 962; Thompson, 1 924). These books used a text to exemplify a woodcut that
v i su ally represented a v i rtue or vice, teaching a les son both v isually and
verbally. Problems arose, however, in producing emblem books due to new and
often faulty technology. The woodcuts that the emblematic texts were meant to
gloss were difficult and expensive to produce; therefore, it became routine for
printers to use whatever woodcut they had on hand. Rather than create text and
image, authors of emblem books chose to write texts to match the available
woodcuts. This practice resulted in a kind of seventeenth-century clip art, wherein
often inappropriate images were used as a gloss on texts. The image became
secondary to the text, functioning as an ornament rather than as the subject of the
l e s s o n and the means by which the l e s s o n w a s effectively learne d . T h i s
standardization of the image relegated it t o a secondary status, mirroring again
its position as less valuable than verbal representations.
Today, the difference between emblem books and mental imagery echoes the
polarization between pictorialists and descriptionalists by refocusing attention
on their competing status. Which is predominant? Which has more validity, more
integrity? Are mental images real pictures (Platonic embodiments of the thing
itself) or are the pictures simply metaphors, constructed from v isually powerful
terms to articulate ideas? Can researchers develop tests that measure whether
subj ects are translating v isual images into external pictures , or trans lating
picture images into words, or combining these two operations in some way? Can
we answer the philosophical question of which comes first, the image or the word?
(Finke, 1 989; Rollins, 1 989).
In contemporary writing pedagogy we must be aware of the complexities
implicit in the use of mental imagery and of the problematic history that sur
rounds it. But more important, we need to consider how mental imagery can help
writer create texts, how mental imagery reinforces the way writers arrange texts,
and most difficult perhaps, how readers of texts use mental imagery to enhance
their understanding of, their enj oyment of, and their use of those texts. The ways
in which we discuss mental imagery in our discipline should not further divide
us into those who fit the mainstream and those who are peripheral to it.
And although w e need to study the psychological proce s s es i n mental
imagery, we need to remind ourselves that this work i s not without limitations.
Not only must we consider the cultural interferences Richardson warns us of, but
we also need to be aware of the mechanization of the mental image. Prominent
cognitive psychologist, Geoffrey Loftus ( 1 989), alludes to these limitations when
he says, "Computer simulations are seducing us away from doing real creative
thinking in the behavioral sciences" (as cited in Finke, p. 145). Even today we
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fall into the trap that beset the late emblem authors. Current psychological work
in mental imagery constructs computer simulations. It attempts to pinpoint the
relationship between mental and physical images and discusses them in technical
vocabulary that mimics the mechanical. Even Kosslyn and Shwartz's ( 1 977) model
of mental images, which arises from a pictorialist view, describes mental images
as having scanning, zooming, and rotating computer-like properties. Though we
cannot deny this view of imaging, we must not be seduced by it, away from the
creative thinking we need to make mental imagery a valuable part of composi
tion theory and practice. cQj
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Images at the Heart of Things :
The Writer's Unconscious Speaking
H ildy Miller

Y of writer ' s unconscious on their writing. She remarked: "There i s no wisp

ears a g o Janet Emig ( 1 983 )pointed o u t that we know little about the effect

or scent anywhere that composing is anything but a conscious and antiseptically
efficient act. Nowhere in such an account is there acknowledgment that writing
involves commerce with the unconscious self" (p. 48). I recall being struck by
the need for such research when reading a story told by Fan Shen, a Chinese
student new to the American classroom. A kind of extended reverie, her writing
was an example of the concept of "yij ing," which i s "a creative process of induc
ing oneself, while reading a piece of literature or looking at a piece of art, to
create mental pictures, in order to reach a unity of nature, the author, and the
reader" ( 1 989, pp. 463-464). Intrigued with her response to the assignment, I
wondered then why we so seldom allow our students the wholeness of their intel
lectual processes in a way that could include such unconscious imagery. If, as
Wallace Stevens once said, "A poem is at the heart of things," surely the mental
images evoked in readers were also reflective, from a Jungian standpoint, of not
only self-but soul. Such writing i s potentially rich with meaning for students.
Yet we rarely see it, as Moffett ( 1 994) explains, "because writing to heal and to
grow .. .is alien to universities" (p. 258). Despite several decades of research in
writing, we still know so little about this cognitive area. Yet, in my research into
the cognitive proces ses of writers, my students have discovered many compel
ling mental images which, like Fan Shen 's, seem to be examples of the personal
unconscious of writers speaking.
Beneath the usual concerns of purpose, audience, thesis, and structure, writ
ers are really often preoccupied with i ssues far more reflective of self and soul.
Their mental images are ones of trying to learn the lessons of life-why some
thing has happened to them, what an event has meant, or how they can establish
a sense of connection to others . Through the work of two writers who partici
pated in a study of mental imagery in writing processes, I wish to illustrate some
ways that the unconscious may contribute to the intellectual activity of writing.

Mental Images and the Unconscious
From a Jungian perspective, the personal unconscious is assumed to be as
much a part of an individual as conscious awareness. The unconscious is not just

Hildy Miller is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Louisville. Her research interests
include cognition, gender studies, and the history of rhetoric.
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a repository of repressed thought, like infantile tendencies that are better left
undisturbed. Rather, it contains all the psychic material that has not yet reached
consciousness, the "seeds of future conscious contents" (Jung, 1 97 1 , p. 7 1 ). Jung
said: "The thought we shall think, the deed we shall do, even the fate that we
shall lament tomorrow, all lie unconscious in our today" ( 1 968, p. 279). Dreams
and fantasy are its common modes of expression. But these narrative forms of
discourse are really grounded in images , conceptualized in psychoanalysis as the
"royal road" to the unconsci o u s . I mages often c ommunicate core human
concerns that underlie everyday reality. They deal, you might say, with i s sues
of eternity, not time. "[A]n image presents a claim," as psychologist James Hillman
( 1 983) says, "-moral, erotic, intellectual, aesthetic-and demands a response"
(p. 1 4) . We may be accustomed to thinking of an image only as a passive
pictorial representation rather than as an enlivened rhetorical vehicle. Yet, it i s
through image that the unconscious, or s o u l , i s s ai d t o speak. As Hillman
goes on to say:
The primary intention of this verbal work with image is the 'recov
ery of soul in speech. . . which at the same time reveals the erotic and
aesthetic aspect of images-that they captivate, charm, persuade,
have a rhetorical effect on soul beyond their symbolic content. Many
images represent motifs in our individual lives. (p. 1 5)
As Jung explains: "These images are balancing and compensating factors that
correspond to the problems which life confronts us with in reality" ( 1 970, p. 44) .
Yet, for all their psychic and rhetorical power, such images are not easy to
translate into conscious endeavor. Many times, as the two cases that follow illus
trate, their meaning can be best captured artistically or philosophically. They
appear to drive writing from what I call the "metaphoric substrata" (Miller, 1 994,
p. 1 1 4 ), those figurative layers of symbols beneath our conscious awarenes s from
which writers fashion abstract meaning.
Image psychologists (Klinger, 1 97 8 ; Pope & Singer, 1 97 8 ) who conduct
naturalistic research on images in thought, say that we are constantly generating
a steady stream of mental images. This stream forms the "flow of thought," which
is itself composed of bits and pieces of different mental representations of
meaning. Images are ongoing, lively, and complex. They contain traces not only
of actual outside visual stimuli that we deal with day-to-day but of our deeper
personal concerns. Such a view of the mind runs counter to the kind of cognition
embraced by the rationalist academy i n which conscious, logical thought is
emphasized. Yet, as Klinger ( 1 987) and others have pointed out, we are not as
"conscious" as we might expect. In his experimental work, he finds that most
people are absorbed in the contents of their unconscious at least 25 percent of
their waking hours. That is, we are immersed in states that are dream-like
preoccupied with images arising spontaneously in reverie.
In the processes of writers we still know little about the effect of images
generated by the unconscious . Early on, Mandel ( 1 980) proposed that much of
the writing we do originates there, that "planning" is largely a proces s of
responding to unconscious impulses. Flower and Hayes ( 1 984) in their protocol
studies noted at one point that beneath writers' verbal articulation lies what they
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"multiple representations" of meaning, including i mages , metapho r s , and
geometric patterns . More recently, studies have pointed to some specifics. Graves
and Becker ( 1 994) have explored the effects of using cultural archetypes to guide
writing, and Mullin ( 1 994) has discovered what she calls "traces" or eruptions of
unconscious material that periodically disrupt texts. Fleckenstein ( 1 994) has found
that mental imagery coincides with writers ' fullest engagement with their texts.
And Worley ( 1 994) teaches her students imaging techniques that they can em
ploy deliberately as a way of familiarizing themselves with what i s an unrecog
nized and often unconscious part of writing.
In my own research on mental imagery ( 1 99 3 ; 1 994), I have found that it is
an ongoing part of the thoughts of writers as they work. In a study of 1 48 writers,
I assigned a writing task during which I interrupted them three times at approxi
mately eleven to thirteen-minute intervals and asked them to fill out written
thought-sample questionnaires. Such self-reports are based on standard measures
of internal imagery (Anderson, 1 98 1 ; Klinger, 1 97 8 ; Sheehan, Ashton & White,
1 98 3 ) . Writers also indicated where in their texts they had been interrupted, so
that I could compare the images in their thoughts with what they were actually
writing at the moment. On a post-sample questionnaire, participants also reflected
on their writing, particularly on any images that had been outstanding for them.
Later, I spoke with twenty-nine students in extensive (l l /2 hour) interviews to
gather retrospective accounts of their imagistic activity and to understand them
as writers generally-their history, attitudes, and habits.
Results of this study revealed that fully half the thoughts of writers
contained some evidence of v isual activity-far more than most composition
specialists might suppose would be characteristic of responses to an abstract
writing project. Mental images were ongoing for most writers, though they var
ied in intensity, clarity, and detail. Yet 4 1 % of the images reported in written
thought samples never actually appeared in the texts themselves. Therefore,
thought processes rich with images are not necessarily reproduced in the actual
writing that is underway. Furthermore, on post-sample questionnaires, 5 1 .4 % of
the time participants identified a controlling image as containing the essence of
their main idea. Taken together, what these findings suggest is that there is a
great deal of imagistic and unconscious mental activity that we know little about
since this material is seldom captured in studies of writers' cognitive processes
(Brand, 1 987; Flower & Hayes, 1 9 84). Yet, it i s precisely here that a conjunction
of images , emotions, motives, and private purposes may be found. Here the
unconscious appears to affect writing in many ways, most often generating in
sights that reflect deeply personal issues of individual writers.

The Unconscious Speaking
Through the Mental Imagery of Two Writers
Warren and Ethan, two of the writers who participated in the study, illustrate
how issues arising from unconscious mental imagery are translated into conscious
awareness, with Warren writing about his creativity and Ethan speculating philo
sophically. Even in response to a fairly bland writing prompt (Explain to me how
you learn best), their thought processes appeared more driven by the unconscious
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than previous research has indicated. Perhaps other students are also inscribing
such psychic contents in their work without teachers knowing it.

Warren: Establishing Connections With Others
Warren, an architecture student, was strikingly preoccupied with images of
his personal relationships. In fact, if images from the unconscious reveal themes
that are current in an individual ' s life, family would be Warren ' s chief concern.
In his case, interest in personal connection underlay much of his creative work in
architecture and furniture design. For example, he told me that recently he had
crafted a special table only one and a half feet high. The inspiration for the un
usual design originated in a daydream he had about a picnic table for himself and
his friends that he could set up on the slope of a hill. Unlike the sterile designs of
so much of modern mass production, his vision of human connection infused the
style of the piece with meaning. His interest in architecture was also rooted in a
pivotal family experience, in which, as a teenager, he collaborated with his fa
ther in remodeling his bedroom. Warren was allowed to put forward his own ideas,
and it was from this warmly recalled family project that his own design interests
later developed.
Such underlying relational concerns extended also to writing . One of
Warren's earliest memories was of talking his third grade friends into giving up
recess to perform a play he had written. During our writing session, two of the
thought samples revealed family images . In the first, he was interrupted in his
text at a point at which he was explaining why he did not want to study foreign
languages:
I know I almost feel guilty for this kind of an attitude. I must stress
I ' m not prej udiced. I j ust don ' t seem to have any interest i n
language. I guess I like t o learn what seems t o enlight [sic] m e for
my everyday interests. Here I am an architecture student and classes
that I can tie relevance (STOP) to--that is exciting. It may seem
ironic that an architecture student is not interested i n foreign
languages but that's the way I am !
In his written thought sample he reported:
Sure I bet your [ sic] thinking that someone with an attitude toward
foreign language like me and thinks he'll make a good architect is
fooli sh. Don't get me wrong. I love foreign architectural variety. I
just realize you can ' t do everything, and I ' ve chosen not to try to
fluently speak a foreign language.
As he explained i n our interview, his playful defensiveness stemmed from
mental images that he was seeing of his si ster with whom he had a mock
disagreement over the value of foreign cultures. As Warren put it, "She teases me
about being a bigot-the kind of American the French don 't like." Though the
reference to family never entered the actual text, it was this personal connection
that enlivened the thought for him. He cared what his sister thought as much as
he did the readers of his writing sample.

84

JAEPL, Vol. l , Winter 1995-1996

During another interruption the thought of his grandfather seemed to gener
ate a series of remembered images. In the text he wrote:
I ' m motivated to draw so I can bless people around me with touch
ing pictures (STOP) . For example, I strongly desired to draw a pic
ture of my family. And I strongly desire to draw a picture of my
grandfather before he passed away.
At this moment he was actually seeing all the pictures of his grandfather that
he wanted to draw-even specific scenes of him hiking in the woods . In this
image he wanted to use art to connect to his grandfather, just as in the previous
image he worried that his views on architecture would alienate his sister. For
Warren, these ongoing images of family reflected a concern for using his
creativity to express this love and care. In all his creative efforts, whether
writing, architecture, or furniture design, his mental images seemed to reveal his
underlying wish to create and sustain relationships with family.

Ethan: Exploring the Function of Faith
Ethan, an English and philosophy major, was focused on the tension between
what he felt was demanded of him in academic writing and what he really wanted
to say. Ideas that most concerned him were philosophical searches for meaning
in human experience . Yet he recognized that much academic writing was
concerned with simply conforming to convention. As he said: "After you' ve writ
ten for a couple of years, you get the forms-introduction, ideas, conclusion.
That's all you can really do." But he found on reflection: "I always read a page
and think, God, this i s really boring . "' Still, he was seizing chances in which to
explore safely the i ssues uppermost in his mind . The writing sample he produced
for my study provided just such an opportunity.
Ethan was aware that he had been mulling over the question of the function
of spiritual faith throughout the past year. In a medieval philosophy class, he
had been exposed to the theoretical concept of faith, principally the idea that
hope can sustain people through life's vicissitudes. But he questioned how deeply
he "knew" what he had learned: "We take a test. I can write down such things as
' We only must believe in order to understand. ' Or ' Reason inspires faith and
faith inspires reason. ' It all sounds so correct; the professor grades my test. I get
an A. Thus I ' know' these things . " In the writing sample for the study, he found
himself unconsciously sifting through mental images of people he had encoun
tered on his job-a search that ultimately enabled him to explore the concept of
faith more fully. As an intern in a county attorney ' s office, he escorted families
of murder victims to court and remained with them throughout their ordeal. At
his first thought-sample interruption, he was mesmerized by these recollections.
He said to me in our interview:
I didn ' t think of what I wanted to say-just thought of a woman in
the courtroom her face, the suspect and the way he looked, impen
etrable eyes-you want to get the feeling . . . . Everyone's life has a
life that extends far beyond them. How do they deal with a murder?
From the multiple images that surfaced he selected two cases to explore.
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Later in the essay he was interrupted just as he began to expound on the
function of faith:
To thi s I s ay, what is wrong w ith faith, what is wrong with
believing in this greater justice, this one single concept that makes
people live when there seems to be nothing to live for. I now (STOP)
understand these lectures of these great men.
In both the written thought sample and in reflecting back during our interview,
he explained that he again saw multiple images as he wrote this section. Not only
did he visualize himself as an orator speaking to an imaginary audience and an
ticipating their response, but he also saw past conversations with people over
similar issues on which he wished he had spoken his mind.
Ethan found this opportunity to write about something especially satisfying.
He noted too that at other times , genuine commitment to an idea had led to much
the same writing style. In a paper on Rupert Brooke, for instance, he recalled
also saying in ringing oratorical fashion, "To this I say . . . . " And on another occa
sion: "Yes, in a Henry Miller paper-same thing-I really believed in what I was
trying to get across." He summed it up: "There are certain things that you just
read and understand; then there are other things where you say, ' Yes, I know
that ! "' For Ethan, the mental images of the families of victims that had haunted
him for a year finally found expression in an essay that enabled him to explore
the philosophical issue of human resilience.

Writing as "Unconsciousness-Raising"
Annas Pratt ( 1 985) has characterized the exploration of repres sed feminine
archetypes as "unconsciousness-raising," and this term might also aptly apply to
the writing generated by the mental images of Warren and Ethan. In embracing
the role of the unconscious in composing, some counterbalance is provided to
the dominant rationalist view that emphasizes an impersonal reason (Johnson,
1 98 7 ; Lloyd, 1 984 ) . This rationalist tradition and the discourse conventions that
have arisen from it have a long rhetorical lineage (Brody, 1 99 3 ) . Yet, as Esther
Harding ( 1 97 1 ) has noted, academic thought devoid of spirit is likely to become
increasingly sterile. The psyche or spirit that is repressed will, in turn, become
more energized and compelled to seek expression elsewhere. Indeed, as Brand
and Graves ( 1 994) have said of our need to go beyond rationalist definitions of
cognition: "The greatest need for growth in composition studies lies now in the
ways we create meaning beyond what i s currently considered acceptable knowl
edge" (p. 5 ) . The heartfelt writing of Warren and Ethan suggests too a way in
which students can develop themselves both as individuals and as writers. Rather
than appearing as inappropriately confessional, this expression of the unconscious
self manifests what Jung ( 1 968) has called an individual ' s "reality in potentia"
(p. 279). Some students, like Warren, may find their unconscious concerns
covertly inspiring their writing. Others, like Ethan and Fan Shen, may produce
new and energized shapes of discourse. Thus, "unconsciousness-raising" may
lead to significant changes in the ways we describe cognition, the development
of the writer ' s self, and the writing processes and products that emerge from it. cQ
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Mastery: Or, Where Does True Wisdom Lie?
Martha Goff Stoner

A story is told of a student who yearned for the wisdom of a master. Every
morning the student climbed a mountain to reach her teacher who lived at the
summit. When she arrived at his hut, she would ask him where she might find
wisdom. Then she would stand, gazing at her teacher, waiting for his answer.
Always the teacher remained silent, sitting on his cushion.
Each new day the student would climb the mountain, again hoping to receive
an answer to her question. Each time she rephrased her question, believing that
if she found the correct wording, the teacher would answer her. But every evening
she returned home downcast.
Finally she decided this day would be her last climb. She would tell her
teacher that she would visit him no more. But when she arrived at the hut, the
teacher had gone. As the student turned to leave, her gaze rested upon the teacher 's
cushion. It occurred to her then that she might sit there, that she might see from
his perspective. She walked to the opposite side of the hut and sat.
Days passed. The student forgot her home. She watched the light grow and
recede. Day and night, night and day, she sat. A time came when the light and
dark that she watched on the wall before her mingled and became one.
After a time, a seeker came to the hut. He had heard of the wise one who
lived there. He bowed to the student sitting on the teacher's cushion, and asked,
" Where does true wisdom lie ? "
The student did not answer, but she knew.
Pearl

I ture of the journey toward wisdom. It is a West-meets-East fable. The student
wrote this fable in the tradition of a Zen teaching story to illuminate the na

represents the methods typically used by the earnest seeker-of-wisdom in the tra
ditions of the West. The teacher represents the way Zen philosophy teaches .
Rightly experienced, the fable shows how these two w ays, rather than opposing
each other, create a whole. The lesson of the fable is not that West or East is
better, but that in the West we tend to favor a single approach and that approach
can undermine wisdom until we understand and include in our awareness insights
such as those offered by Zen philosophy.

Martha GoffStoner, Ph.D., The University ofMichigan, teaches meditation in her writing and literature
classes. She is currently developing a book that applies Zen philosophy to pedagogy. She writes fables
under the name of Pearl.
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In our Western system of formal education, we tend toward a mountain
climbing approach to wisdom. That i s , we perceive the search as a j ourney
toward a goal that i s tangible, that can be held, as one might hold a crystal globe
in the hand. What the East, as represented by Zen philosophy, has to offer the
West is an awareness that wisdom comes not when the individual is busy climb
ing a mountain, aggressively focused on grasping the goal, but when the indi
vidual is quietly sitting, apparently doing nothing. In the West our training is
never to sit down. We are encouraged to keep on trying, keep on climbing, eyes
ever on the goal. But Zen philosophy teaches us to stop focusing on the goal, to
stop climbing, to let go of trying and to sit down. Thus , in the fable, it is only
when the student gives up her quest that wisdom arises.
What can it mean to suggest that by giving up, we gain? The Zen perspective
on the goal-oriented search for wisdom was popularized for Westerners in the
mid- l 950s by the German philosopher Eugen Herrigel. In his slim volume, Zen
in the A rt of A rchery, Herrigel ( 1 97 1 ) described his experience of learning
archery from a Zen master. Herrigel began to notice his preoccupation with
hitting the center of the target. He became aware that he was determined and
effort-full every time he pulled the bow string. The master called Herrigel 's
attention to this attitude:
"The right art," cried the Master, "is aimless ! The more obstinately
you try to learn how to shoot the arrow for the sake of hitting
the goal, the less you will succeed in the one and the further the
other will recede. What stands in your way is that you have a much
too willful will. You think that what you do not do yourself does
not happen."
"What must I do, then?" I asked thoughtfully.
"You must learn to wait properly," [the master replied.]

(p. 34)

But how can we wait properly ? What i s the quality of mind or attention that Zen
offers as a replacement for the attitude of ceaseless striving so familiar to the
West?
Waiting properly happens when we are fully aware in the present moment.
Typically, our minds are occupied with thoughts of the past or plans for the
future. In thinking about the past or the future, we miss what is happening in the
present moment. Yet, all we ever truly have is the present. Consider, for example,
a woman driving a country road, lost in thought. She may be thinking about a
particularly difficult encounter with a co-worker or family member; those thoughts
may shift to thoughts about her dinner plans; next she may consider a project that
she has underway. The radio has been on all the while, but she has not been aware
of it; then, a particularly resonant piece of music captures her attention. Perhaps
the music is S amuel B arber ' s Adagio for Strings. Now the driver feels a call, an
emotional shift, as the deepening strains of the music awaken her. She begins to
notice the scenery around her. She sees lush green fields and summer light
touching the wheat. She becomes aware of an arch of reddening gold where the
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wheat begins to ripen and merge with the sunlight. She breathes in the awe of the
present moment. She forgets what came before and what will come after. She i s
no longer constrained by a consciousness that concerns itself with linear time. I n
that moment, s h e ceases trying t o control and maneuver her life. Instead, she
allows herself to flow with the journeying motion of the car and with the fields
and sunlight as they envelop her. The haunting violins become the swelling wheat:
She notices the mingling of worlds. In this condition of awareness, the woman ' s
sense o f herself shifts. N o longer i s she isolated, immersed i n problems that re
quire personal effort if they are to be solved. By losing awarenes s of her ego
based concerns, she experiences herself both as an individual who witnesses life
around her and as a participant in a mysterious drama that i s unfolding without
her effort. She experiences her connection to the flow of life.
We have all experienced such moments. Such moments come to us because
we have let go of the intention to make something happen-thus, the paradox
suggested by the master of archery when he says, "You think that what you do
not do yourself does not happen." To wait properly, we must stop trying to make
something happen; we must even stop waiting. We must simply be, with our aware
ness tuned to the multiplicity of life.
In the fable, the student is blocked from this state of being by her own
perception-what Herrige l ' s master called a "too willful w i l l . " The student
decides. Deciding i s an act of will, an exertion toward, a choosing to perceive in
a certain way. The student decides that wisdom i s of a certain order and that it
requires a certain approach. Deciding this, she exists in a state of too willful
will. Convinced of the validity of her own perception (lost in her thoughts as our
driver of country roads was), the student misses what i s around her. Missing what
is around her, she also misses what is inside her. When she finally sits on her
teacher ' s cushion, what is about her and what is inside her mingle-as did the
wheat and the sunlight-and, thereby, wisdom emerges .
The student' s too willful will i s the mountain-climbing approach t o wisdom.
This approach reveals a habit of mind that the student should overcome. Funda
mental to the student' s approach is her belief that wisdom exists outside herself.
The student assumes that she herself lacks wisdom and, therefore, that someone
else must possess it. Her climb is the climb toward the one she believes can help
her. Similarly, the student assumes that either she must find the right question i n
order t o elicit the desired response from her teacher o r s h e must fail in her search.
Her belief in the teacher and her focus on the phrasing of her question reveal the
student' s tendency to think in an either/or fashion. Either I have wisdom or some
one else does. Either my question is phrased correctly or it is phrased incor
rectly. Either I must climb up the mountain or I must retreat. No room exists for
a third possibility.
Because, as Rudolf Steiner ( 1 984) put it, "consciousness determines events,"
the student' s decision that her world i s one of opposites creates precisely such a
world (p. 1 67). That the student inhabits a world of oppositions is evident in the
alterations of light and dark, in the climbing up and the retreating downward, in
the hope in the morning and in the despair at night. The student i s female; the
teacher is male. She sits on one side of the hut; he sits on the other. They face
each other.
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Such duality i s familiar in the Western tradition. We need look no further
than the Judaeo-Christian Genesis to discover its presence. As Joseph Campbell
( 1 99 1 ) stated, "The trouble that began [in Eden] was the discovery of duality.
That was the Fall" (p. 29). When Adam and Eve tasted the apple, they opened the
door to a world of polar opposites. They became aware of male and female, of
inside Eden and outside Eden, of good and evil. Their discovery ejected them
from paradise. In paradise, humanity knew the union of opposites as well as such
mutually exclusive states as non-differentiation and multi-differentiation at the
same time. Paradise was the realm of infinite possibility. After the fall, earthly
existence, by contrast, became the realm of opposition and of limitation. The
pain of the fall is this separation from the paradise of familiarity with a universe
in which all things are possible.
No longer one with all of creation, the human being i s now an outsider-one
who is not in synchrony, one who is separate. Now the individual does not
recognize his or her essential kinship with that which i s different. Instead, the
Self say s , "I am I. I am not You . " Divided from all that surrounds, we begin to
fear the very context in which we live. This fear wells up in us and is projected
on to the forces that seem to be most unlike ourselve s . Self fears Other.
Opposition becomes both our perception of how the world i s and terrifying at the
same time.
In this context, the Other becomes essentially repellent. When a dualistic
mindset divides the universe into Self and Other; inside and outside; matter and
energy; presence and absence; being and not being, the tendency i s to go one step
further and pit these apparently opposite forces against each other. The tendency
of Western tradition to assume that opposites repel is apparent as early as Plato.
In the Phaedo, Plato ( 1 96 1 ) quotes Socrates as saying, "Opposites themselves do
not admit one another" (p. 8 5 ) . This "not admitting" of the opposite in the West
ern tradition often means defining the poles of any two opposing things as good
or evil. A thing cannot be a thing in itself. Thus, if X i s good, its opposite must
necessarily be bad. If day i s safe, night is frightening. If white i s familiar, black
i s threatening. If male i s powerful, female i s weak. If life has value, death does
not. If Eden is good, outside Eden (human beings , nature, the earth) is bad.
S o it is, writes Plato, that "opposite forms cannot face one another ' s approach"
(p. 8 5 ) .
B u t i s n ' t duality o u r very nature? Because o u r bodies exist on a material,
physical plane, we are invited to inhabit a dualistic consciousness. In order to
move in the physical plane, we must experience boundaries, edges , sides, differ
ences that are visible and felt. And because our physical senses teach us night
and day, dark and light, cold and warm, sour and sweet, hard and dry, we cannot
simply decide not to think dualistically. As Robert Frost ( 1 969) put it, "Nature in
her inmost self divides/ To trouble man with having to take sides" (p. 92).
However, while duality i s inherent in our way of perceiving, it i s not the
nature of the universe. Quantum physics tells us that reality both is and is not a
place of division. The table on which we write appears stable, formed, finite, and
static, yet we know that it is composed of energetic forces in constant motion.
As Danah Zohar ( 1 990) writes in The Quantum Self, the new physics suggests
that "reality at the everyday level on which we commonly experience it does
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indeed consist of actual things like bodies and desks and chairs , while at
the quantum level there exist no actual 'things' but rather myriad possibilities
for countless actualities" (p. 3 1 ) . What this implies i s that division-boundaries,
edges, separations between things-is not the whole picture. If the world as we
perceive it with our eyes is not the whole picture, what is? Wrote Einstein, "There
is no place in this new kind of physics both for the field and matter, for the field
is the only reality (as cited in Capek, 1 96 1 , p. 3 1 9). In the field, matter or reality
becomes indeterminate. The universe seems to be in constant flux, in a process
of forming and unforming. Physicist David Bohm ( 1 957) writes:
[T]he empirical evidence available thus far shows that nothing has
been discovered which has a mode of being that remains eternally
defi n e d in any g i ven way. R ather, every element, h o w e v e r
fundamental it m a y s e e m to be, has always been found under
suitable conditions to change even in its basic qualities, and to
become something else. (p. 1 5 3 )
True wisdom lies i n being open t o this unseen, flowing realm, the terrain of rela
tionships, the place of interplay between forms, forces, and possibilities. There
is no place here for an either/or consciousness . What is required is a both/and
awarenes s . According to quantum physics, reality can neither be said to be
stillness or motion, being or force, particle or wave, but it can be said to be both.
[A]ll being at the subatomic level can be described equally well
either as solid particles, like so many minute billiard balls, or as
waves, like undulations of the surface of the sea. Further, quantum
physics goes on to tell us that neither description is really accurate
on its own, that both the wavelike and the particle-like aspects of
being must be considered when trying to understand the nature of
things. (Zohar, 1 990, p. 25)
The teacher in the fable calls the student' s attention to the true nature of
wisdom by awakening her from her tendency to believe only what she perceives
with her eyes. He does so not by lecturing to her, or even, after a time, by
demonstrating through his own physical presence the example of the conscious
ness (sitting) that he i s referring her to. Instead, he simply leaves. He presents
the student with absence to consider. In so doing, the teacher withdraws from his
position as the student ' s opposite. He draws her awareness beyond the percep
tions available to her through her physical senses and invites her into that realm
of consciousness that she had believed to be permanently outside herself. When
the student sits in the opposite place from her accustomed way of being, she
experiences transformation. That transformation i s apparent in the mingling of
the light and the dark on the wall.
This mingling i s the essence of wisdom, a condition in which multiplicity
and nonjudgment prevail. It i s a form of wisdom sometimes accessed through the
arts. I recently saw a painting by Whistler in which this mingling of worlds was
apparent. Whistler combined gray, white, blue, brown and black to depict a cold,
misty scene of beach, water and sky. On the beach but somehow also in the water

Goff Stoner/Mastery

93

and in the sky appeared a solitary figure of a person. This person seemed to be
substantial and insubstantial at the same time-a figure that drifted in and out of
the mist surrounding it. Whistler's painting did not represent reality in a dichoto
mous fashion. That is, I did not see a blue sky, distinct ocean waves, and a sandy
beach. Rather, I saw a fluidity of colors mixing with each other in such a way
that no single color could be said to exist in any part of the canvas. In the middle
of this fluidity, a single human form attempted physical reality without quite
succeeding .
The student's experience of wisdom at the end of the fable is precisely such
an experience of wavering between and within alternate worlds. As she sits on
the teacher ' s cushion, she becomes quiet. Becoming quiet, she i s and i s one with
a universal energy, an experience that has come to her because she has shifted
her perspective.
The mingling of worlds that the student experiences i s characteristic of Zen,
a philosophy in which all forces are held simultaneously. While the student sees
contradictions and i s disturbed by them, the master simply exists with the contra
dictions. Thus the ancient book of Chinese wisdom, the Tao te Ching, tells us:
The Master stays behind; that i s why she i s ahead. She is detached
from all things; that is why she is one with them. Because she has
let go of herself, she i s perfectly fulfilled. (Mitchell, 1 99 1 , p . 7)
Mastery requires letting go of fixed forms and fixed ideas. As we let go, we
become fluid. Becoming fluid, we become open to experiencing life as it is, rather
than trying to make it become something we think it ought to be. In Hindu the
sound "Aum" represents the universe in motion, the cyclical process of birth,
being, dissolution, and renewal. When the Zen aspirant chants "Aum," it is an
affirmation of this proces s and an acknowledgment that the answers to our
questions lie within and about us in every moment. Writes Joseph Campbell
( 1 99 1 ) :
Now you are inward turned. The secret t o having a spiritual life as
you move in the world is to hear the AUM in all things all the time.
If you do, everything is transformed. You no longer have to go any
where to find your fulfillment and achievement and the treasure that
you seek. It is here. It is everywhere. (p. 1 25 ) cQj
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REVIEWS
O ' Reilley, Mary Rose. 1 993. The Peaceable Classroom.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook.
Zoe Ke ith l ey
Q u e s t i o n : What do a b i l l of rights for student s , a spiritual
handbook for teachers, a manifesto for liberal education, a searing
analysis of the war mentality of twentieth century America, and the
book The Peaceable Classroom have in common?
Answer: Mary R o s e O ' Reille y : C atho l i c , Buddhist, Quaker,
pacifist, professor of English at St. Thomas University in St. Paul,
Minnesota.

M cal position of pacifism, j oining ranks with a select group often labeled
ary Rose O' Reilley harnesses the teaching of literature directly to a politi

educational mavericks-Ivan Illich, Ira Shor come to mind-who have pursued
their passionate conviction that education should aggressively further the well
being of students, teachers, and community.
O ' Reilley explains how she became yoked to the question, "Is it possible to
teach English so that people stop killing each other?" (p. 20) proposed by a
mentor some twenty years ago in graduate school-a question so surprising as to
qualify as a koan.
The Peaceable Classroom sets forth an argument for the coming to the
academy of what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "beloved community" (p. xvii).
It uses an unorthodox, collage-like form that not only offers readers hands-on
participation in the author ' s own process, but mirrors the way a class or course,
under a pedagogy of peaceful teaching and learning, might appear and proceed.
Look at this partial table of contents: Inner Peace Studies and the World of
the Writing Teacher; "Exterminate the B rutes" and Other Notes Toward a
Spirituality of Teaching; S ilence and Slow time; The Retro War; The Sibyl in the
B ottle . We are swimming in spirituality and poetry, in personal reflection,
surprising opposites.
Listen to Peter Elbow, the Lewis-and-Clark of Voice, in the Foreword: "[T]his
book constructs a wide-ranging exploration of teaching derived from her focus
on peaceableness or nonviolence " (p. ix). " There is anything but easy optimism
here . . . . But she gives courage about having the vision and letting teaching grow
out of i t . . .. respecting the inner struggle and disappointment as part of the real
life of a teacher" (p. xiii).
The book begins w i th the "pedagogy of the depre s sed" drawn from
O ' Reilley ' s experiences with Special Learning/Behavior D isordered (SLBD)
students at what she names the Black Hole School. The trip i s not linear but
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rather one "of stories, tropes, and images that nudge up against each other"
(p. xvii), moving quietly among the years of formation and rumination, arriving
at tentative positions, reaching forward. An uneven pedagogy of peace unfolds
itself through an unexpected authorial intimacy. We see where academic
concerns necessarily meet the roots of humanity, whether we like it or not.
"I wondered if we can discover the seeds of war in the interactions of the
typical classroom or wherever our treasures happen to lie" (p. 22) . O ' Reilley
introduces the sy stemic evidence of war i n academia, its pervasiveness in
policies and practices, in administration, in our teaching, and in our students'
ingrained attitudes and expectations.
But O ' Reilley also reveals to us that counter-balancing light at the very heart
of our studies, the awakening and energizing of our spiritual life. "This act of
'entering in' and the transformations of consciousness that accompany it is the
essential moral transaction of the literature of the classroom," O ' Reilley tells us
(p. 26). On these grounds she calls the teaching of literature a radical act. "I try
each Monday to set up utopian communities of reflection, acceptance, and useful
work" (p. 28). "We know .. .little about cooperation; more about the male than the
female ; the outer world than the inner; the rational than the intuitiv e ; the
machine than the garden" (pp. 34-35). She brings to her students a syllabus of
l istening to the texts. She stopped lecturing, she says, so that her students could
hear each other, and the literature, and her.
O ' Reilley goads-herself and us-into the radical change of peaceableness
in the classroom, in all of academic life. "The arrangement of our classrooms
should tell us, if we do not consciously know, what horizon we have set for the
next generation" (p. 40).
She points out solid beginning s already made . "By incorporating such
strategies as group process and freewriting, by defining the concept of voice . . .
Macrorie, Elbow and their colleagues were laying out, I believe, a pedagogy of
nonviolence" (pp. 3 8-39). She speaks of our work as teachers as being one of
helping students to find a "sacred center," that place at the crossroads of human
experience, beyond that, to point out the wider circle of community within which
each exists. "To find voice and to mediate voice in a circle of others i s one of the
central dialectics of the peaceable classroom," O ' Reilley holds (p.40).
The English classroom, she contends, i s one place whose actual business is
to help students access their spirits, their personal voices, as well as the voices
of others. The finding of voice, O ' Reilley holds to be a spiritual event of maj or
proportion.
O ' Reilley acknowledges The Peaceable Classroom i s a compilation of
previously published articles yoked to fresh material. This may explain a certain
unevenness in the book: distinct changes in respiration, stylistic quarrels, a sense
of patchwork. It might explain some overblown treatments, or the giving of depth
but no breadth to a subject which the form of the book cannot accommodate
adequately. The treatment of "maleness" and the roots of anti-feminism come to
mind, an opus maximus in itself, let alone applied to the academy, or to the En
glish classroom and its relationship to peace.
But whether you teach at a university or in a public school, if you don ' t
demand a perfect ride, and if your taste runs t o astute observation, t o books which
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are frank and funny, rich in personal anecdote and literary attribution, from an
author widely and deeply read in the humanities who integrates what she reads
and practices what she preaches, you will want the adventuring, the mentoring,
the friendship of The Peaceable Classroom. cQj

Brand, Alice G., and Richard L. Graves, Eds. 1 994.
Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook.

G e rd B r a u e r

B introducing students to literature by j ust reading and discussing it from the

ack in Germany I often thought about h o w t o change the common w a y of

teacher ' s point of view. As the years went by, I favored the link between
storytelling, theater improvisation, and writing, believing in the necessity of in
terweaving the wisdom of the literary text with students' own experiences. What
else can make learning more important than seeing knowledge in its deep con
nections to one' s own life?
Departing from there and starting research on American writing pedagogy in
1 992, I naturally came across works by Janet Emig, Peter Elbow, James Moffett,
Gabriele Rico, and others. By reading books such as Elbow's Writing Without
Teachers ( 1 97 3 ) and Writing With Power ( 1 98 1 ), Moffett's Active Voice ( 1 98 1 ),
and Emig' s The Web of Meaning ( 1 977), later on Rico' s Pain and Possibilities
( 1 99 1 ) and again Moffett with Coming on Center: English Edu cation in
Evolution ( 1 9 8 1 )-especially his essays on writing and meditation-! finally
introduced myself to Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi ( 1 969),
Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence ( 1 993)
by George Kalamaras, and Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art ( 1 990) by
Stephen Nachmanovitch. As I listened to Janet Emig at the 1 993 NCTE Confer
ence on Teaching English and the Language Arts in Portland, Oregon, honoring
James Moffett ' s influence on English education, I finally found what I was
searching for in my analysis of writing curricula in American grade schools,
colleges, and universities: the teaching of writing as a tool for individual and
institutional growth toward creative and collaborative learning.
When I talked to Moffett about my research, he mentioned a new book,
Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive, edited by Alice
Brand and Richard Graves, quite worth reading, but not just for academic pur
poses, Moffett said. I got the book the same day, started reading it and soon after
I knew this book was a most valuable discovery for my work. Later, after I had
already put some of the teaching and writing methods from the book into prac
tice-first just by myself, later with my classes-I began to realize the value of
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the book for my personal growth.
Through Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive
( 1 994) I started to understand the complexity of the term, "writing as a mode of
learning," which here goes much further than Janet Emig's initial definition in
the essay of the same name ( The Web of Meaning, 1 983). Such learning i s no
longer limited merely to the conscious , but reaches "beyond the cognitive," as
the subtitle of the book signals. What that exactly means i s not easily said in a
few words. In one of the first meetings of the interest group "Beyond the Cogni
tive Domain," the participants came up with 34 different terms (p. 1 ) for defin
ing their area of attention, all heading somehow in a similar direction but no two
of them having precisely the same meaning. I would like to focus on just three
terms-writing and learning through silence, writing and intuitive learning, and
writing and therapeutic learning-giving examples of how I have read the book
and in what ways it has influenced me.
From time to time I get into an argument with my daughter. After a while our
voices rise, joined by sharply gesticulating hands. I can almost see the air burn
ing between us. When, in such moments, I step off the stage of overheated verbal
combat, take my daughter ' s head, and gently bury it under my arms, all of a
sudden, I feel silence physically. It takes away pressure from both forehead and
neck, clears my sight, and frees my chest of a heavy weight. I am now able to
breath again.
When I was in a conflict with myself, wanting to write better, faster, more,
I used to think writing comes through writing-a consideration which, I still
believe, i s not wrong, but one which does not always work. Silence (Part One of
the book)-waiting, meditating, recentering myself-is another way of overcom
ing obstacles to a harmonious flow of human communication, whether it be on
paper between my own voices, in the classroom between me and my students, or
at home between my daughter and me. Peter Elbow's restructuring of silence (p.
9), Donald Gallehr's demand to "wait, and the writing will come" (p. 2 1 ), and
Charles Suhor ' s "pedagogy of silence" (p. 3 1 ) have helped me to discover the
creative impact of the moments before, between, and after the act of writing.
Elbow writes: "I have a hunger for silence" and "In fact I ' ve always been
interested in people who don ' t write or talk-the silent ones" (p. 1 0) . In his
collage he looks for a relationship between silence and voices, the ones i n us and
around u s . What do they sound like in silence? He is concerned about what
happens in the writer ' s body when there i s no writing. Are we able bodily to feel
the energy of the voices we deal with? Does the meaning-making of something
we wrote or wanted to write about stop? What response do we get from our felt
sense about our writing process?
Years ago in a class on German poetry, I got stuck trying to get students to
interpret a text. They didn ' t see anything other than heavy, blurry metaphors in
the poem and by complaining about the "stupidity" of the text they successfully
aggravated the frustration. "What happens in the text?" I shouted over their ducked
heads, frustrated myself, and without thinking about what I was actually saying.
I promptly received a response telling me clearly that the subject of the discus
sion was poetry, not prose or drama, and, therefore, nobody understood me
asking about the story line. I called myself stupid, impulsive, and incapable of
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consistent thinking in l iterary genres . I was about to excuse myself to rearrange
my material, when suddenly a young woman stood up and ambled across the
clas sroom, transforming the heavy, blurry poetical metaphors into a light,
transparent movement of a short improvisation. What we weren't able to see on
paper by thinking in theoretical terms became instantly visible and emotionally
understandable by the woman' s physical performance.
Being under pressure and not thinking any longer about the boundaries be
tween l iterary genres, I intuitively grasped for help by asking them to identify
the dramatic action in the text from my most abiding interest-theater. Neverthe
less, the step "from intuition to insight" (p. 67)-I want to call it here intuitive
learning-was also taken by the young woman and, later on, by the students,
who for the rest of the class, enthusiastically told me personal stories related to
the subject of our initially so-badly-handled poem.
Wisdom of the Unconscious (Part Two) and Wisdom of the Body (Part Three),
make up, t o my understand i n g , the b a c k b o n e o f the b o o k . The e s s a y s
provided m e insights into the psychic and physical links between intellect and
emotion in the process of writing and learning. The authors, Anne Mullin,
Richard Graves and Susan Becker, Elizabeth Holman, S ondra Perl, Karen Klein
and Linda Hecker, and Trudelle Thomas make v isible processes which we all
experience every day, without, unfortunately, being aware of them: an intuitive
learning, a learning through our senses. "The unconscious speaks in many voices,"
so the introduction to Part Two refers one more time to Part One and its state
ments about silent voices. Here the voices come as traces in writing which lead
and link to unconscious parts of our memories (pp. 4 1 -5 2 ) , or as personal
metaphors , mysteries, and memories, deeply connected to the inexhaustible
unconscious of the writer (pp. 5 3-64). In the book our inner voices are also shown
as physically present: as felt sense (pp. 73-88), spatial kinesthetic (pp. 89-98),
and acoustic sense (pp. 99- 1 1 2) . They enrich our writing when we are able to
notice and understand their messages within a process of intuitive learning.
By working with Sondra Perl ' s guidelines for composing, my class and I
followed the "writer ' s way of knowing" (p. 77). I taught Perl ' s model in contrast
to a German program by Gert Ueding, a current-traditional rhetorician from the
University in Ti.ibingen. In his book, Rhetorik des Schreibens (Meisenheim: Verlag
Anton, 1 99 1 ), Ueding introduces a model where writing is understood as a tool
for describing reality obj ectively. Ueding proposes step-by-step programs for
writing in different nonfictional genres . One of his major concerns is "controlled
writing" (p. 20), that i s , tailoring one ' s exact language use to the rhetorical
situation and audience. The central method Ueding relies on is imitatio (Cicero
and Quintilian), the imitation of recognized authors through extensive reading
and writing.
Here are a few statements about the differences my students experienced
throughout the writing proces s : "With Perl I was concentrating on what I wanted
to write after a few minutes"; "Confronted with Ueding' s rule-canon I felt as if I
were becoming smaller and smaller"; "When we did the breathing, it connected
my thoughts and emotions" ; "With Ueding I felt very comfortable and safe, be
cause the stuff I was writing about didn ' t really belong to me. I j ust documented
it" ; "By reflecting on my own writing process as well as my feelings and thoughts,
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writing for the first time became personally important"; "Ueding's model is good
for class: clear structure and academic value. Perl ' s model i s good for a therapy
session: It opens up a lot you can ' t easily stop after the class is over."
Writing as therapeutic learning? While Ueding's model embodies strict rhe
torical patterns to be followed for the purpose of correct writing by fulfilling
stylistic rules, Perl ' s approach is directed toward the inner self of the writer.
Hers are guidelines for an active, individual search for one' s own voice as a hu
man being. Understanding the history of rhetoric and its results as an institution,
Uedin g ' s writing becomes institutional, public, even though it might be intended
for private use. Perl ' s writing is personal, though it would seem to aim for a
larger audience. To my understanding, education needs to combine both ways,
writing and learning within and beyond the cognitive, so that they may go hand
in hand.
The essays by Hildy Miller, Kristie Fleckenstein, and Demetrice Worley in
Part Four of the book, entitled Images , reminded me of Janet Emig ' s 1 9 8 3
essay, "Hand, Eye, Brain: Some 'Basics ' in the Writing Process" ( The Web of
Meaning), in which she quotes Jean-Paul Sartre describing his vision loss as the
end of his career as a writer. Emig at that time searched for answers of how the
eye participates in the writing process, focusing on the cognitive effort of the
eye. The authors of Part Four of this book concentrate on the intuitive, the invis
ible of the visible like part one was on the silent voices: It i s the recognition of
images as something which fosters writing that interests Miller. For Fleckenstein
it i s the interplay between image and emotion that i s a key for creating texts
successfully. Worley bridges the gap between cognition and intuitio n : She
suggests exercises for improving the ability to visualize for effective detail
writing and problem-solving.
Coming from a rather rationally oriented German culture and education, I
found that the essays by Brand and Teich on Emotions (Part Five) in the writing
classroom were beneficial to my understanding of the theoretical and practical
connection between intuition and cognition. In these essays, sensual experience
is characterized as i mportant in the proce s s of unfolding personality and
establishing a system of human values within society. Learning through writing
"beyond the cognitive domain" i s described as a matter of individual and of
social learning. Living as I do in a society that overrates science and technology,
I found Alice Brand's conclusion about the system of human values personally
exciting: "The most important human values are emotional, not intellectual"
(p. 1 7 8 ) . Unfortunately, I cannot claim to have already learned how to live this
wisdom. To know something and to be able to put it into practice are two
different shoes. Writing about this conflict might be a chance to get used to the
new shoe.
The Open Door (Part Six) led me to the historical dimension of writing: nar
rating, searching, recalling, listening, viewing, and imagining. The process of
composing integrates past, present, and future, even though we as writers might
sometimes not be aware of it. Our autobiography is part of history; our daily life
stories embody the present; hopes, dreams, and fears are our vision of the future.
To discover their often hidden richness, it needs techniques tapping into the un
conscious: Donald Murray introduces story writing as writing personal history;
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personal writing as healing i s the focus by Sandra Burkett and Gabriele Rico;
Richard Murphy Jr. recounts the relationships between teacher and student needed
to hold open the door toward our past, present, and future.
The progression of the parts in Presence of Mind, evocative of the move
ment of one' s personal growth, almost persuades me to believe in the existence
of a "right way" to reach the root of creativity: Silence, Wisdom of the Uncon
scious, Wisdom of the B ody, Images, Emotions, and The Open Door. Neverthe
less, no single essay within the parts listed above made me feel able to count on
anything more than myself. To believe in oneself (as a writer) here means to trust
oneself as a whole person: one ' s body, experience, and language. From there one
can go on as far as one wishes. "What a miracle," Peter Elbow exclaims, "we can
write anything . . . we can say anything. Language doesn't fail" (p. 9). For the dif
ferent paths of this j ourney the articles do not provide recipes, but rather sugges
tions , example s , experience, tips for remembering-all i n all, a space for
personal growth. cQ

Humphrey, Nicholas, 1 992. A History of the Mind: Evolution and the
Birth of Consciousness. New York: Simon & Schuster.
La rry A n d e rson

N preface that this book i s "an evolutionary history of how sensory conscious

icholas Humphrey sets no small task for himself; he states boldly in his

ness has come into the world and what it i s doing there . . . . It sets out not just to
define the problem of consciousness but to solve it" (p. 1 7) . Humphrey succeeds
by the end of book in solving a theoretical problem. But what we are unaware of
at the start is that he will continually narrow the scope of his key terms, so that
by the end we are not sure that what he has solved is the problem of conscious
ness. I think of someone who i s about to explain the internal combustion engine,
but ends up actually j ust explaining the carburetor because in the process he de
fines the carburetor as the place where it all begins. We certainly learn some
thing about the internal combustion engine, but not exactly what we at first thought
we would.
The most fascinating part of the book is its overview of evolutionary history
from the origin of the cosmos to the present. Humphrey i s careful to begin at the
beginning, imagining the time when there were no sentient creatures and how
they-our ancestors-came to be. He takes the long view to avoid making any
assumptions about either the emergence of mind and consciousness or about ob
jective physical reality. He spends a little time criticizing other theorists for mak
ing just such assumptions but quickly moves into evolution. As organisms devel
oped, their membranes became increasingly important in that they eventually cre
ated the distinction between "me" and "not-me." These boundaries, though, were
also frontiers at which the outside world made an impact on the organism.
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Over time there would have developed (so Humphrey's argument goes) or
ganisms that could select among various influences those that were "good" and
those that were "bad"; these were early sensations. As the sensitivity of this fron
tier increased, the organism could make progressively selective and specific re
sponses. This brings us to Humphrey's definition of mind: the faculty of organ
isms that stored "action-based representations of the effects of environmental
stimulation on their own bodies" (p. 42). That is, the stimulation that evoked an
action has become meaningful; the mind developed in response to the "phenom
enology of sensory experiences" (p. 42). Due to these representations we have a
clear distinction between "that which is happening to me" and "that which is
happening out there. "
I n this distinction w e have the difference between sensation and perception;
for Humphrey, the distinction rests on the act of interpretation. For instance, or
ganisms during the first stage of evolution constantly processed input through
their sense organs, which allowed them to create a subjective presence. But in
order to create "intentional objects of cognition and objective knowledge of the
external world" (p. 44) , a new style of processing had to evolve, a style that
depended on the organism interpreting the sensation as representing something
"out there. " As an illustration, Humphrey describes a scene in which he is sitting
at his desk writing. He is being bombarded by stimuli: approaching thunder, sights
and smells from the garden outside the window, an ant crawling up his leg. At
one level, he processes these stimuli as sensations that affect his private world;
he likes some and dislikes others. But at another level, he interprets these stimuli
as signs that signify the state of the external world. "At the second level,"
Humphrey states, "I am the spectator of a public world (not my world now) of
independent physical phenomena" (p. 45).
With this phenomenological background, Humphrey illustrates the nature of
sensory experience using the sense of smell, drawing on Thomas Reid' s Essays
on the Intellectual Powers of Man ( 1 7 8 5 ) . With Reid' s help, he points out that
when we smell a rose, sensation answers the question "What is happening to
me?" Perception answers the question, "What is happening out there?" The
crucial determination to be made is whether sensation and perception exist in a
serial or parallel relationship. He goes on to argue, convincingly, that the rela
tionship is a parallel one. But he first bemoans the nineteenth century ' s obses
sion with perception to the exclusion of sensation, the effects of which we feel to
this day. In the process he applauds the Romantic poets (Coleridge, Wordsworth,
Byron) and the Impressionistic painters (Van Gogh, Monet) for turning away from
perception and focusing on sensation.
He returns to his argument, then, by pointing out that if he can show that it's
possible to "decouple" sensation and perception, then that would tell us if they
were serial or parallel. He accomplishes this by drawing on experimental and
clinical evidence as well as thought experiments based on questions like, "What
would happen if you could wear glasses that reversed all colors?" and "What
would happen if you could wear glasses that inverted everything?" Having
arrived at this juncture, we seem poised on the brink of reaching Humphrey ' s
definition of the term "consciousness." B u t he isn't ready t o deliver yet.
He anticipates potential criticism of his argument at this point on the basis
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of imagery. He recognizes that we can create images of sensations (visual ones
being the easiest), which pose a problem for his theory: How do we know if a
sensation is actual or imagined? He provides an answer to this question. But it
rests squarely on evolutionary history.
Having addressed this potential criticism, he defines what it means to be
conscious : "to have affect-laden mental representations of something happening
here and now to me" (p. 1 20). He immediately recognizes the narrowness of this
definition, for it says nothing about other states of mind that we obviously have
but that also obviously do not arise from the stimulation of our sense organ s .
T h i s narrows his territory considerably; in effect, he removes the concept o f
consciousness from discussions of cognition. He apparently feels that the latter
has been explored all too thoroughly by those psychologists who have focused
on perception. Humphrey separates perception from sensation, having shown their
relationship to be parallel rather than serial. So what we end up with is a theory
of sensations , with an argument for the centrality of affect in our lives-our
subj ectivities-since sensations are affect-laden. In other words, Humphrey re
vises Descartes dictum: "I feel, therefore I am" (p. 1 1 5 ) .
A t this point, h i s argument takes a bold turn. If w e agree that sensations
require some state of control over the responses evoked by outside stimulation,
then perhaps it is we who control our sensations. Humphrey proposes that we are
the authors of the sensations we typically believe "happen to" us. In order to
argue this, he claims that the "I" experiences two different durations of time,
which he calls physical and subj ective. For example, imagine persons climbing a
spiral staircase. As they climb, they naturally feel that they are continually ad
vancing; yet on a spiral staircase half the time they are actually retreating. For
Humphrey, a unit of physical time (the time needed to reach the top of the stair
case) contains an entire sequence of units of subjective time (the time needed to
raise one foot and place it on the next tread). Consequently, "what constitutes the
conscious present is largely the immediate sensory afterglow of stimuli that have
j ust passed by-the dying-away activity in reverberating sensory loops" (p. 1 89).
It i s from the reverberating loop that Humphrey claims we actually send outward
the instructions for the sensations we want. He summarizes it: "What it is for
someone to feel a particular sensation i s j ust for him to i ssue whatever ' instruc
tions ' are required to bring about the appropriate activity" (p. 1 92). The weak
ness in this argument i s Humphrey's assumption of such a thing as physical times,
as opposed to subj ective time. It could be argued that all time i s subjective time
because time i s always processed mentally.
And so we arrive at the solution he promised to the "problem of conscious
ness" (p. 1 7 ) . In his preface he warned us to not expect too much: "Could the
solution to the problem of consciousness be boring ?" He returns to this question
at the end, defending the critique I made earlier about narrowing the scope of
what we take to be the original topic. After all, Humphrey seems to imply, 'the
problem i s not as complicated as we all thought! Of course, the way he has framed
the problem, the answer is a bit boring, not for what he says but for what he does
not say. He knows he i s leaving some readers dissatisfied. Mmmm. But he finds
he can 't stop there; he concludes with a two-page final chapter which may be
summarized in one sentence: "It i s consciousness [as he, of course, has defined
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it] , with its power to make the vanishing instant of physical time live on as the
fel t m o v e m e n t o f s e n s a t i o n , that m a k e s i t L I KE S OM E T H I N G TO B E
OURSELVES-and s o sweetens and enriches the being o f the external world
FOR US" (p. 228). I , for one, find myself not persuaded.
Humphrey presents his ideas in a readable, almost folksy style. He does a
convincing job of redirecting our attention to the importance of sensations and
makes a strong case for the parallel existence of sensation and perception. But
with the focus on sensation, I was puzzled by the complete inattention paid to
research on sensory-deprivation. Likewise, he makes no reference to Julian Jayne s '
The Origin of Consciousness i n the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind ( 1 976) o r
Gerald Edelman' s Bright, Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind ( 1 992),
which would seem to have some natural points of overlap. c9

Hughes, Elaine Farris. 1 994. Writing from the Inner Self.
New York: HarperCollins.

D e b o ra F. Van H oo rn

Wwriting exercises and nearly 300 writing ideas designed to foster self-aware

riting from the Inner Self provides both teachers and students with 48

ness through self-examination. Elaine Farris Hughes claims these writing and
meditation activities will free students' creativity, inspire their imagination, and
help them overcome writer ' s block. The book is designed so that students can use
it on their own and the instructors can choose their own level of involvement.
Each of the exercises employs some type of inner focus, meditation (meditation
i s used here as a catch-all phrase for a variety of inner-focusing techniques, in
cluding conscious breathing, visualization, sensory awareness, guided imagery,
and memory recall), encouraging readers to look inside themselves first and
discover personal connections with the subject before they even begin to write.
Hughes, retired from Nassau Community College in New York City, developed
these exercises as a way to generate in-class j ournal entries. Many of these ideas
were first published in 1 9 9 1 in a trade book for the general public. Hughes re
vised and expanded that book of 63 exercises into this text for college students.
An instructor ' s guide i s also available.
The exercises are arranged into three sections with each of the twelve
chapters containing four exercises. The exercises are grouped in such a way as to
lead writers progressively deeper into themselves and into their writing. While
the starting point i s the physical body, the exercises quickly lead into the broader,
more abstract realms of feelings, memories , self-awareness, observations, events,
and imagination. Each exercise contains some form of meditation, introspection,
body awareness, observation, or a reliving of past events.
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Part O n e , The Inner World, contains twenty exerc i s e s on The B ody
( e . g . , Rec apture a feeling of yourself as an infant) , Childhood Memories
(Remember your first love), Intense Emotions (Contemplate an incident of early
rej ection), Memorable Moments ( Remember a moment of rebel l i o n ) , and
Observing Your Life (Think about your life in relation to popular songs).
Part T w o , The O u ter Wo r l d , c on t a i n s s i x t e e n exerc i s e s o n S e e i n g
(Objectively examine a kitchen utensil), People (Observe people i n a public place),
Places (Explore your ideas of home), and Events (Think about a modern hero).
Part Three, The World of Invention, contains twelve exercises on Reading
(Bring a character from literature to life in your mind), Mind Play (Imagine you
wake up to find you ' ve changed sex overnight), and Imagination (Relive a
nightmare you ' ve had).
Part Four of the text i s a handbook of sorts, covering among others such
concepts as voice, audience, and revi sion. Here Hughes guides students in
molding their freewriting into an essay, using the multiple drafts of prologue as
an example. The book closes with an appendix of sources and some sample
student writings that correlate to exercises given in the text.
Hughes, acknowledging the often difficult task of writing, encourages and
explains a traditional method of process writing that "requires all your resources
mental alertness, imagination, emotional response, a relationship with chaos,
physical stamina, and the courage to face the critics who will read what you have
written" (p. 3 ) . The exercises presented in this text are easy to follow intellectu
ally ; however, the number and types of questions may prove a bit overwhelming
emotionally to some students. While this text could prove interesting in the
classroom, the instructor must be prepared to deal with students' innermost
thoughts, sometimes frightening and mes sy, which result from this type of
a s s ignment. The Inner World section causes s ome concern. Several of the
writing exercises might prompt some deep levels of sharing best handled by a
trained counselor. Consider the following suggested writing assignments and the
manner in which some students might respond:
Write a personal essay about all the major scars you have acquired
(physical, psychological, or emotional) (pp. 34-36).
Write a short essay that details an early rejection and explain how this
experience has affected your concept of yourself and your life (pp. 63-65).
Write out your full confession of an incident that continues to cause you
shame, guilt, or embarrassment (pp. 66-68).
Recall an incident in which you felt intense anger. Stay in touch with the
anger until it begins to dissolve. Don't turn away from it or talk yourself out
of it. Give up your anger only when you're ready (pp. 68-70).
Hughes gives little advice, and there has been little written on what the
instructor should do with such self-discl o sure. Marti S inger ' s 1 990 article
"Responding to Intimacies and Crises in Students' Journals" (English Journal,
79) addresses the i ssue of self-disclosure in the composition classroom. When
Singer received some personal revelation via a student's writing, she was "flat
tered and awed by the trust and confidence displayed through long detailed
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accounts of students' lives and experiences" (p. 72). However, she then won
dered how to respond to such sharing and sought out answers in composition
theory. She found that "there i s very little written about ways of responding
to . . .personal writing" (p. 7 3) . While other articles and books deal tangentially
with the i ssue of self-disclosure, there is a gap-no, more of a gaping hole-in
the research in this area. Until such research is undertaken, the following books
may help clarity the instructor ' s and the student' s role in a classroom where per
sonal writing occurs: Inside Out: A Guide to Writing by Maurice Scharton and
Janice Neuleib ( 1 993), The Hero Within by Carol S . Pearson ( 1 989), Presence of
Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive, edited by Alice G. Brand
and Richard L. Graves ( 1 994), and Coming on Center by James Moffett ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
Overall, Hughes' textbook could b e a catalyst for some wonderful expressive
writing. However, be prepared to deal with the ensuing writing which may be
uncomfortably personal. Qj

Kalamaras, George. 1 994. Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension:
Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence.
Albany : State University of New York Press.

S u s a n Becker

T ties: philosophy, religion, music, and literature. Hinduism, Buddhism, Tao

his slim volume i s a short course in both quantum physics and the humani

ism, Christianity, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Levi-Strauss, Keats, Coleridge, Eliot,
and Pirsig all play a role in developing the author ' s argument that silence is a
mode of knowing.
Kalamaras opens with a reference to the Eastern mystic Rumi who stated
that we know each other in unspoken way s . Nevertheless, notes the author, "As a
practitioner of silence, I have sometimes felt at odds with the intellectual and
academic community" because in the West silence is often cast as the "bad guy"
(p. xi). The argument for promoting silence that follows is logical, informing,
and engaging. Kalamaras shows reader awareness by using the first person "I" to
personalize sometimes convoluted thinking, allowing the reader to share not only
in the author ' s mental process but also in his conclu sion: Practitioners of
silence no longer need to keep silent because silence is a demonstrable mode of
knowing.
To support this the s i s , the author provides seven chapters replete with
endnotes and a glossary of thirty terms from Eastern philosophy and religion.
The one hundred and thirty works consulted identify AEPL scholars and charter
members James Moffett and Charles Suhor alongside Jung, Suzuki, Eckhart,
Shakespeare, B akhtin, Britton, Elbow, Vygotsky, and others.
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With the definition that silence is an emptiness that is full, Chapter One,
"Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension," sets up the argument that silence i s a mode of
knowing. The culprit for silence as emptiness, claims Kalamaras, i s Western ra
tional thought. B y associating power with language (i.e., discourse as enfran
chisement), it follows that silence or lack of discourse is annihilation. Mistrust
of silence in the West i s the result of Plato's classical view reinforced by Aristotle,
objectivism, feminism, and poststructuralism (p. 9).
B ut Eastern p h i l o s ophy culti vates paradox by l oc ating reciprocity i n
opposites. Contrary t o the dualistic Western view o f language and s ilence a s
opposites, these dualisms construct knowledge in reciprocal fashion. Meaning
need not be dependent on language in oral or written form. If rhetoric i s defined
as a symbolic act that makes meaning, then silence is a rhetoric.
Kalamaras personalizes his thesis in the second chapter before investigating
theory, poetics, and the symbolic complexity in later chapters. Chapter Two,
"Into the Chaos: Writing Across the Curriculum and the Tao of Change" answers
the question: What role does the teacher of process writing play in writing across
the curriculum? Kalamaras uses James Moffett' s and Charles Suhor ' s emphasis
on the reciprocity of silence and meaning to investigate theories of composing
and curriculum development as shaped by intuition, ambiguity, tenuousness, and
chaos. Ever present i s the paradox of chaos and order. Comparing his position as
writing consultant in the biology department to a zebra fish in an aquarium of
leeches, Kalamaras explains that he survived the challenging consultancy not by
trying to overcome contradictions but by immersing himself in them. Talking
and listening (i.e., collaborating and reciprocating) led to a synthesis of discourse
with silence, separate with connected knowing. When the language of the con
sultant and the language of the biology faculty actually inhabited each other, the
two sides arrived at a condition of mutual understanding and eventual success i n
what h a d appeared t o b e a doomed consulting assignment across the curriculum.
Chapters Three and Four provide the meaty center of the book. "Classical
Rhetoric, Objectivism, Mysticism, and the Great Divide" examines the ways clas
sical rhetorical theory, objectivism, and Western mysticism have fostered a mis
trust of silence. Starting with the Gospel According to John and moving back
ward and forward thorough times and places, Kalamaras traces the relationship
between words and origins via Plato' s Phaedrus, Aristotle ' s development of Plato' s
binary vision, and Cartesian perceptions. The author then examines Eastern modes
of thought that allow a less dichotomous and more fluid approach. Jung and
Eckhart, Western thinkers who have examined Eastern modes, authenticate the
"vacuum-plenum" paradox as a legitimate merging of words into silence as in
"OM" (p. 90). B ritton and Polanyi have, i n turn, enlarged this interpretive
framework, showing that individual utterances do contribute to meaning. Never
theless, the presence of a fixed categorical reality in Western thought makes it
difficult for Westerners to accept as valid the complex ambiguity of mystical
experience and practice necessary to the language/silence paradox.
As Chapter Four posits, although our culture fosters the binary thinking so
antithetical to silence, Western art relies on the nonconceptual as a way of
making meaning. "Paradox and the Sacred: The Still Point of the Turning World"
uses poetics to validate movement and stillness, word and silence. Sound devices
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and metaphor have been used by such poets as Shakespeare, Shelley, Keats, Blake,
and Eliot to expand the perception of reality by altering time and emotion. Their
successors in projectivist (open form) verse and talk poetry have added tricks of
typography for short-circuiting the categorical to focus on symbolic form.
Language and its gaps reciprocally create meaning. Kalamaras recalls an early
awarenes s to "both the harmony and the melody, the stillness and the dance"
(p . 1 44). Their method is not unlike the Zen koan or nonsensical statement
designed to prepare the mind for a nonverbal experience of reality.
The three final chapters are "An Intimate Immensity : S ilence and the
Paradox of Attention"; "The Physics of Meditation: Silence and the Garland of
Letter s " ; and "The Death of the Self: Poststructurali s m and a Rhetoric of
S ilenc e . " Together they round out Kalamaras ' argument that s ilence i s not
transcendental. The quantum model reveals silence as generative, a symbolic act
that makes meaning and is therefore a rhetoric compatible with dialogic theories
of composing. The following are highlights of the author's argument:
Yoga or "union" is a practice that leads to oneness of mind and body,
stillness in movement, the "zero" experience. This paradox is genera
tive.
According to Gaston B achelard, the paradox of knowing i s not
knowing: "Behind dark curtains, snow seems to be whiter" (p. 1 5 3 ) .
The apparent contradiction i s reciprocal.
Ralph Waldo Emerson dissolves dualities with awareness of "the wise
silence" when within man lies "the soul of the whole" (p. 1 56).
T. S . Eliot writes a corollary for silence and language when he says, "at
the still point, there the dance is" (p. 1 60).
The mantra, "OM," reveals that silence i s constituted of sound, and the
word constitutes and dissolves itself endlessly.
Awareness of silence i s a symbolic form of interpretation that makes
meaning as does any rhetoric .
Quantum physics via vacuum diagrams verifies that empty space i s not
empty (the vacuum-plenum).
Since reality i s not a stable, definable condition but i s shaped through
acts of perception, nonconceptual understanding itself is a symbolic
form that makes meaning.
S ilence retains the potential of language by expanding the complexity
of language into "its ' original way' or 'radical vital potential' from
which all form manifests" (p. 1 96).
Maurice B lanchot's concept of the paradox of life and death simulta
neously decenters and reconstitutes the self in symbolic form.
Thus, concludes Kalamaras, if both quantum physics and deconstructionist
theory suggest that symbolic forms construct knowledge and silence has been
shown to be such a form, then silence is a way of knowing that makes meaning.
With bold erudition and much documentation, the author comes full circle to vali-
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date the paradox of discourse and its void, silence, as a valid methodology in the
teaching and learning of writing.
This landmark little book i s a volume of the SUNY series, Literacy, Culture,
and Learning: Theory and Practice, w ith Alan C. Purves as editor. George
Kalamaras, a writing professor at Indiana University-Purdue University and a
recent recipient of a poetry fellowship from the National Endowment of the Arts,
was present at the AEPL session on silence during the Conference on College
Composition and Communication 1 994 in Nashville. From the cover of his book,
which features an attractive pen and ink rendering named "Yogi," to the detailed
index at its conclusion, Kalamaras takes readers on an intellectual journey through
Eastern and Western culture. His challenging argument is a viable contribution
to knowledge on the affective domain to which AEPL is dedicated. Q_j
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The Assembly on Expanded Perspectives Learning

announces its Second Annual Conference-Symposium for Educators
Estes Park Center

Estes Park, Colorado
Thursday, June 6 - Sunday, June 9, 1 996
TEACHING THE UNCONSCIOUS:
Transforming Classrooms, Theories, and Selves
featuring
JOAN BORYSENKO
Co-founder and director of the Mind/B ody Clinic at New England
Deaconess Hospital/Harvard Medical School during

1987-88, Borysenko

is currently President of Mind/Body Health Sciences, Inc. She has
authored Minding the Body, Mending the Mind; Guilt is the Teacher;
Love is the Lesson; The Power of Mind to Heal.

CAROL PEARSON
Distinguished Human and Organizational Development Research Scholar
and Dean of the Center for Women and Work and the Center for Analyti
cal Psychology at the Mount Vernon Institute/Mount Vernon College,
Pearson is a Jungian scholar and former English professor. She has
authored or co-authored The Hero Within: Six Archetypes We Live By,
Educating the Majority: Challenging Tradition in Higher Education, The
Female Hero in American and British Literature, and Magic at Work: A
Guide to Releasing Your Highest Creative Potential.

CHARLES SUHOR
English teacher and English supervisor in the New Orleans Public Schools
before joining the staff of the National Council of Teachers of English as
Deputy Executive Director in

1 977, Suhor is a fellow of the National

Conference on Research in English and member of the Steering Com
mittee of the Alliance for Curriculum Reform.

For more information on the conference or on AEPL membership,
contact Regina Foehr, AEPL Chair, English Department-4240, Illinois State University,
Normal, IL 6 1790-4240, Phone: (309) 829- 1493. Fax: (309) 662-6984.

